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For much of modern history, U.S. political parties adopted a consensus non-partisan 
knowledge regime, consisting of experts at universities, non-partisan think tanks and 
government agencies, to inform policymaking decisions. However, after the consensus 
supported by the knowledge regime enabled the expansion of the scope of federal 
government domestic policy during the 1950s-1970s period, ideological conservatives 
rejected the non-partisan regime and created their own alternative knowledge regime 
centered around a small number of party-aligned think tanks. Democrats followed a few 
decades later to create their own alternative knowledge regime. These think tanks fill a 
privileged role advising political parties that is reserved for formal party organizations in 
most democracies. I argue that they use a variety of strategies, including issue redefinition, 
activating latent preferences and elite persuasion, to move their party’s positions away from 
the center and toward the left or right. They published biased policy analysis that often 
makes claims which conflict with claims made by non-partisan policy analysis. As they 
become larger and more influential across time or between issues, party-aligned think tanks 
increase polarization in Congress. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The 2008 Republican Party Platform contained a plank titled, “Addressing 
Climate Change Responsibly.” The section laid out the party’s position on climate issues: 
“The same human economic activity that has brought freedom and opportunity to 
billions has also increased the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. While the 
scope and longterm consequences of this are the subject of ongoing scientific 
research, common sense dictates that the United States should take measured and 
reasonable steps today to reduce any impact on the environment. Those steps, if 
consistent with our global competitiveness will also be good for our national 
security, our energy independence, and our economy. Any policies should be 
global in nature, based on sound science and technology, and should not harm the 
economy.”1 
 
The platform proposed to solve the climate change problem by supporting a prize system 
for technological innovations to reduce carbon emissions, a “market-based” system to 
decrease emissions and increase energy efficiency and a diplomatic effort to encourage 
India and China to join in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. While the Republican 
Party Platform opposed command-and-control environmental regulation, their positions 
were similar to those expressed in the Democratic Party’s platform. Consistent with their 
historical prioritization of environmental policy (Egan 2013; Fagan 2019), Democrats 
signaled that climate change was a more urgent priority than Republicans, 
“We will lead to defeat the epochal, man-made threat to the planet: climate 
change. Without dramatic changes, rising sea levels will flood coastal regions 
around the world. Warmer temperatures and declining rainfall will reduce crop 
yields, increasing conflict, famine, disease, and poverty. By 2050, famine could 
 
1 2008 Republican Party Platform. Available online at the American Presidency Project, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2008-republican-party-platform. Accessed 4/22/2020. 
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displace more than 250 million people worldwide. That means increased 
instability in some of the most volatile parts of the world.”2 
 
However, they took very similar positions as the Republican Party to solve the problem. 
Their platform proposed that the federal government invest in clean energy technology, 
create a market-based cap and trade system to price carbon and generate revenue and 
work to enforce international restrictions on climate pollution with India, China, Russia 
and the European Union.  
 While the two parties disagreed over some of the details about how to solve the 
climate change problem, their positions were close enough to find common ground. 
Indeed, a few weeks before the party conventions, the Bush Administration released a 
plan titled, “Energy Security for the 21st Century,” 
“President Bush has taken a reasoned, balanced approach to the serious challenges 
of energy security and climate change.  The President supports a climate change 
policy that takes advantage of new clean energy technologies; increases our use of 
alternative fuels; works towards an international agreement that will slow, stop, 
and eventually reverse the growth of greenhouse gases; and includes binding 
commitments from all major economies.”3 
 
 In Congress, Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman introduced the Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007 with four Republican and seven Democratic co-
sponsors, including Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. The bill would have established a 
cap and trade system to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions using a market mechanism 
while investing in clean energy technology. While the parties had polarized on 
 
2 2008 Democratic Party Platform. Available online at the American Presidency Project, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/2008-democratic-party-platform. Accessed 4/22/2020. 
3 “Energy for America’s Future.” https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/energy/ 
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environmental policy issues during the previous two decades as extractive industries 
became more central to the Republican Party and environmental groups became more 
central to the Democratic Party (Karol 2009), party leaders in Congress, both party’s 
nominees in the 2008 Presidential contest and the sitting President were all well on their 
way toward passing a significant policy change in response to a widely-recognized 
problem. Republican elites who expressed support for action on climate change included 
future climate deniers such as governors Sarah Palin and Mitt Romney (Peach 2011) and 
Donald Trump (Cama 2016).   
 Four years later, the party positions on climate change shifted dramatically. The 
Democratic Party still supported legislation to address climate change, but Republican 
support evaporated. The 2012 Republican Party platform opposed cap and trade systems, 
federal subsidies for technological innovation and scientific inquiry and regulatory 
actions to reduce climate change. No Republican Senator supported the Climate 
Stewardship Act’s successor, the American Clean Energy Security Act of 2009. No major 
Republican candidate for the presidency was willing to publicly acknowledge that the 
earth was warming (Peach 2011). The parties are farther apart on climate change than at 
any point since the issue emerged in the late 20th century with little short-term hope for 
consensus. 
 What could have caused such a rapid and decisive shift in the policy positions of a 
major American political party? The Republican Party coalition has a long-term 
association with the extractive industries, which opposed efforts to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions. Beginning in the late 1980s, the close connections between the Bush family, 
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and Texas Republicans more broadly, and the extractive industries caused large 
environmental groups to sort into the Democratic Party (Karol 2019). However, these 
coalitions were firmly in place by the late-2000s, so they could not have caused the 
change. Given that the problem, climate change, and proposed solutions, a market 
mechanism to price carbon coupled with public investment in clean energy technology, 
did not change, it could not have been caused by ideology objections to the policy 
change. In fact, cap and trade policy designs were originally brought to the United States 
by the George H.W. Bush Administration to combat acid rain as a conservative 
alternative to progressive command and control designs (Voß 2007). Finally, there is 
little evidence that the Republican Party changed their position in response to public 
opinion, as the public began to oppose action on climate change only after elites 
(Merkley and Stecula 2018; Tesler 2018).  
 The change which caused Republicans to rapidly shift their positions on climate 
change was introduction of widespread climate denial among elites of the party. 
Republican elites questioned the science underlying climate change before the late-2000s 
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; McCright and Dunlap 2003). However, something changed 
during the second term of the Bush presidency. Well-organized climate skeptics 
published a flood of research denying the scientific consensus on climate change 
(Oreskes and Conway 2011). Numerous studies show that Republican-aligned think tanks 
were central to this campaign (Albert 2019; Brulle 2014; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; 
Fisher, Waggle, and Leifeld 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008; Neubauer 2011; 
Stokes 2020). They published books, aggressively appeared in the media, testified before 
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Congress, and privately advised members of the broader conservative movement on the 
issue. Figure 1.1 shows this mobilization. The Heritage Foundation, the most important 
information producer on climate change in the Republican extended party network 
(Albert 2019), surged their production of white papers on climate change from 2007 to 
2009.4 Their counterparts in the center-right American Enterprise Institute, center-left 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and progressive Center for American Progress did 
not countermobilize to match the surge from climate denying organizations. The climate 
denial campaign was enormously successful. Republican elites began to deny climate 
change, and quickly transferred those behaviors to rank-and-file party members (Guber 
2013; Hamilton 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011).  
 
Figure 1.1. Party-Aligned Think Tank White Papers on Climate Change, 2004-2016 
 
 
4 These data are drawn from all white papers on think tank websites. They are coded for policy content 
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Before the organized campaign to encourage climate denial, the politics of climate 
change consisted of party disagreements over issue prioritization, ideology and how the 
party coalitions will bear the costs and benefits of policy change. When it became clear in 
the mid-2000s that the United States would have to deal with an existential threat in the 
form of climate change, the problem forced both parties to attend to a long-ignored issue. 
The normal problem-solving processes that direct most agenda setting in democracies 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005) caused even reluctant Republican elected officials to 
decide that the federal government needed to change public policy and address climate 
change. Because both parties agreed that climate change was a serious problem, it was 
caused by greenhouse gas emissions, and a set of policy solutions could address the 
problem, a bipartisan consensus emerged around a cap and trade system coupled with 
international cooperation and clean energy subsidies. The parties disagreed on some 
aspects of the policy, but those disagreements were reconcilable. After the organized 
campaign, a different kind of disagreement emerged. Republicans and Democrats now 
disagreed on the basic facts of the issue. Republicans did not believe that climate change 
was a serious threat to the United States and that public policy to address it would be 
prohibitively costly. Under these conditions, no compromise between the parties was 
possible. No climate legislation has made serious progress in the U.S. Congress since. 
Political parties are supposed to disagree on policy. Modern U.S. political parties 
hold distinct and strong ideological beliefs about the role of government, culture, race 
and class in society (Noel 2014). They represent constituencies with different interests, 
resulting in disagreement over who should bear the costs and receive the benefits of 
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policy (Karol 2009; Wolbrecht 2000). At any given time, parties may also disagree 
strategically in furtherance of electoral competition (Lee 2009). These disagreements 
produce powerful differences over policy on a range of issues, from opinions of abortion 
rights to preferences for free trade deals. They are a component of a functioning 
democracy, assuring that parties hold each other accountable and take positions that 
allow voters to choose between viable policy alternatives to solve society’s problems.  
However, parties increasingly polarize on another dimension: a basic 
understanding of the facts underlying policy debates, or the relationship between the 
outputs of government and policy outcomes. As Congress has polarized, party 
disagreement on facts has extended across numerous issues. Republicans and Democrats 
disagree on the underlying facts of highly salient issues, such as the impact of greenhouse 
gas emissions on the climate (Dunlap and Jacques 2013), the relationship between tax 
cuts and deficits (Jones and Williams 2008) and the relationship between intelligence and 
race (Devlin 1997). They also disagree on the underlying facts of less salient issues, such 
as the impact of urban planning strategies on traffic (for example, see DeGood 2019; 
Moore 2020) or the impact on net neutrality on competition among technology 
companies (for example, see Gattuso 2017). These disagreements strongly influence the 
positions that they take; if a policymaker believes that a policy has a great benefit or 
harm, they will support or oppose it. 
Party disagreements on objective reality are destructive to policymaking in a 
representative democracy. Elites, parties and voters seek to influence policy outcomes 
through public policy outputs. These goals are often shared, such as solving the most 
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pressing problems facing the country at any given time (Adler and Wilkerson 2013; Jones 
and Baumgartner 2005). When political parties agree on facts, these shared goals help to 
build a productive consensus. The parties may bargain over who bears the tradeoffs of 
some solution to a problem or have ideological disagreements on how to structure the 
mechanisms, but overall, they can reach agreement on some solutions to the problem. 
However, if they disagree over the facts, they will struggle to reach consensus. Parties 
which disagree on facts will disagree about whether or not a policy output solves the 
problem, its costs, or how those costs and benefits are distributed. When these new 
disagreements are layered on top of existing disagreements over the proper role of 
government, morality, and constituency interests, they pour gasoline on the fires of 
polarization. Both parties believe that their preferred policy alternatives are best the solve 
the country’s most pressing problems, and the other party’s alternatives will not. The 
result of these good-faith disagreements is paralysis and gridlock. 
We have a strong intuitive and scientific understanding that interested parties will 
believe facts that support their prejudices. When people are confronted with information, 
confirmation biases powerfully affect their understanding of that information (Mynatt, 
Doherty, and Tweney 1977; Nickerson 1998). Motivated reasoning causes people to both 
seek out and frame information in a manner that supports their interests (Kunda 1990; 
Slothuus and de Vreese 2010) (Kunda 1990; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). Elite 
policymakers and policymaking organizations are just as subject to cognitive biases as 
normal people (Jones 2001; Shannon, McGee, and Jones 2019). Indeed, much of the 
public’s attitudes toward salient issues are created by public cue-taking from elite opinion 
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(Druckman and McGrath 2019; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Tesler 2018).  
Heuristics are common in all types of human psychology and decision-making, and we 
should expect those heuristics to impact the factual understanding of political parties. 
However, partisan beliefs that lead to cognitive biases are not self-generating. 
Rather, they are the product of long-term interactions with knowledge regimes, or the 
organizations and practices that generate information about public policy outputs and 
outcomes (Campbell and Pedersen 2014). Historically, the parties achieved a degree of 
consensus over which organizations and institutions could be trusted to provide important 
objective information on public policy. However, that consensus broke down beginning 
in the 1970s when conservative Republicans created their own alternative knowledge 
regime to offer different conclusions from the scientific consensus. This knowledge 
regime was centered around a small number of highly influential party-aligned think 
tanks. These organizations promoted heterodox policy analysis supporting conservative 
public policy. While progressive Democrats did not immediately respond by forming 
their own think tanks, they eventually created their own alternative knowledge regime in 
the 2000s. Thus, the partisan disagreements over the underlying objective reality of 
public policy debates were created by organized politics, not just their natural 
psychological pathologies 
PLAN FOR THE BOOK 
This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of party disagreement on 
the basic facts of policy change using a mix of qualitative historical analysis, case studies 
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of partisan policy analysis and quantitative analysis. It is divided into two broad sections. 
In the first section, I examine the historical and theoretical causes of partisan knowledge 
regimes. In the second section, I use polarization in Congress to test their influence over 
time and across issues.  
The dissertation begins in Chapter 2, “Knowledge Regimes, Political Parties and 
Think Tanks,” which examines the adoption of separate knowledge regimes by the 
Republican and Democratic parties. The chapter argues that conservative Republican 
elites reacted to cooperation between the two political parties and non-partisan experts 
during the Great Broadening period of the 1950s-1970s (Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 
2019). They observed that this cooperation tended to lead to policy alternatives involving 
an increased federal role in domestic policy on a wide range of issues. As a result, they 
grew deeply distrustful of the non-partisan knowledge regime and sought to replace it 
with a more conservative alternative knowledge regime. They successfully redefined 
non-partisan and technocratic experts in universities, government agencies, the media, 
and think tanks as liberal, and therefore equally legitimate in policy debates as 
conservatives. Conservative Republicans built their alternative policy regime largely 
around a network of think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation and American 
Enterprise Institute. These conservative think tanks adopted aggressive marketing tactics 
to persuade their fellow Republicans to adopt more conservative policy preferences. They 
were quickly integrated into the Republican Party, developing and supporting many of 
the conservative policy proposals and staffing the executive branch during Republican 
presidencies.  
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However, the Democratic Party did not immediately respond by creating its own 
network of progressive think tanks. For nearly three decades, Democrats were content to 
rely on the non-partisan technocratic institutions that they had relied on during the 1950s-
1970s. However, after losing many key policy battles to the right, progressive Democrats 
established and resourced their own powerful think tanks, beginning with the Center for 
American Progress. While these think tanks retained some of the party’s technocratic 
ethos relative to the Republican-aligned think tanks, they successfully helped move the 
party to the left, further increasing polarization.  
I conclude Chapter 2 by arguing that we should study the role of party-aligned 
think tanks in modern party and Congressional politics. I define the terms “party-aligned” 
and “think tank,” and use these definitions to select cases to study. I then select the four 
largest party-aligned think tanks by average revenue from 2001-2016. These are the 
Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute on the Republican side and the 
Center for American Progress and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on the 
Democratic side.  
Chapter 3, “A theory of political party preferences and information,” proposes a 
theory of party position change through policy analysis. I begin by reviewing the 
literature on party position-taking in the United States. I then propose my own theory of 
policy preferences, where preferences for policy outputs are a function of three factors: 
ideology, incentives and policy analysis. Ideology refers to a member’s preferences for 
policy outcomes ceteris paribus. Political, career or personal incentives can change or 
reinforce these preferences. Policy analysis can change the policymaker’s beliefs about 
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the relationship between policy outputs and outcomes, thus changing their preferences for 
policy outputs while their preferences for outcomes remains constant. The chapter then 
discusses how policy analysis might be used to change preferences. It argues that 
members of the extended political party (Kathleen Bawn et al. 2012) are best positioned 
to persuade policymakers through policy analysis due to their ability to exploit cognitive 
biases. It proposes that party actors can influence their party preferences using three 
mechanisms: elite persuasion, framing and activating latent preferences. Finally, it 
proposes several hypotheses regarding the activities of party-aligned think tanks, the 
information they produce, and their impact on polarization. 
Chapter 4, “Comparative policy analysis” explores the differences in predictions 
made by impact analyses across five cases by party-aligned think tanks and non-partisan 
information sources. By examining comparable predictions of the impact of a policy 
output on some outcome, I measure bias in party-aligned think tanks reports as compared 
to non-partisan policy analysis. The five cases are: reports on the impact of the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act’s cap-and-trade system on GDP, reports on the impact of 
the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act of 2010 on the deficit, reports on the 
impact of renewable or clean energy portfolio standards on electricity prices, reports on 
the impact of legalizing 11 million undocumented immigrants on economic growth and 
deficit and the impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 on economic growth and the 
deficit. I find that some party-aligned think tanks tend to produce estimates to the left or 
right of non-partisan information sources. However, there is considerable variation 
between think tanks, with the Heritage Foundation and Center for American Progress 
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producing considerably more biased information than their most centrist counterparts in 
the American Enterprise Institute and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, who tended 
to reframe issues rather than produce biased information. I conclude that exposure to 
party-aligned think tank information should shift co-partisan policy preferences away 
from the center and toward the extremes. 
Chapter 5, “Polarization and Party-Aligned Think Tanks,” examines the 
relationship between polarization and party-aligned think tanks over time. While the 
party positioning and polarization literatures are often poorly connected, they both seek 
the explain similar phenomena. As parties take positions further apart from their rivals, 
and their members express those positions with roll call votes, polarization increases. We 
can thus use polarization data to examine the impact of party-aligned think tanks on party 
position-taking.  
Polarization in Congress began increasing in the late 1970s, long before 
polarization in the electorate. Because elites polarized first, scholars have long struggled 
to explain why elites changed the preferences. I argue that as party-aligned think tanks 
used policy analysis to persuade their co-partisans to move their preferences to the left or 
right, Congress will become more polarized. Using data on party-aligned think tank 
revenue, testimony before Congress and newspaper citations, I find a strong relationship 
between party-aligned think tank activities and polarization in Congress. As party-aligned 
think tanks become bigger, polarization increases. As Congress calls more party-aligned 
think tank witnesses to testify, polarization increases. In both cases, the increase in 
polarization is delayed slightly and independent of trends, supporting a causal 
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relationship. Newspaper citations also increase with polarization, but the relationship is 
more likely to be spurious. 
Chapter 6, “Measuring Polarization Across Issues,” introduces new data to 
measure polarization in Congress across issues. Because polarization in Congress has 
monotonically increased, time series analyses of polarization in Congress like the 
analyses performed in Chapter 5 are prone to false positives. One solution to this problem 
is to measure polarization across issues, rather than over time. In order to do so, I divided 
Congressional outputs into 20 individual policy topics using the Policy Agendas Project 
(PAP), and measured polarization in each topic by calculating party disagreement scores. 
I improve upon prior work which also calculated party disagreement scores across topic 
areas (Lee 2009) by incorporating both roll call votes and non-commemorative laws 
passed by voice vote or unanimous consent procedures. I demonstrate the importance of 
including these additional laws in the party disagreement scores. Finally, I describe these 
new data and suggest studies beyond the scope of this dissertation where they could be 
used.  
Chapter 7, “Polarization and Party-Aligned Think Tanks Across Issues,” I explore 
the relationship between party-aligned think tank activities and polarization across issues. 
I measure the policy content of party-aligned think tank activities across four policy 
outputs: think tank white papers, citations of think tank research in the Congressional 
Record, bills named on think tank lobbying disclosure reports and hearings where think 
tanks were called to testify. I measure polarization using the data introduced in Chapter 6. 
First, I examine the relationship cross-sectional across all four think tank outputs and 20 
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issues. I find a strong and robust cross-sectional relationship between the two variables. 
Issues that receive more attention from party-aligned think tanks relative to Congress 
tend to be more polarized. Next, I examine the relationship dynamically across both time 
and issues. Across numerous model specifications, I find strong evidence of a long-term 
relationship between the two variables, but little evidence of a short-term relationship. 
These results suggest that party-aligned think tanks are not merely flocking to policy 
areas when debates become partisan but are rather a structure force making issues more 
polarized.  
Finally, Chapter 8, “Democracy during the Information Wars,” concludes the dissertation 
and discusses the implications of its findings. I summarize the conclusions of the 
dissertation. Next, I discuss it place in the literature, and its contributions to the study of 
party politics, Congress and the public policy process. Finally. I discuss the dissertation’s 
implications for American democracy, and how Congress and other institutions can 





Chapter 2: Knowledge Regimes, Think Tanks and U.S. Political Parties 
 
 
 Sociologists John Campbell and Ove Pedersen (2014) define a knowledge regime 
as, “the organizational and institutional machinery that generate data, research, policy 
recommendations and other ideas that influence public debate and policymaking” (3). 
Their work examines national policy regimes, finding variation in the processes by which 
ideas enter the policy process under different national knowledge regimes. However, we 
can also apply the concept to political parties. Political parties have organizational and 
institutional machinery to provide policy analysis so that they and their members can 
make decisions about public policy. To understand why political parties believe in 
different facts about public policy, we need to understand the knowledge regimes that 
generate those beliefs. 
 This chapter explores the development of the knowledge regimes underlying U.S. 
political parties. It is divided into two sections. In the first section, I examine the history 
of knowledge regimes and think tanks in U.S. politics. I divide this history into three 
distinct eras. In the first era, from the 1930s until the late 1970s, U.S. policymaking was 
largely defined by a technocratic consensus. Academics, non-partisan think tanks and 
bureaucrats were regarded by both parties as credible experts in their policy domains. 
This knowledge regime was an essential component of the expansion of the federal 
government, both as a source of policy analysis capacity before the expansion, and as a 
source of political consensus.  
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In the second era, from the late 1970s to the early 2000s, the collaboration between 
both parties and the technocratic knowledge regime prompted a reaction from 
conservatives, who viewed it as inherently liberal, rather than non-partisan. Technocrats, 
and the bipartisan consensus around their legitimacy, allowed the federal government to 
vastly expand the scope of its policy agenda during the knowledge regime. Conservatives 
observed this connection and decided that the technocratic knowledge regime prevented 
the Republican Party from adopting laisse-fare economic policy positions. They 
responded by establishing an alternative knowledge regime that featured a small number 
of think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation. The conservative knowledge regime grew 
rapidly, allowing conservative ideologues to capture the Republican Party and displace 
the technocratic knowledge regime as the party’s primary source of policy analysis. 
Think tanks became deeply integrated into the Republican Party, successfully pushing 
their preferences to the extremes. Democrats did not immediately respond by creating 
their own alternative knowledge regime. They continued to rely on technocratic 
institutions to provide policy analysis. 
In the third and final era, beginning into the 2000s and continuing to present, 
Democrats rapidly created their own alternative knowledge regime. Progressive 
democratic party actors saw their party’s positions moved to the right on a variety of 
issues and sought a counterweight to move those positions back to the left. Led by the 
Center for American Progress, Democrats quickly poured resources into left-of-center 
think tanks. When Democrats returned to government in the late 2000s, these think tanks 
played the same critical role played by Republican-aligned think tanks in the late 1970s 
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and early 1980s. However, in contrast to their rivals, Democrats maintained a foot in the 
technocratic policy regime while still producing more progressive policy analysis. 
From this history, I argue that some U.S. think tanks have become party-like 
organizations. In most democracies, parties control formally affiliated think tanks to 
provide policy analysis. U.S. law provides parties with no such mechanism, so privately 
funded think tanks occupy a similar role. However, these privately funded organizations 
are ultimately agents of their management and donors, rather than the party, and thus 
have different goals. Parties tend to be office-seeking, while interest groups are policy-
seeking. Thus, U.S. pseudo-party think tanks can exploit their privileged position to 
change the party’s positions, rather than support office-seeking goals. Finally, I argue that 
because not all think tanks in the U.S. function as pseudo-party organizations, careful 
case selection is necessary to identify and analyze their role in U.S. politics. 
In the second section, I select cases to study for the remainder of this dissertation. I 
begin by defining the terms “think tank” and “party aligned.” I then use these definitions 
to select the four largest party-aligned think tanks in the United States. These are the 
American Enterprise Institute, Center for American Progress, Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities and Heritage Foundation. I explain why I selected these cases and test 
their face validity. 
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HISTORY OF THINK TANKS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND KNOWLEDGE REGIMES IN THE U.S. 
Technocratic era (1920s-1970s) 
 Policymaking from the beginning of the New Deal coalition in the 1930s until the 
beginning of the polarized era in the late 1970s was defined by a bipartisan consensus 
knowledge regime centered around technocracy. Backhouse (2005) describes this 
consensus as, “based on the premise that disinterested social scientific inquiry could 
contribute to better policymaking” (370). The technocratic consensus had its roots in the 
scientific management movement brought to American industry by Fredrick Taylor and 
Henry Ford (Cooke 1915; Wilsok 1973). Modern bureaucracies and civil service systems 
were often designed using scientific management principles (Wilsok 1973). Social 
science research other than economics was routinely used by legislators, bureaucrats, and 
courts to inform policymaking (Applebaum 2020; Erickson and Simon 1998). These 
practices created a system where professional experts routinely provided policy analysis, 
and that policy analysis was central to policy design and evaluation. 
 The technocratic knowledge regime was critical to the expansion of the scope of 
the federal government’s policy agenda between the late-1950s through late-1970s. This 
period, labeled “The Great Broadening” by Jones, Theriault, and Whyman (2019), saw 
the federal government rapidly enter many new policy areas that were previously 
reserved for the states or left to the free market. The federal government created dozens 
of new agencies and departments, including the Departments of Energy, Housing and 
Urban Development, Health, Education and Welfare and the Environmental Protection 
Agency. It began to protect the civil rights of racial minorities and women. Congress 
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created countless programs, such as the Interstate Highway System, Medicare, Medicaid, 
Pell Grants and the National Flood Insurance Program. Policy analysis from non-partisan, 
technocratic sources was essential to policymaking during this period (Backhouse 2005), 
aiding cooperation between the parties.  
 Both parties bought into the technocratic consensus. All of these new programs 
were deeply bipartisan, and many were led by Republican presidents or Congressional 
leadership (Grossmann 2014; Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 2019). Indeed, despite the 
intellectual foundation laid by conservative economists such as Frederick Hayek and 
Milton Friedman, Republican leaders still embraced the mainstream consensus. After 
taking the U.S. off the gold standard in 1971, Richard Nixon famously remarked, “I am 
now a Keynesian in economics,” referencing the famous quote from Milton Friedman, 
“We are all Keynesian now.”5 Indeed, his administration employed many mainstream 
Keynesian economists and valued their expertise (Williams 1998). The period was also 
historically unpolarized (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Networks of party leaders in the 
legislative and executive branches worked together repeatedly to design and evaluate new 
federal programs and agencies (Grossmann 2014).  
 Non-partisan, technocratic think tanks were an essential part of the post-New Deal 
knowledge regime. Before the Second World War, the federal government lacked much 
of the policymaking capacity necessary to implement the New Deal. Non-partisan think 
tanks such as the Brookings Institution provided much of this capacity and were quickly 
 
5  "We Are All Keynesians Now". Time. December 31, 1965.  
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integrated into the federal policymaking process (Stahl 2016). As the political parties 
were weak ideologues, these think tanks were able to build consensus based on their 
reputations for scientific rigor and policy advise unbiased by self-interest (Weaver 1989).  
 Think tanks created during this era were set up under two different models to 
encourage rigorous research. Many think tanks established during the first half of the 20th 
century, such as the Brookings Institution and National Bureau of Economic Research, 
used a “university without students” model, where researchers were hired by the 
organization but retained academic freedom (McGann 2016; Weidenbaum 2011). These 
think tanks generally employed scholars with either academic or public service 
backgrounds who sought to produce useful information to policymakers. After the 
Second World War, several large think tanks, such as the RAND Corporation and Urban 
Institute were established using a “contract” model, where clients, usually governments, 
would commission individual research projects (McGann 2016; Weaver 1989). Contract 
think tanks functioned as a direct extension of the federal government’s policy analysis 
capacity. Indeed, the RAND Corporation was established for this expressed purpose. 
During the Second World War, the U.S. military built up the first significant policy 
analysis capacity in the federal government. After the end of the war, the Air Force set up 
RAND to absorb much of this capacity.6 While RAND was initially focused on defense 
policy, it also provided analysis on a range of other issues. Contract think tanks tend to 
employ Ph.D. researchers and rigorous research standards (McGann 2016). Today, 54% 
 
6 See “A Brief History of RAND.” RAND Corporation. Available online at 
https://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html. Accessed April 16, 2020. 
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of the RAND workforce holds a doctorate and about two-thirds work on defense or 
homeland security policy.7 In addition to contract work, RAND scholars have made a 
number of significant social scientific contributions. Most notably, RAND scholars 
developed early game theory to model decision-making during the Cold War (Backhouse 
2005). Both models encouraged serious scientific inquiry and created organizations that 
were trusted as authoritative voices on public policy. 
While much of the intellectual foundation for conservatism had been laid before 
the 1970s, it failed to oppose the dominate knowledge regime. Fredrick Hayek and other 
Austrian economists began to develop a critique of the Keynesian consensus in the 1930s 
and 1940s (Backhouse 2005). Milton Friedman developed supply-side economics and 
monetarism in the 1950s and 1960s, both of which were successfully integrated into 
mainstream economics. Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick, and other political theorists began to 
develop a libertarian political theory to support laisse-faire capitalism (Noel 2014). 
William F. Buckley and other conservatives published The National Review in 1955. As a 
result of these foundations, a coherent conservative ideology that resembled 
contemporary conservatism crystallized in the late 1950s (Noel 2014). However, while 
Barry Goldwater’s campaign adopted much of this new ideology, it failed to catch on 
with most mainstream Republicans (Noel 2014). Conservative policy preferences 
remained on the sidelines in American policymaking. They would not force themselves 
into the political system on their own. Rather, they required the formation of an 
 
7 “RAND at a Glance” RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/about/glance.html. Accessed 1/20/2020.  
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alternative knowledge system similar to the one that sustained the technocratic 
knowledge regime.   
Conservative reaction (1970s-1990s) 
The expansion of the federal government’s policy agenda created a powerful 
reaction among ideological conservatives. Ideological conservatives opposed the 
expansion of the federal government into domestic policy areas such as civil rights, social 
welfare and environmental regulation (Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 2019). They saw 
the Republican Party as betraying conservatives by joining the Democratic Party in the 
expansion of government (Noel 2014). According to Stahl (2016), conservatives 
identified technocrats as fundamentally anti-conservative, 
“More often than not, those who subscribed to such [technocratic] innovations 
were inclined to advocate for the expansion of the welfare state as an ameliorative 
for the downsides of corporate industrial capitalism.” (9) 
 
Indeed, critiques of the technocratic knowledge regime were present at the very 
beginning of modern conservatism. Noel (2014) finds that the modern basket of policy 
preferences that formed into the modern conservative ideology—preferences for less 
government regulation of economic and civil rights policy, traditional social and cultural 
structures, a hawkish foreign policy, and opposition to taxes and redistribution—
crystallized in the 1950s with the publication of William F. Buckley’s God and Men at 
Yale. Buckley, who went on to found The National Review, was the most important 
intellectual figure in early modern conservatism. In the book that launched his career, 
Buckley argued that the Yale faculty’s support of a secular worldview, racial equality, 
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cultural relativism, Keynesian economics, and government intervention into the 
economic sphere was inherently unconservative. Instead of inherently objective or 
unbiased, Buckley framed this knowledge regime as liberal, while conservatism 
represented an opposite but equally valid worldview which deserved equivalent 
representation in academia. Thus, it required a conservative counterweight. Soon after his 
book was published, he founded The National Review. 
Before Buckley, even the nominally conservative American Economic 
Association (AEA), renamed the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy in 1962, 
was forced to conform to the technocratic knowledge regime. AEA was founded by a 
group of New York City businessmen in 1938 with a mission to achieve, “greater public 
knowledge and understanding of the social and economic advantages accruing to the 
American people through the maintenance of the system of free, competitive enterprise.”8 
It tended to produce rigorous research similar to the Brookings Institution, including 
important scholarly contributions in the area of anti-trust and labor law (Stahl 2016). 
However, AEA reports almost always arrived at the conclusion that less government 
intervention was good for the economy (Stahl 2016). AEA’s fundraising tended to rely on 
large corporate donors, overlapping heavily with the Chamber of Commerce (Stahl 
2016). Despite their free market mission and mild conservative lean, AEA still largely 
bought into the technocratic consensus, and was not integrated into the Republican Party 
 
8 “History of AEI”, American Enterprise Institute. Available online at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090708195505/http://www.aei.org/history. Accessed 
January 14, 2020.  
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(Stahl 2016). This status quo began to change under the presidency of William Baroody 
Sr. in the 1950s and 1960s. Baroody, who changed the name of the organization to the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy (AEI), worked with Barry Goldwater’s 
1964 presidential campaign to craft a conservative policy platform (Stahl 2016). 
However, Baroody clashed with Buckley and other Goldwater advisors, who thought 
Baroody and AEI’s policies were insufficiently conservative (Stahl 2016). AEI’s culture 
and ethos was still largely grounded in the technocratic knowledge regime, awkwardly 
positioning it in between the current mainstream consensus and the newly insurgent 
conservatives (Stahl 2016). It also suffered from its reliance on corporate donors, rather 
than conservative foundations or individuals (Stahl 2016). AEI was not successful at 
influencing the policy process in a conservative direction ,outside of a few key issues, 
until much later. Republicans, led by Richard Nixon, continued to expand the scope of 
the federal government into the 1970s (Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 2019). 
 The beginning of the end of the era of technocratic knowledge regime began with 
the creation of the Heritage Foundation in 1973. Heritage was founded by three former 
Republican staffers who were unhappy the Republican Party’s embrace of federal 
government programs to solve policy problems (Edwards 1997). Heritage rapidly 
changed the structure of new think tanks in the United States and the relationship 
between elected officials, parties and think tanks. Heritage, and the numerous 
organizations founded or modified in its image, would provide a means through which 
ideological conservatives could capture the Republican Party.  
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Heritage produced several important innovations in think tank operations. First, it 
built an organizational structure where researchers and support staff act strategically and 
coordinate, rather than work independently with only ad hoc teamwork. One former 
senior Heritage Foundation manager described the difference between the university 
model and new model as the difference between a “condominium” and a “tight 
neighborhood.”9 In the former, researchers are only related by proximity, while the latter 
is able to work together to produce something greater than the sum of its parts. Heritage 
management exercised more control over the organization’s policy agenda by producing 
conservative research in advance of policy debates.  
Indeed, this structural change is at the heart of the organization’s founding 
legend.10 According to Edwards (1997, 3-4), in 1971, Congress debated whether to fund 
research and development into a supersonic commercial airliner. Conservatives opposed 
the spending as an unnecessary and wasteful government entry into a free market 
function. The measure failed by just a few votes. A few days later, Heritage’s two 
principal founders, Paul Weyrich and Ed Feulner, met for breakfast in the House 
cafeteria. Weyrich was angry at the American Enterprise Institute, who had published a 
study on the pros and cons of federal funding of supersonic commercial jets a few days 
after the vote. Weyrich asked William Baroody Sr. why he didn’t release the study before 
the vote. Baroody replied, “We didn’t want to try to affect the outcome of the vote.” 
 
9 Interview with a former senior Heritage researcher, July 2017. 
10 Like many legends, this story has been repeated many times with slightly different details. Any 
individual facts may be apocryphal. The version of the story that I recount here is drawn from Edwards 
(1997). Edwards is the organization’s internal historian, writing its autobiography to celebrate its 25th 
anniversary. 
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Feulner and Weyrich decided that conservatives needed a new organization that would 
anticipate the Congressional policy agenda and act to influence it.   
 Second, Heritage aggressively marketed its research. While most think tanks are 
more adept at putting their research in front of policymakers than academics, Heritage 
invested far more resources into marketing than other think tanks (McGann 2016; Rich 
2005). They were the first think tank to have an office of Congressional liaison, allowing 
them to understand where Republican leaders expected the policy agenda to focus on in 
the near future.11 While other think tanks were writing long technical reports appropriate 
for an academic or specialist setting, Heritage edited their reports down to short briefs, so 
they could pass “the briefcase test,” – small enough to fit in a briefcase and be read in the 
time it took to drive from Congressional offices to DC National Airport (Rich 2005). This 
aggressive marketing and brevity allowed Heritage an advantage over its competition in 
convincing allied policymakers to rely on their policy analysis when making decisions.  
In the days before email, communicating rapid responses presented a logistical 
challenge. One former Heritage staffer spoke fondly of “report days” in Heritage’s 
basement.12 He would often write a brief late at night on a typewriter on short notice if an 
agenda item was about to come up. In the morning, he would give the report to a group of 
interns in the basement, which contained a large, expensive Xerox machine. At the time, 
far cheaper copying options existed than the Xerox machine, such as screen printing. 
However, only the Xerox machine could collate copies of the report, saving time. Every 
 
11 Interview with a former senior Heritage researcher, July 2017. 
12 Interview with a former senior Heritage researcher, July 2017. 
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intern at Heritage would wait on the far end of the Xerox machine, collecting reports. 
When they collected a handful of reports, they would run deliver them by hand to each 
House and Senate office, as well as slipping a copy under each door at the National Press 
Club.  
Finally, Heritage developed a more diverse fundraising strategy. Instead of 
relying on large foundations or government contracts, they borrowed a grassroots strategy 
from Republican electoral politics, raising money from a diverse group of individual 
conservative donors (Abelson 2004). Because individual donors tend to be more 
ideological than foundations with technocratic traditions like the Ford Foundation, they 
were able to produce more conservative or liberal information than university-based 
models (Rich 2005). It also allows the organization considerable autonomy from donors. 
Ed Feulner, who was President of the Heritage Foundation from 1977-2013, wrote,  
“The importance of [having a diverse donor base] was made clear to us some 
years ago when a corporate CEO, taking exception to our policy in favor of free 
trade, ripped up a check for a six-figure contribution. Such short-term losses are 
significant, of course, but by accepting them, we strengthen the allegiance of our 
more numerous small donors.” (Feulner 2000, 71) 
 
Members tended to trust the information more than information patronized by 
corporations, because they were receiving conservative ideas rather than self-interested 
ones.13 
 Collectively, these innovations created a new model for think tanks. Most modern 
think tanks in the United States now adopt what McGann (2016) classifies as an 
 
13 Interview with a former senior Heritage Foundation researcher, July 2017. 
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“advocacy” model,14 where they act more like interest groups than universities. It was 
adopted by a wide range of think tanks, including other conservative think tanks such as 
the Cato and Manhattan Institutes, later progressive think tanks like Demos and 
Economic Policy Institute, and numerous think tanks representing more traditional 
interests, such as the progressive pro-Israel group J Street (Medvetz 2014).  
Heritage was enormously successful in influencing the Republican Party. The 
organization quickly became closely connected to Ronald Reagan and the conservative 
faction of the Republican Party. It supported Reagan’s challenge against Gerald Ford, 
whom Heritage saw as insufficiently conservative, in the 1976 Republican nomination 
contest (Edwards 1997). After Reagan won the 1980 election, Heritage played an 
important role in the Reagan transition (Brown 2011; Jones and Williams 2008). When 
parties enter government, they must rapidly fill thousands of executive branch jobs, 
develop a policy agenda, and immediately execute it. Unlike in many democracies, U.S. 
parties do not form shadow governments to prepare a policy agenda should they win the 
next election. As a result, parties often draw many of their appointees from interest 
groups and think tanks (Brown 2011; Ricci 1993). Heritage had spent much of 1979 and 
1980 preparing a 3,000 page, 30 pound, document titled Mandate for Leadership, laying 
out a plan for the first year of the Reagan Presidency (Edwards 1997). The document 
contained more than 2,000 concrete policy recommendations for the executive and 
legislative branch in close cooperation with Reagan’s transition team. Reagan personally 
 
14 Others, such as Rich (2004), propose a similar “marketing” think tank label. 
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passed out copies of Mandate at his first cabinet meeting (Edwards 1997). Reagan 
appointed at least twenty-three contributors to Mandate into senior policy roles (Edwards 
1997). Mandate, and subsequent support from Heritage, allowed Reagan to move quickly 
and achieve a number of conservative policy goals, including a $749 billion tax cut, a 
large increase in defense spending, cuts to social welfare spending and the Urban Jobs 
and Enterprise Zone Act of 1981 (Edwards 1997). Heritage later claimed that the Reagan 
Administration implemented 60% of Mandate’s policy recommendations in his first term 
(Edwards 1997). Few interest groups can claim such a record of success at influencing 
American public policy. 
Other conservative think tanks followed in Heritage’s footsteps. The 1970s and 
early 1980s saw an explosion in the number of think tanks in Washington (Bertelli and 
Wenger 2009). Many were highly ideological, conservative advocacy think tanks 
modeled after Heritage (McGann 2016). Charles Koch and two libertarian conservatives 
founded the Charles Koch Foundation, later renamed the Cato Institute, in 1974. William 
Casey, a former Nixon Administration appointee and future Reagan CIA Director, 
founded the Manhattan Institute in 1977. Manhattan most notably employed Charles 
Murray, whose Losing Ground and The Bell Curve provided much of the conservative 
case underlying the backlash to federal welfare policy and the mid-90s reform (Heckman 
1995; O’Connor 2001). While the American Enterprise Institute retained its university 
model, it significantly changed its operations following Heritage’s success. AEI hired a 
large number of conservative full-time resident scholars after decades of focusing on 
visiting or adjunct university professors (Stahl 2016). It released a policy agenda for the 
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second term of the Reagan presidency modeled on Mandate (Medvetz 2014). It began to 
raise money from wealthy conservative ideologues, rather than relying on corporate 
donors (Stahl 2016). AEI began to work more closely with grassroots conservatives, 
rather than just business groups (Stahl 2016). More recently, conservative policy 
entrepreneurs (including Charles Koch) founded numerous think tanks in individual 
states, connecting them together to share information and resources with the State Policy 
Network (Hertel-Fernandez 2019; Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch 2016). 
Collectively, these organizations created an alternative conservative knowledge 
regime. Conservatives framed the mainstream media, universities, Keynesian economics 
and non-partisan institutions as inherently liberal, rather than unbiased or mainstream. 
They sought to elevate academic research that reached conservative conclusions out of 
universities to equal footing with what they considered liberal research.15 When 
surveyed, Republican legislative staff answer that they prefer information that they know 
conforms to their ideological beliefs over information that is unbiased, while Democrats 
and elite journalists answer the opposite (Rich 2005). While there were few large and 
active progressive think tanks in 1997, when Rich performed his surveys, Democrats 
tended to rate them lower than non-partisan think tanks like Brookings, RAND and 
NBER.  
One illustrative modern example of this alternative conservative knowledge 
regime is Conservapedia. This website was founded by Andrew Schlafly, son of the 
 
15 Interview with a former Heritage Foundation researcher, July 2019. 
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famous conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly, in 2006. Schlafly founded the site in 
response to his belief that Wikipedia moderators were tilting an article on a debate over 
teaching evolution in Kansas schools away from creationism (Zeller 2007). The site’s 
self-described ethos rejects positivism as a concept for an encyclopedia to strive for, 
rather insisting that all facts are inherently biased. 
“Conservapedia strives to keep its articles concise, informative, family-friendly, 
and true to the facts, which often back up conservative ideas more 
than liberal ones. Rather than claim a neutral point of view and then insert bias, 
Conservapedia is clear that it seeks to give due credit to conservatism and 
Christianity. Schlafly said in regard to the point of view issue, "It's impossible for 
an encyclopedia to be neutral."16 
 
According to Schlafly’s logic, facts can only be liberal or conservative. Therefore, 
disagreement with conservatives necessitates alternative facts. In one entry that best 
exemplifies this ethos and its conflict with the technocratic knowledge regime, 
Conservapedia defines “econometrics” as,  
“Econometrics is a field of economics that uses statistics to 
analyze economic data for patterns. It is frequently used by liberal influences in 
economic think tanks, like the Brookings Institution, to justify increased 
government deficit spending in order to weaken America's currency advantage in 
world trade.” 
 
In these two sentences, the conservative ethos regarding positivism is clear. The first 
sentence correctly defines econometrics in positivist terms. The second sentence notes 
that positivism is used to justify policy outcomes that conservatives disagree with, notes 
that liberals use positivism, and specifically points to activities of a non-partisan think 
 
16 Quoted in “Conservapedia”, Conservapedia. Available online at 
https://www.conservapedia.com/Conservapedia. Accessed 1/16/2020.  
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tank as an example of the relationship between anti-conservative policy change and 
positivism.  
 Republican politicians also express the same sentiment. In another example, 
former Senator Rick Santorum addressed the Values Voter summit in 2012, 
“We will never have the media on our side, ever, in this country.  We will never have 
the elite smart people on our side, because they believe they should have the power to 
tell you what to do. So our colleges and universities, they’re not going to be on our 
side.  The conservative movement will always be – and that’s why we founded Patriot 
Voices – the basic premise of America and American values will always be sustained 
through two institutions, the church and the family.” (Santorum 2012) 
  
 Santorum makes it clear that science, scientific institutions and the media are 
inherently and inevitably anti-conservative, and so alternative institutions are necessary 
to promote conservative policy preferences. In a final example, columnist Ron Suskind 
recounts a 2002 conversation with an anonymous George W. Bush White House official 
where the official explicitly argued against positivism, 
“The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," 
which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious 
study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment 
principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works 
anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own 
reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act 
again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things 
will sort out.” (Suskind 2004) 
 
The anonymous official perhaps best summarizes the goal of the conservative 
reaction to the technocratic era. Conservatives saw that a reality-based community came 
to conclusions about public policy that they did not agree with. They sought to build their 
own reality and convince the Republican Party to adopt it. They did so by creating a 
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knowledge regime centered around party-aligned think tanks, rather than the existing 
knowledge regime centered around government agencies, universities and non-partisan 
think tanks. 
 
Progressive counter-reaction (2000s-present) 
Progressives Democrats were slow to respond to trend of advocacy-oriented think 
tanks with clear ideological missions and deep integration into political parties. For the 
most part, Democrats continued to value rigorous, non-partisan research produced by 
universities and non-partisan organizations (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Rich 2005). 
As with conservative Republicans, some progressive Democrats founded advocacy-style 
think tanks in the wake of the Heritage Foundation’s success, such as the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and Economic Policy Institute (EPI). Despite their 
progressive missions, these organizations both maintained a technocratic ethos 
(Grossmann and Hopkins 2016; Rich 2005) and were much smaller than the Heritage 
Foundation.17  
However, moderate Democrats, who believed that the party’s electoral defeats in 
the 1980s were caused by a shift too far to the left, did respond. In 1985, a group of 
moderate Democratic elected officials founded the Democratic Leadership Council 
(DLC) in order to move the party to the center. The DLC was the chief party organization 
supporting the New Democrats, a moderate faction of the party that included Bill Clinton. 
 
17 The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and Economic Policy Institute had budgets of $4 million and 
$3 million in 1996 (Rich 2005). In contrast, the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute and 
Brookings had budgets of $25 million, $13 million and $17 million, respectively. 
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As part of their effort to move the party to the center, they founded the Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI), a centrist think tank, in 1989. Despite its name and association with the 
Democratic Party, PPI often supported quite conservative policy proposals. For example, 
during the 1996 welfare reform debate, PPI supported welfare work requirements and 
time limits, and criticized progressive plans to expand aid to the poor (Medvetz 2014). 
They often clashed with both more progressive think tanks such as the Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities and Economic Policy Institute, but they were “scarcely audible over 
the din of their conservative competitors.” (Medvetz 2014, 207). PPI defined much of the 
Democratic Party’s policy agenda during the 1990s. 
Mainstream Democrats led by former Bill Clinton Chief of Staff John Podesta 
thought the DLC had pushed the Democratic Party too far to the center (Dreyfuss 2004; 
Savage 2008). The 1990s and early-2000s were defined by Democrats losing debates not 
only on welfare, but also on marriage equality, tax cuts for the wealthy and the Iraq War. 
In order to move the party to the left, they founded a think named called the Center for 
American Progress (CAP). CAP would provide a left-of-center counterweight to AEI and 
Heritage.  Podesta was supported by a $30 million grant from a group of Democratic 
Party mega-donors known as the Democracy Alliance, led by George Soros, Peter Lewis 
and Herb and Marion Sandler. CAP was immediately the largest Democratic-aligned 
think tank in the United States.18 Unlike Heritage, which began as an outsider group 
looking to capture the Republican Party, CAP was much more explicitly allied with the 
 
18 Author’s count of IRS Form 990 filings of party-aligned think tanks contained in the ProPublica Non-
Profit Explorer database. 
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Democratic Party from the outset. For example, Bob Boorstin, a CAP researcher focused 
on national security, described his mission as explicitly aiding the Democratic Party, 
“My job is to take the thirty-five-point gap and shrink it, so that we’re viewed as 
credible again,” [Boorstin] said. “It’s vital that we Democrats demonstrate 
through our ideas that we are not a bunch of wimps.”19 
 
Furthermore, Podesta described its mission as an intra-party organization focused on 
representing the party’s mainstream, which felt tugged on by both centrists and more 
extreme left-wing groups (Dreyfuss 2004). At the same time, the organization was 
designed as a modern update of the Heritage advocacy model. Indeed, the CAP founders 
informally consulted with Heritage management about how to best organize their think 
tank.20  
In addition to producing policy analysis, CAP built its apparatus to engage 
actively in policy debates, both in the media and the halls of Congress. CAP was one of 
the first think tanks to set up an independently-financed companion 501c(4) lobbying 
organization called the Center for American Progress Action Fund, which allowed its 
employees, many of whom were employed by both organizations, to lobby and engage in 
electoral politics more freely than 501(c)3 employees. Heritage would follow up a few 
years later by creating their own 501(c)4 companion organization named Heritage 
Action. Jennifer Palmieri, CAP’s first communication director who would eventually 
hold Communication Director titles for the Obama White House and Hillary Clinton 
2016 campaign, sent CAP experts out to engage in television news debates. Shortly after 
 
19 Quoted in (Scherer 2008) 
20 Interview with a former Heritage Foundation senior researcher, July 2017. 
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CAP was founded, a talk show booker stated, “For conservatives, we can call Heritage or 
AEI. Now we have a place to get liberals.”21   
CAP was quickly integrated into the Democratic Party. CAP presidents John 
Podesta and Neera Tanden chaired the Obama and Clinton transition committees. For the 
Obama Administration, CAP followed the lead of Heritage’s Mandate by preparing a 
similar document, Change for America: A Progressive Blueprint For The 44th President, 
to lay out an agenda for the executive branch (Scherer 2008). Like the original Mandate, 
many of the authors of Change went on to be nominated to agencies in order to 
implement their own recommendations, including the Solicitor General, Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Director of the National Economic Council, and Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget. Tanden also served on the 2016 Democratic 
platform committee. 
 In addition to their transition work, CAP research formed the basis of much of the 
first term of the Obama Administration. While working for CAP, former Senate Leader 
Tom Daschle published Critical: What We Can Do About the Health-Care Crisis, as a 
partial blueprint for what would become the Affordable Care Act (Daschle 2008; Pear 
2008). Critical was both a political and policy book – diagnosing the problems of the 
American health care system, explaining why past attempts at universal health care 
failed, and laying out a politically feasible reform plan that Democrats could pass in 
2008. While Daschle’s nomination to HHS ultimately failed, his ideas heavily influenced 
 
21 Quoted in Dreyfus (2004) 
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the Affordable Care Act (Marmor 2014). CAP was also instrumental in designing much 
of the domestic spending contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA). In September 2008, shortly before Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy but 
after it was clear that a major recession was coming, CAP proposed a $100 billion “Green 
Recovery” package, which would both stimulate the economy and jump start a shift 
toward renewable energy (Podesta 2008). ARRA included many of Podesta’s 
recommendations, including loan guarantees for renewable energy, subsidies for wind 
and solar energy installation, subsidies for “smart grid” technology and tax credits to 
retrofit buildings for increased energy efficiency. 
 More recently, CAP helped define the mainstream Democratic plan to build on 
the Affordable Care Act. In February of 2018, it released “Medicare Extra for All,” a 
detailed plan which would allow individuals and businesses to buy in to a public 
insurance plan administered by the Center on Medicare and Medicaid Services.22 They 
later released “The High Cost of Hospital Care,” a detailed plan to regulate prices at 
hospitals.23 The plan closely resembles Medicare buy-in plans later introduced by Pete 
Buttigeg, Joe Biden, and Amy Klobuchar during the 2020 Democratic nomination 
contest, as well as the Choose Medicare Act.  
Other progressive think tanks followed CAP’s example. Most notably, the Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) rapidly increased in size. In 2004, CBPP spent 
 
22 “Medicare Extra for All” Center for American Progress, 2018. Available online at 
<https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2018/02/22/447095/medicare-extra-for-all/> 




$9.3 million.24 By 2006, the CBPP budget increased $16 million in 2006. Between 2012 
and 2017, it ranged from $29 million to $33 million. New America, a center-left 
foundation founded in 1999, grew from $4 million in 2004 to $7 million in 2006. Thanks 
in part due to large donations from Google chairman Eric Schmidt (R. Cohen 2018), New 
America grew to $20 million the early 2010s and $36 million by 2017.25 These think 
tanks and others formed the basis of a progressive knowledge regime. 
 
U.S. think tanks as party-like organizations 
 
Political parties have substantial policy advisory needs. They need to prioritize 
and define problems, search for or develop policy solutions to those problems, decide on 
positions, and make arguments defending their positions to voters. In most advanced 
democracies, party think tanks fill the policy advisory role. Unlike U.S. think tanks, who 
are legally prohibited from formally affiliating with a political party as 501(c)3 
organizations, party think tanks are formally affiliated with and controlled by political 
parties (McGann 2016). Many of these organizations are quite large. For example, 
Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the think tank affiliated with the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) and European People’s Party (EPP) raised €177 million in 
 
24 Expenditure data drawn from IRS Form 990s contained in ProPublica’s Non-Profit Explorer database. 
25 Author’s count of IRS Form 990 filings of party-aligned think tanks contained in the ProPublica Non-
Profit Explorer database. 
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2017.26 They are also largely publicly financed; KAS received €172 million in grants 
from the German federal government in the same year.27 Because of their formal 
affiliation, these party think tanks tend to take on a lower profile role in their country’s 
politics (Braml 2006). These systems also tend to have weak privately-funded think tank 
ecosystems (Braml 2006), perhaps because they struggle to compete with the party think 
tanks.    
While the U.S. has no formal party think tanks, U.S. political parties also need 
various kinds of policy analysis. However, these needs differ from parties in systems with 
strong party discipline, like Germany. Parties in the United States do not make direct 
policy decisions. Formal party organizations only nominate candidates, release a party 
platform and raise money to spend on elections and related activity. Much of the conflict 
over the party’s policy positions and eventual policymaking in government occurs 
outside of the formal party apparatus in the extended party network (Kathleen Bawn et al. 
2012). The party network can use policy analysis to search for problems, identify or 
develop solutions that fit the party’s ideological preferences, bring members to 
consensus, share ideas and information (Albert 2019; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2010) and 
make policy arguments in the public sphere (Rich 2005). While they receive information 
from a variety of sources, U.S. parties have come to rely on think tanks to perform this 
role. In their comparative study of knowledge regimes in the United States, France, 
 
26 Konrad Adenauer Stifthhung. 2018. Annual Report. Insights into 2018. Available online at 
<https://www.kas.de/en/web/guest/single-title/-/content/deutschland-das-naechste-kapitel-jahresbericht-
2018> Accessed 1/27/2020.  
27 Public financing structures vary by country. Some party think tanks are funded through the country’s 
university system (Campbell and Peterson 2014). 
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Germany and Denmark, Campbell and Pedersen (2014) find that some U.S. think tanks 
perform many of the same functions as party think tanks in the other countries: bringing 
ideas from broader knowledge regimes into party positions. Albert (2019) finds that they 
are critical actors in the party network, bringing in ideas from outside research sources 
and transmitting those ideas to both officeholders and interest groups in the party 
network. 
However, despite their role as party-like organizations, U.S. think tanks are not 
controlled by the political party or their officeholders. Think tanks like the Heritage 
Foundation and Center for American Progress are 501(c)3 non-profit organizations, 
funded primarily by grants from foundations and large individual donations. Unlike 
formal party organizations, their fundraising is autonomous and independent from the 
party’s officeholders (McGann 2016). Thus, as with other members of the extended 
political party, they have independent goals from officeholders and formal party 
organizations. They seek to change public policy by moving their party’s positions—to 
the right or left in the case of organizations like the Heritage Foundation and Center for 
American progress, or to the center in the case of the Progressive Policy Institute. This 
role differs from party think tanks in other democracies, where the think tank acts as an 
agent of the political party. 
Not all think tanks occupy this party organization-like role. Some think tanks are 
just think tanks. Even in systems with formal party think tanks, political parties receive 
policy analysis from a variety of sources, including other think tanks (Braml 2006). In 
Germany, only about one-in-six think tanks is a party think tank (Thunert 2004). In the 
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United States, these distinctions will be even less clear. Researchers have generally 
referred to U.S. think tanks by their ideological orientation, rather than their role in 
political parties (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Stahl 2016). However, some research has 
started to consider think tanks as party actors. In Asymmetric Politics, Grossmann and 
Hopkins (2016) compare information produced by Republican and Democratic-aligned 
think tanks, finding that they follow many of the same patterns of differences in party 
platforms, rhetoric, and other outputs. Albert (2019) finds that think tanks are important 
vectors of information in party networks. Fagan (2019) uses their activities as 
representatives of the party’s elite. We should expect think tanks that operate as party 
integrated organizations to perform different functions than those that do not. Parties 
should treat them as potential shadow governments and privileged sources of information 
above and beyond other think tanks or interest groups. While parties do occasionally 
collaborate, they should primarily work with co-partisans in government. Thus, if we are 
to study the role of these organizations, we must pay careful attention to case selection.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In the first section, I established that some think tanks in the United States have 
taken on a pseudo-party role in American politics. While not formally affiliated with 
political parties, party-aligned think tanks fill a role in U.S. politics filled by formal party 
organizations in most democracies. They are important pieces of modern U.S. party 
knowledge regimes, particularly for Republicans. The purpose of this next section is to 
select cases of U.S. party-aligned think tanks to study in order to understand their impact 
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on political parties. In order to do so, it first defines two terms in the U.S. context: think 
tanks and party alignment. Next, I select U.S. party-aligned think tank cases to study for 
the remainder of this dissertation. I select the four largest party-aligned think tanks: the 
American Enterprise Institute, Center for American Progress, Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities and Heritage Foundation. 
Definitions 
 As Rich (2005) notes, think tanks have attracted relatively little attention from 
political scientists when compared to more traditional interest groups or NGOs. In 
contrast, some think tanks loom large in Washington politics. Rich attributes the 
discrepancy to the discipline’s broad acceptance of theories of political decision-making 
based in raw power and rational self-interest and the lack of political conflict around 
which expertise ultimately informs policymaking decisions. However, he argues, this 
dynamic has changed,  
“This limited view of the role of expertise may have been more justifiable in an era 
when the underlying, “rules of the game,” were basically agreed by scholars to 
consist of a “consensus” in support of expanding social welfare commitments on 
the domestic front.  When the underlying tenets of Keynesian economics were 
basically shared by Republicans and Democrats alike, for example, visible battles 
were often restricted to competing interests’ claims to public privileges and 
resources.” (Rich 2005 8-9)” 
 
 Scholars, including Rich, have struggled to create a concise and analytically useful 
definition of a think tank. More than a thousand organizations in the United States 
identify as a “think tank” (McGann 2016). As Medvetz (2014) notes, the term is “a 
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murky, fuzzy concept that cannot be nailed down perfectly.” (16). Think tanks produce 
policy information, but so do universities, interest groups and media organizations. To 
make matters worse, many of these organizations will themselves establish child 
organizations, either formally related or through patronage, that identify as think tanks. If 
think tank is a useful analytical concept, its definition must separate it from all of these 
organizations from the ones we want to study. The United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), which often funds think tanks in new democracies, defines the term as,  
“organizations engaged on a regular basis in research and advocacy on any 
matter related to public policy. They are the bridge between knowledge and 
power in modern democracies.” (UNDP 2003, 6) 
 
 
 However, in the U.S. context this definition is inclusive of traditional interest 
groups, who also engage in research and advocacy in matters related to public policy on a 
regular basis. McGann (2016) proposes a definition that suffers from the same problem,  
“organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on 
domestic and international issues that enable policy-makers and the public to 
make informed decisions about public policy issues.” (10).  
 
 
 He solves the problem by applying a detailed typology to the problem, dividing 
think tanks into autonomous and independent, university, party, contract, vanity, etc. (see 
also McGann and Weaver 2000). While this added complexity is analytical useful for a 
comparative study of think tanks, it is costly for this project. However, Rich (2005) cuts 
through this complexity and incorporates some of the typologies into his definition, 
“Independent, non-interest-based, nonprofit organizations that produce and 
principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the 
policymaking process.” (11) 
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 This definition eliminates traditional interest groups who influence policy through 
many means, including information, groups that are dependent on a single individual or 
industry donor, such as trade groups, media, for-profit research firms and universities. 
Rich adds that single-issue think tanks tend to have a different function than “full 
service” organizations and eliminates them from his inquiry by limiting his sample to 
organizations that, “produce research and studies that span the broadest array of issue 
domains” (11). I include this caveat in my final definition: 
“Independent, non-interest-based organizations that seek to influence public policy 
on a broad range of issues primarily through the provision of policy information.”  
 
 Next, we must differentiate think tanks that act as pseudo-party organizations 
from those that are merely think tanks. While scholars of think tanks have put 
considerable effort into understanding think tanks by dividing their functions and 
organizational forms into typologies (McGann 2016; McGann and Weaver 2000; Rich 
2005; D. Stone 1996), existing schemas do not identify a pseudo-party role occupied by 
U.S. think tanks. For this definition to be analytically useful in the U.S. context, it must 
capture the role of party think tanks, but allow for a different organizational structure. It 
must also separate think tanks which are integrated into political parties from those that 
are merely preferred by members of one party over the other.  
McGann and Weaver (2000) define the role and structure of party think tanks. 
They define party think tanks as think tanks that are: 
• primarily staffed by party members or loyalists; 
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• financed by the either the formal party organization or government 
subsidies; 
• with an agenda that closely follows the party’s platforms; 
• produce a variety of work products, ranging from legislation to white 
papers to talking points for media debates, on a broad range of issues.  
To translate the concept of a party think tank into the U.S. context, we must 
interpret these criteria to the U.S. context. First, U.S. parties have no formal membership. 
U.S. parties in government do appoint or hire officials to perform policy duties, but U.S. 
think tanks that are deeply integrated into political parties will serve as homes for party 
policy officials when they are not in government. Second, U.S. formal party 
organizations and governments do not finance party think tanks. However, U.S. parties 
and their elected officials are financed by their own networks of donors (Koger, Masket, 
and Noel 2009). U.S. think tanks that are deeply integrated into political parties should 
draw from similar networks of donors, although their 501(c)3 status, which allows them 
to accept unlimited donations, will bias their donor base toward very large party-
connected donors. Finally, while parties release platforms that influence legislative 
agendas (Fagan 2018), weak party discipline, the separation of legislative and national 
parties and divided government make them a poor indication of the party’s core priorities 
at any given time. U.S. party-integrated think tanks should produce policy information on 
the party’s longstanding core issue priorities, or their owned issues, primarily for the 
consumption by their co-partisans (Egan 2013; Fagan 2019).  
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I refer to these think tanks as party-aligned think tanks, rather than party or 
pseudo-party think tanks. U.S. party-aligned think tanks occupy both the pseudo-party 
role and also function as interest groups with their own goals. I identify them using this 
definition: 
 
Think tanks that are aligned with one political party are staffed by future or past party 
appointees or officeholders, produce a variety of policy information on a broad range of 
party priorities, work primarily with one party and are financed by similar networks of 
donors. 
Case Selection 
Next, I select cases to study. One strategy would involve selecting all 
organizations that meet the definition of party-aligned think tank. Doing so would create 
a comprehensive and representative sample of party-aligned think tanks in the United 
States. However, this option is infeasible given the onerous quantitative data collection in 
chapters 4, 5 and 7. There are many small party-aligned think tanks, and each would 
present its own data collection challenge to solve. Furthermore, smaller think tanks would 
present more edge cases, where an organization might not fit cleanly into the definitions 
above. An alternative strategy would be to create a list of party-aligned think tanks and 
randomly sample from the list. This strategy solves the feasibility problem, but risks 
leaving out the most influential and important organizations from the sample. Instead, I 
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use a third option: selecting the largest party-aligned think tanks, with total expenditures 
serving as a proxy for influence.  
Using internet searches, I identified all of the prominent think tanks that meet the 
definition of party-aligned think tanks. Next, I selected the four largest think tanks by 
average expenditures from 2004-2016 according to IRS Form 990 filings stored in 
ProPublica’s Non-Profit Explorer database, two from each party. Table 2.1 shows these 
organizations, their average real expenditures from 2004 to 2016, and their expenditures 
in 2016.  
Institution Orientation Average Expenditures 
2016 
Expenditures 
American Enterprise Institute Republican $27.7 million $42.2 million 
Center for American Progress Democratic $35.2 million $43.8 million 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Democratic $23.0 million $25.8 million 
Heritage Foundation Republican $68.6 million $84.6 million 
Notes: Real 2009 dollars. Source: IRS Form 990 filings, retrieved from ProPublica’s Non-Profit 
Explorer database.  
  
Table 2.1: Average Revenue of Party-Aligned Think Tank Cases, 2001-2016 
 
On the Republican side, I selected the Heritage Foundation and American 
Enterprise Institute. Both organizations clearly meet my definition of party-aligned think 
tanks. They both receive funding from Republican elites; Heritage tends to raise more 
from wealthy ideological conservatives, while AEI tends to raise from the Chamber of 
Commerce wing of the party (Stahl 2016). They both produce a variety of policy 
information on a broad range of party priorities (Fagan 2019). Recent data suggest that 
they send considerable employees to staff the executive branch. Figure 2.2 shows the 
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distribution of appointees from a selected group of organizations.28 Republican-aligned 
think tanks are very well represented on this list. The Heritage Foundation was the 
second most common previous employer of a Trump Administration employee, after the 
Trump campaign. The American Enterprise Institute was the fourth most common 
employer. These appointees include numerous high-profile policy jobs, including the 
Secretaries of Transportation, Secretary Education, Secretary Labor, chair of the White 
House Council of Economic Advisors and Commissioner of the Food and Drug 
Administration, as well many more high-level agency deputy secretary, policy planning 
and general counsel jobs. Other prominent and large Republican-aligned interest groups 
like the National Rifle Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Right to 
Life received many fewer appointments and less prominent jobs. Similarly, non-partisan 
information producers and Harvard University and the Brookings Institution similarly 
received fewer appointments.  
  
 
28  Trump for America, Inc, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was by far the most common previous 
employer of Trump Administration employees, with 118 appointments. These are excluded from Figure 2.2 
in order to better show the variation of all other organizations. 
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Figure 2.1 Trump Political Appointees from Select Organizations 
 
On the Democratic side, I selected the Center for American Progress and Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities. Of these, CAP is most comparable to AEI and Heritage. 
It was created with large donations from top Democratic Party funders (Dreyfuss 2004). 
It produces a variety of information on a broad range of issues. More than even the 
Heritage Foundation, CAP conceives of its mission as one in service of the political party 
(Scherer 2008). While the ProPublica data aren’t available for the Obama Administration, 
CAP was at the forefront of staffing it (Brown 2011). CAP President John Podesta 
chaired the Obama Transition committee. Among other things, CAP produced a 665-page 
document outlining an early agenda for 56 agencies in the new administration based on 
CAP employee recommendations (Green and Jolin 2009). Many of the authors of these 
authors were appointed to the agencies which they wrote for, including the Solicitor 
General, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator, Director of the National 
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Economic Council, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The next CAP 
president, Neera Tanden, co-chaired the Hillary Clinton transition (Karni 2016) (Karni 
2016) and served on the 2016 Democratic Party platform committee (Nichols 2016). 
CAP clearly occupies the role of a Democratic party-aligned think tank.  
The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, however, is a less clear case. Overall, 
it is a lower profile organization than the other three, smaller in terms of expenditures, 
and less information is generally available on its role in U.S. politics, funding and 
employee structure. While most scholars categorize them as a left-leaning think tank 
(Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Rich and Weaver 2000) and elite media tend to regard it as 
a progressive-leaning organization (for example, see Fernholz 2010; LaMarche 2014; 
Matthews 2018), CBPP works to maintain an unbiased reputation for policy analysis 
closer to non-partisan think tank like Brookings or the Urban Institute. Their 2016 
funding primarily lists foundation donors, with many of the same progressive foundations 
and donors as the Center for American Progress.29 While CBPP’s founder, Bob 
Greenstein, was a former top Carter Administration official, it has seen fewer high-level 
executive branch officials appointed from its employees when compared with other think 
tanks. Their most prominent recent executive branch official was Jared Bernstein, Chief 
Economist and Economic Advisor to Joe Biden during his time as Vice President. Their 
leadership are largely drawn from mid-level Democratic staff with some staff moving 
 
29 The 2016 statement is available online at: https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/honorroll-
final-2016-forwebsite.pdf. The “Over $500,000” section includes donations from Herbert Sandler and 
George Soros, the two surviving original donors to the Center for American Progress. 
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back and forth between CBPP and Democratic legislative or executive branch staff.30 The 
Obama Administration sought out the advice of CBPP experts while crafting the 2009 
stimulus bill; CBPP claims credit for crafting “about a third” of the bill (Dionne 2019).  
 
SUMMARY 
Like other organizations, political parties have policy advisory needs. The 
organizations, beliefs and practices that serve these needs over the long term constitute a 
knowledge regime. To understand U.S. knowledge regime, I divided modern U.S. 
political history into three eras. In the first era, a bipartisan consensus held that 
technocratic information sources in the form of experienced bureaucrats, universities and 
non-partisan think tanks would inform policymaking decisions. This consensus enabled 
the vast expansion of the scope of the federal government’s policy agenda during the 
1950s-1970s. However, conservatives observed that because this technocratic 
information sources often supported the creation of new domestic policy interventions, 
Republicans tended to support those interventions instead of laisse-fare domestic policy. 
Despite the formation of the modern conservative ideology in the 1950s, conservatives 
were unable to swim upstream against the current of the scientific consensus.  
The second era began when a group of conservative think tanks, led by the 
Heritage Foundation, created their own innovative policy analysis regime. These new 
conservative think tanks were more aggressive at strategically responding to the policy 
 
30 Interview with a senior CBPP employee, July 2017. 
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agenda, marketing, and working directly with the Republican Party. They successfully 
carved out a privileged role as a party-like organization. Their knowledge regime branded 
organizations that were formerly considered non-partisan like scientists and non-partisan 
think tanks as liberal, thus requiring a co-equal conservative counterpart. Their 
ideological worldview extended beyond a critique of the role of the federal government 
in policymaking to include a critique of positivism itself. Importantly, the Democratic 
Party did not immediately create its own equivalent knowledge regime, instead relying 
primarily on the non-partisan knowledge regime until the early 2000s. 
The third and final era followed the creation of the Democratic Party’s own party-
aligned think tanks in the image of the Heritage-led conservative knowledge regime. A 
group of large Democratic donors and former Clinton Administration officials launched 
the Center for American Progress in 2003. CAP was the left’s first true advocacy think 
tank that was built on a similar model to Heritage. It produced left-of-center policy 
analysis for the Democratic Party. CAP quickly assumed many of the privileged roles 
afforded to Republican-aligned think tanks such as staffing the executive branch and 
designing major policy initiatives. Other Democratic-aligned think tanks also grew 
rapidly during this period. While the non-partisan knowledge regime remains influential 
in Democratic Party politics, both parties now had their own partisan knowledge regime 
to fill a policy advisory role.  
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Chapter 3: Theory of Information and Political Parties 
 
 In Chapter 2, I established that party-aligned think tanks play an influential role in 
American party politics, in part by serving in a party organization-like role reserved for 
formal party organizations in most democracies. While this argument fits into the 
literature on comparative think tanks, it does not directly address the well-developed 
literature on party position-taking and American political parties. The goal of this chapter 
is to establish a theoretical framework through which we can predict how party-aligned 
think tanks can influence party positions, under what conditions they will be more or less 
successful at doing so, and the strategies that they will employ.  
 In the first section, I review the existing literature on party positions. These 
theories make a number of predictions about political party behavior, including that they 
are generally office-seeking organizations which strategically take positions in order to 
appeal to voters. However, more recent literature suggests that U.S. political parties 
function more as diverse coalitions with internal conflicts, and will change their positions 
based on changes in issue definitions, elites inside their parties, and the interests of 
important groups in their coalition. These theories suggest that while parties are office-
seeking, they are constrained by the policy-seeking demands of the people and groups 
that they are composed of, rather than a strictly Downsian framework where parties 
respond directly to voter preferences. While they do a poor job of explaining how 
organizations that primarily produce information can be influential members of party 
coalitions, I note that Wolbrecht’s theory of issue redefinition suggest they can play a 
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role in reframing and redefining how the parties see issues, and therefore cause 
endogenous change without changing the composition of the coalition.  
Next, I review the literature on extended political parties, where parties are 
policy-seeking, rather than office seeking. Interest groups, activists, thought leaders, 
intellectuals, donors and other party elites get involved in party politics in order to change 
public policy, rather than simply to win elected office. In the extended party framework, 
groups demand that their co-partisan elected officials maximize their policy gains. While 
they care about winning elections, they see them only as instruments to policy-seeking 
and are willing to sacrifice some probability of winning in return for policy gains. In this 
framework, the extended political party seeks to control the party nominations process in 
order to assure that elected officials who support their policy positions. The modern 
progressive and conservative ideology, and thus the positions of the Democratic and 
Republican parties, emerged out of these policy demands. I note that that information 
producers like think tanks fit well into the extended party model, but some of their 
activity is difficult to explain. However, as with issue redefinition, they can play an 
important role in defining the preferences of the participants in extended party 
competition, and thus influence the party’s policy positions. 
 In the second section, I develop my own theory of party position-taking. I begin 
by reviewing information theory, noting that policy information can rapidly change 
policymaker’s preferences. Policymakers draw information from a large number of 
sources because information in politics is oversupplied (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Because information is oversupplied, policymakers require heuristics to choose which 
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information to attend to and trust and which to ignore. I propose that the privileged role 
given to party-aligned think tanks in political parties allows them to exploit these 
heuristics and become privileged information providers. Next, I propose my own theory 
of party preferences. I argue that three factors determine party actor’s positions: values, 
incentives and policy analysis. While most theories of party positions focus on the former 
two, I argue that policy analysis can also powerfully affect positions. Using this theory, I 
propose three strategies that party-aligned think tanks can use to change their party’s 
positions: reframing, activating latent preferences and elite persuasion.   
 
 
THEORIES OF U.S. PARTY POSITION-TAKING  
Office-seeking and coalitional theories of political parties 
There is a well-developed literature on position-taking by U.S. political parties. 
Unlike most other democracies, U.S. legislative parties are defined by relatively weak 
party discipline. Individual members have more freedom to make their own decisions on 
issues, and often take heterodox positions to accomplish their own goals. Political parties 
have a strong influence on the positions that they take, but these positions are not 
determinative. In future chapters, we will measure party position-taking using the 
expressed preferences revealed by voting in Congress, which are a collection of 
individual positions, rather than the positions of a party organization. Thus, when this 
chapter discusses party position-taking in the U.S., it is referring to the tendency of party 
members to take a certain position.   
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 The most basic framework of party position-taking was created by Downs (1957), 
where parties position themselves in ideological space in response to voter preferences. 
Downsian parties are office-seeking, in the sense that they are single-minded seekers of 
seat maximization. The public is also rational; they decide who to vote for based on 
which party position is closest to their preferences, although they may rely on party 
reputations rather than observing specific position-taking in order to guess which party’s 
positions are closest to their own preferences. Parties thus take positions according to the 
distribution of public preferences. Downs assumes that all issues can be expressed in 
single liberal-conservative dimension. If the public’s preferences are normally 
distributed, parties in a two-party system will adopt very similar positions themselves 
close to the center of public opinion. If the distribution is bimodal, parties will take 
positions near the centers of the distribution. Party positioning changes only in response 
to changes in public opinion. While the Downsian framework explained much of why the 
political parties took very similar positions during the 1940s-1970s, it struggles to explain 
the more recent polarized era, where U.S. political parties rapidly shifted their positions 
on numerous issues (Poole and Rosenthal 1984), and in particular struggles to explain the 
specific realignment on civil rights issues (Carmines and Stimson 1990).  
 The next important theory of party position-taking was developed by Aldrich 
(1995). Why Parties argues that parties are primarily created, maintained and adapted by 
powerful elected officials and candidates to serve their own purposes. These elected 
officials mobilize activists, organize funders, and set up the party infrastructure. Aldrich’s 
endogenous parties produce collective goods for the officeholders, and to some degree 
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enforce collective decision-making on their members. They follow the utility function of 
elected officials, which is a mix of office-seeking for the sake of holding office and 
policy-seeking (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). For Aldrich, party issue positions and 
priorities change only when the interests of the controlling officeholders and candidates 
change. Because officeholders and candidates have diverse goals, these factors 
contributing to position-change are complex, rather than a simple Downsian office-
seeking model. 
 Wolbrecht (2000), examining party position changes on women’s rights issues, 
argued that three factors lead to party position-taking: the preferences of party elites, the 
preferences of major coalitions within the parties and dominant frames and policy images 
surrounding the issue itself. As any of these factors change, party positions change. While 
issues are at equilibrium, party positions will remain fairly stable. However, they can go 
through rapid and powerful moments of redefinition, where the dominant policy image is 
replaced by a new one, changing the incentives of the party’s elites and coalition. On 
women’s rights issues, the two parties rapidly moved from a period of consensus during 
the 1950s and 1960s to a highly polarized period. The best example of this rapid change 
was from the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The ERA, which would have prohibited 
law from discriminating on account of sex, passed both chambers of Congress with broad 
bipartisan support in 1970, and was ratified by 30 states within two years. Both political 
parties supported the ERA in their platforms. However, Wolbrecht argues, the events of 
the 1960s and 1970s kicked off a rapid issue redefinition of women’s rights issues. The 
dominant frame shifted to one of equality to a broader feminist critique of social and 
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cultural traditions rooted in the counterculture and social movements of the time. 
Women’s rights issues quickly became central to numerous policy debates beyond civil 
rights, such as health care and labor market policy. This redefinition changed the way that 
the issue interacted with party elites and coalitions. Republican Party elites and religious 
conservatives rapidly changed their preferences. Conservative states stopped ratified the 
ERA. Four states that had ratified the amendment in 1972 even took the drastic step of 
rescinding their ratification of the amendment.  
 Similarly, Karol (2009) focuses on coalition management strategies as causes of 
party position change. Karol’s model argues that party positions are a function of the 
interests of the party coalition and change only when those interests change. He proposes 
three mechanisms which can change party positions: coalition maintenance, incorporation 
and expansion. Maintenance refers to changing positions as the interests of existing 
groups in the party coalition changes. For example, labor unions are an important part of 
the Democratic Party. In the middle of the 20th century, labor unions benefitted from free 
trade as the U.S. was a net exporter of manufactured goods. Thus, the Democratic Party 
supported free trade policies. When the U.S. became a net importer of manufactured 
goods, labor unions sought protectionist trade policies, and the Democratic Party became 
more protectionist. Coalition incorporation refers to adopting a policy position in order to 
bring a previously non-partisan group into the party. For example, the Republican Party 
adopted anti-abortion policy positions after the Fourth Great Awakening in order to bring 
in a new base of evangelical Christians into the party. Finally, coalition expansion refers 
to adopting broadly popular positions to attract support from the public generally, such as 
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the Republican Party supporting a hawkish foreign policy during the Cold War. Karol 
argues that the latter two strategies are led by elected officials in a model similar to 
Aldrich, while coalition maintenance are led by groups inside the party making demands 
internally.  
 Finally, Schickler (2016) proposes a similar model of party positions to 
Wolbrecht (2000) and Karol (2009), but emphasizes internal conflict in the parties. 
Schickler asks why the Democratic Party became the party of civil rights in the 1960s 
despite the importance of White southern to its coalition and the existence of progress 
leaders on the Republican Party such as Dwight D. Eisenhower. He argues that when the 
New Deal Coalition added organized labor, Northern African Americans and urban 
liberals to the party, it set off an internal party conflict over the party’s positions on civil 
rights issues. Other groups inside the Democratic Party, in particular the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO), a large labor union, saw that their interests and missions 
were aligned with African Americans on civil rights issues. They worked to integrate 
African Americans into the Democratic Party starting in the 1940s, decades before 
Lyndon Johnson signed civil rights legislation which led to the slow realignment of the 
Southern Democrats to the Republican Party. Thus, Schickler argues, the shift on civil 
rights was the result of endogenous party conflict inside grassroots of the Democratic 
Party, rather than the strategic choices of elected officials or party leaders. 
 In general, these theories do not consider how information producing 
organizations like party-aligned think tanks can shift party positions. Generally, the 
models suggest that political parties strategically organize political power in order to 
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maximize the number of seats they can win in the next election, and thus set their policy 
positions accordingly. These strategies might include taking positions in order to match 
voter preferences or to create or maintain an electoral coalition. Because voter or group 
preferences in these models are largely exogenous, there is little room for groups within 
the party who seek to persuade their co-partisans. The notable exception is Wolbrecht’s 
theory of issue redefinition, where internal group preferences are responsive to the 
dominant policy images framing the issue. Positions can shift rapidly when issues are 
redefined, as the groups in party coalitions change their preferences. Party-aligned think 
tanks could participate in this issue redefinition process by modifying the dominant 
policy images shared by their co-partisans.  
Extended political network theory and policy-seeking political parties 
Recently, scholars studying American political parties have created a new theory 
of political parties, called extended party network (EPN) theory (Albert 2019; Albert and 
Barney 2018; Kathleen Bawn et al. 2012; M. Cohen et al. 2009; Desmarais, La Raja, and 
Kowal 2015; Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Karol 2009; Koger, Masket, and Noel 
2009; Kousser et al. 2015; Manento 2019). EPN theory differs from many of the coalition 
theories with two key predictions. First, it argues that political parties are not endogenous 
to office holders, but rather exert significant control over them. EPNs are composed of 
coalitions of intense policy demanders such as interest groups, networks of individual 
elites or donors, media or intellectual figures, activists, social movements, and 
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officeholders. Second, it argues that these actors are driven entirely by policy-seeking 
goals rather than office-seeking goals.  
While scholars had noted the importance of diverse coalitions of elites underlying 
political parties much earlier (Key 1964; McClosky, Hoffmann, and O’Hara 1960; 
Schattschneider 1942), EPN theory was developed more recently. Schwartz (1990) first 
observed in his case study of the Illinois Republican Party a robust network of elites 
surrounding officeholders who held powerful sway over the party’s decision-making 
process. EPN theory was formalized in a 2012 article by Kathleen Bawn and her 
colleagues (Bawn et al. 2012). They argue that intense policy demanders form long 
coalitions, where members of the coalition agree to only support candidates who support 
most of the policy positions of the coalition as a whole. They intervene in nomination 
contests to ensure that candidates win who would support the coalition’s positions even 
absent outside pressure. These interventions vary. Party actors may support candidates 
with campaign donations, connections, endorsements, media attention, volunteers, or by 
attacking their opponents. Voters are largely absent from this process other than as 
recipients of the messages from party actors. Bawn et al. theorize that voters have strong 
policy preferences on only a minority of issues, and therefore rarely constrain the actions 
of elected officials. Party actors demand that their elected officials maximize policy gains 
outside of voter awareness but relax those demands when policy can impact elections. 
These activists and elites and are cooperative and deeply connected, forming cohesive 
and diverse social networks (Albert 2019; Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Koger, 
Masket, and Noel 2009, 2010). They argue that direct interventions in general elections 
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are overly costly for most interest groups and members of the party network, so they 
often lack the ability to credibly threaten officeholders to change their preferences once 
in office. Thus, EPN actors intervene in party nominations, where their resources are 
more effective. Over time, ideologies emerge from the basket of issues that the EPN 
actors support, rather than from first principles. Once an ideology is established, it creates 
a largely self-perpetuating system that requires only occasional attention from EPN actors 
to ensure that their party’s officeholders share their values. 
 Party-aligned think tanks and similar organizations fit in conceptually well as 
members of extended party networks. However, they rarely intervene directly in 
nominations. They do not activate grassroots activists or endorse candidates. Rather, they 
try to influence the policy positions of both members of the extended political party and 
the officeholders that they nominate. While some intense policy demanders in the 
extended party network likely have clearly defined interests, others are ideological 
conservatives or progressives with less defined interests. Information producers can work 
to define what policy alternatives their co-ideologues should support or oppose or try and 
harness conservative or progressive instincts in order to convince them to support a 
particular policy. This role does not fit into the extended party network theoretical 
framework, although they can work in tandem. However, the role also extends beyond 
the party nominations mechanism, where information producers will also attempt to 
influence co-partisans in government to support their preferences. Thus, we need a theory 
of how information producers can change the preferences of both elected officials and co-
members of the extended party network.  
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MY THEORY OF PARTY POSITIONS. 
Information theory and Congress 
In order to understand how information producers may influence preferences, I 
first must review the literature on information and policymaking. Information processing 
is an essential step in the policy process. Policymakers require information to define, 
search for and prioritize policy problems, identify and evaluate potential solutions, and 
ultimately make decisions (Baumgartner and Jones 2015a; Hall and Deardorff 2006; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Shafran 2015; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). 
Changes in information can cause rapid and decisive changes in policy preferences  
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015b; Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 2005; Wolbrecht and 
Hartney 2014). Information has many mechanisms to change preferences. It controls 
problem definitions (Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). It can reframe problems or 
solutions, changing the policy image or relative importance of different aspects of it 
(Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Glazier and 
Boydstun 2012; Rose and Baumgartner 2013; Wolbrecht and Hartney 2014). It can lower 
the costs of policy change, making it easier for a legislator to act on the policy (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). It can alert policymakers or other political actors to new problems or 
solutions that they were not previously aware of (Baumgartner and Jones 2015b; Wolfe 
2012). Finally, policy analysis of various forms can persuade policymakers that problems 
are more or less severe, or of the relationship between policy outputs and outcomes. 
Because information plays a powerful role in determining preferences, changes in 
the source of information that policymakers draw from can produce different preferences. 
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Policymakers draw from a broad array of information sources. In private markets, 
information is scarce and costly, so private actors seek out and purchase only the 
information that they need. The opposite is true for public policy. Information producers 
who want to change government preferences produce information and give it away for 
free to policymakers. As a result, information in the public sphere is oversupplied, often 
so much that policymakers are unable to attend to all of it at any given time (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). Thus, policymakers must choose which information sources they 
will attend to, and which to ignore. These choices will have a considerable impact on 
their preferences. 
Congress, the institution which Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus on, has many sources of 
information. The first broad group of information sources are those internal to Congress. 
Staff are the most important internal source (Adler and Wilkerson 2013; Hertel-
Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019). Members of Congress with more 
experienced staff tend to be more productive legislators (McCrain 2018) and tend engage 
in more analytical discourse in committee hearings (Esterling 2007). Committee staff 
tend to generate more expertise than personal staff, as they spend more time dealing with 
policy rather than fielding and addressing constituent concerns (Adler and Wilkerson 
2013; Baumgartner and Jones 2015b; Krehbiel 2006). Members have similarly also used 
legislative service organizations and caucuses to maintain a professional, largely non-
partisan staffing base to help process information outside of the committee structure 
(Ainsworth and Akins 1997). Finally, Congress maintains the non-partisan analytical 
bureaucracies to provide consistent high-quality information to Congress on a variety of 
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policy matters. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Joint Committee on 
Taxation provide budgetary information on legislative proposals, as well as some 
economic analysis. Congressed created the CBO with the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 in order to protect their control over the power of the 
purse from the legislative branch (Binder 2017). The Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) is Congress’ internal think tank, providing detailed legislative advice on a broad 
range of issues. The Office of Technology (OTA) assessment provided advice to 
Congress on emerging technology or scientific issues. Finally, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) helps Congress audit and oversee the bureaucracy. As a 
group, they generally produce high-quality, non-partisan information despite being 
controlled by an increasingly partisan Congress (Baumgartner and Jones 2015).  
However, Congress dramatically cut the budgets of caucuses, legislative service 
organizations, analytical bureaucracies and committee staff after Republicans regained 
power in 1995 (Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Curry 2015). Figure 3.1 shows the decline 
of the committee and legislative support staff. Congressional capacity never returned to 
its previous equilibrium and suffered further declines after budget cuts when Republicans 
regained control of Congress in the 2010s.  
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Source: Vital Statistics on Congress. Brookings Institution (2018) 
Figure 3.1: Cuts to Congressional Capacity 
 These cuts to Congressional capacity had a dramatic impact on Congressional 
operations. Power centralized in chamber leadership, making it more difficult for 
individual members of Congress and committees to process information independently 
(Curry 2015). Congress held fewer hearings that focused on problem-solving (Lewallen, 
Theriault, and Jones 2016). After the cuts, it relied more on assistance from the executive 
branch to oversee the executive branch (Mills and Selin 2017). In a survey of 
Congressional staff about the causes of Congressional dysfunction, participants identified 
“difficulty making evidence-based decisions” and “defining problems logically” as the 
































 Congress also relies on executive branch officials in the bureaucracy for 
information. Executive branch officials develop deep technical knowledge of policy areas 
through their experience implementing laws (Gailmard and Patty 2012). They help 
Congress search for, define, and prioritize problems (Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). 
During times of crisis, committees increase their reliance on bureaucratic witnesses in 
hearings (Shafran 2015). Bureaucrats take an active role in advocating for legislation and 
are often quite effective at persuading members to follow their advice (Baumgartner et al. 
2009; Shobe 2017). They are often assigned as temporary detailees to Congressional 
committees to assist in oversight (Mills and Selin 2017).  They often act independently, 
forging their own policy changes and establishing some degree of bureaucratic autonomy 
from Congress (Carpenter 2001).  
 However, the executive branch will always be a limited information source for the 
legislative branch. Congress must devote resources to monitoring the executive branch 
for policy problems (Baumgartner and Jones 2015b; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). 
They also attempt to control and constrain the bureaucracy, signaling their policy 
preferences and priorities in Congressional hearings (Workman 2015). If Congress 
becomes too reliant on the executive branch, it ultimately risks losing influence in 
interbranch competition. When the legislative and the executive branch are more likely to 
disagree, Congress writes laws that provide less discretion to bureaucrats (Huber and 
Shipan 2002). Thus, increased reliance on the executive branch cannot compensate for 
lost Congressional capacity.  
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 Because Congressional internal capacity has been reduced, members of Congress 
increasingly draw information from outside the federal government. These external 
information providers are most effective at influencing public policy in legislatures by 
providing legislative subsidies (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Under Hall and Deardorff’s 
model, actors outside of the legislature seek to change public policy. They can either 
attempt to persuade individual legislators or parties who disagree with them to change 
their policy preferences, or they can attempt to lower the cost of legislating for allies who 
already agree with them. Hall and Deardorff argue that lobbyists who follow the latter 
strategy will be more successful, as persuasion is difficult. While Hall and Deardorff 
focus on lobbyists, other scholars note that think tanks provide much of the external 
policy analysis used by Congress (Fagan 2019; McGann 2016; Rich 2005; Stone 1996).  
My theory of information and preferences 
Actors, either individual officeholders or political parties as a whole, begin with 
preferences for policy outcomes ceteris paribus, hereafter referred to as values. 
Officeholders have normative conceptions of what is good public policy, what policy 
problems deserve government attention, or what trade-offs are permissible in the pursuit 
of their goals. Political parties have similar collective values and core priorities, which 
we observe as ideology or issue ownership (Egan 2013; Fagan 2019; Noel 2014). Values 
are relatively stable compared with political incentives and information, having 
crystallized for the two political parties in the middle of the 20th century and changing 
only slowly since (Noel 2014). Many values tend to be shared across political parties, 
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such as patriotism or a desire to represent constituencies. Other values tend to diverge, 
such as normative beliefs about redistribution of wealth, race or abortion, or the relative 
priority placed on problems like poverty, discrimination or crime. Actors actualize their 
preferences for policy outcomes by supporting policy outputs. They prefer policy outputs 
only as instruments for achieving their goals involving policy outcomes. Absent the other 
two factors, party preferences for policy outcomes will change only if values change. 
Next, the actor’s preferences for policy outcomes are modified by electoral, 
political or career incentives. As with office-seeking theories of individual or party policy 
positions, elected officials and parties are often motivated by their own re-election 
concerns (Mayhew 1974), or broader concerns about their party’s electoral fortunes (Lee 
2016). Elected officials may also change their preferences in order to advance their career 
within the party. Even if elected officials or parties care deeply about accomplishing 
policy goals and do not see winning elections or advancing a career in the party as the 
end in itself, incentives are often instrumental to accomplishing those policy goals. At the 
same time, many policy preferences will not be strongly influenced by electoral or 
political incentives. Most issues fly below the radar of most voters (Bawn et al. 2012), 
who are responsive to the actions of their representatives only when issues are salient and 
visible (Fagan, Jones, and Wlezien 2017; Mettler 2011; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). 
Incumbent members of Congress in the age of polarization are increasingly unable to 
build reputations independent their party, further decreasing the political consequences of 
policy decisions (Jacobson 2015). Under the Bawn et al. blind spot logic, extended 
political parties demand that their co-partisans in government only respond to voter 
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preferences when voters are aware of and will respond to those decisions, and follow 
policy-seeking goals otherwise. 
Problem-solving likely also drives incentives for elected officials. Problem-
solving models (Adler and Wilkerson 2013; Jones and Baumgartner 2005) suggest that 
agendas are largely set by policymakers responding to the most pressing problems at any 
given time. Policymakers face a complex and diverse problem space at any given time 
but have limited cognitive and physical resources to attend to those problems. Because 
their attention is limited, they are forced to ignore most of those problems and deal with a 
select few important ones. These are often highly salient and thus attract considerable 
attention from the public. Under these conditions, the public have “double-peaked” 
policy preferences, meaning they care more about solving the problem than the particular 
solution used to solve it (Egan 2013). Policymakers have strong incentives to solve the 
problem, largely to avoid being blamed for failing to solve it (Peter B. Mortensen 2013; 
Weaver 1986). Because emergent problems often affect the public broadly, problem-
solving tends to produce broad bipartisan action (Adler and Wilkerson 2013). 
Finally, because actors seek to achieve certain policy outcomes but must use 
policy outputs to achieve those goals, the actor’s belief about the relationship between 
policy outputs and outcomes will modify their preferences for policy outputs. The actor’s 
beliefs about the relationship between outputs and outcomes is created by through 
consumption of policy analysis. Policy analysis includes beliefs about how effective a 
policy alternative is at addressing a policy outcome, its secondary consequences or 
interactions with other policy outcomes or about the baseline objective reality of the 
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policy outcome such as its severity. While policymakers have preferences for policy 
outcomes, they do not have direct control over them. They can only enact certain policy 
outputs intended to have a particular impact on outcomes. If their beliefs about the impact 
of the policy output on outcomes change, their preferences for the policy output may 
change. In the real world, we observe wildly different beliefs between the political parties 
about the impact of different policy outputs on outcomes. Republicans and Democrats 
disagree on a broad range of issues, ranging from highly salient issues like the impact of 
greenhouse gas emissions on climate change (Dunlap and Jacques 2013) and the impact 
of tax cuts on the federal deficit (Jones and Williams 2008) to the impact of urban 
planning designs on traffic (see DeGood 2019). Policy analysis, which I define as 
information about the impact of policy outputs on policy outcomes, determines these 
beliefs. If actors find the policy analysis they consume persuasive, they will adopt its 
beliefs about the function of policy outputs. However, because information in politics is 
oversupplied (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), actors are not exposed to all policy analysis, 
and must first choose which analysis to consume and which to ignore.  
Over their long term interactions with knowledge regimes, actors develop general 
beliefs about how certain types of policy alternatives impact policy outcomes. They use 
these beliefs as heuristics when evaluating policy alternatives, rather than consulting new 
policy analysis for each alternative. For example, a conservative Republican might 
develop the heuristic that free market economic policy tends to produce more economic 
growth, and therefore assign that belief to all economic policy alternatives presented to 
her without consulting specific policy analysis on that topic. If they do consult a range of 
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policy analysis, they might assign more weight to policy analysis with conclusions that 
support free market economic policies or come from sources that tend to support free 
market economic policies. Without this heuristic, actors are less likely to find heterodox 
policy analysis persuasive.  
To evaluate the implications of this theory, we might think about a progressive 
Democratic legislator who cares about decreasing poverty. As a progressive, the 
legislator believes that decreasing poverty is an important policy outcome deserving 
immediate government attention. The legislator’s district also suffers from higher-than-
average rates of poverty, and so she believes that decreasing poverty in her district will 
increase her chance of reelection, and possibly increase her party’s fortunes in the next 
election overall. Thus, her incentives and values both support enacting policy outputs to 
decrease poverty before the next election. She is presented with several policy 
alternatives to decrease poverty, including a direct cash transfer program, an expanded 
earned income tax, and a labor deregulation bill. After consuming policy analysis on the 
alternatives, the legislator believes that the labor deregulation bill will have a small 
impact on poverty but also larger negative consequences on public health, the cash 
transfer program will have a large impact on poverty but also decrease labor force 
participation, and the tax rebate will have a moderate impact on poverty without a 
significant cost to the labor force. She weights these outcomes and decides to support the 
earned income tax. At the same time, a conservative Republican is considering policy 
alternatives to address poverty. She also comes from a high-poverty district. Although 
she cares less about decreasing poverty than her Democratic colleagues, the legislator 
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believes it is in her political interest to decrease poverty in her district. She is presented 
with the same policy alternatives but is persuaded by different policy analysis. A report 
from a trusted Republican-aligned think tank predicts that the deregulatory policy will in 
fact have a much larger impact on poverty than other policy analysis suggests, while the 
other policy alternatives will have a higher cost to the federal deficit. Given her 
preexisting beliefs about free market regulatory policy, the legislator believes the think 
tank report, and thus supports the deregulatory policy and opposes the other alternatives. 
Thus, two legislators who are attempting to accomplish the same goal arrive each support 
and oppose different policy alternatives because they believe in different policy analysis. 
Party-aligned think tanks strategies 
From existing theories of party positions and my own theory, we can predict 
several strategies that party-aligned think tanks will employ to influence the policy 
preferences of their co-partisans. Importantly, these strategies are non-mutually 
exclusive. Party-aligned think tanks may employ all of them or none at all in different 
contexts. We can also understand where party-aligned think tanks will be less effective. 
Unlike many traditional interest groups, party-aligned think tanks have little means to 
directly influence elections. They do not donate to campaigns, endorse candidates or 
mobilize voters. Thus, they will be unlikely to engage in purely political strategies such 
as bringing new voters into an electoral coalition.   
 The first strategy that party-aligned think tanks could use to influence party 
positions is reframing. Under Wolbrecht’s issue definition theory, party positions change 
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when the dominant policy images defining how elites view an issue change. Party-
aligned think tanks are well-positioned to contribute to issue redefinition. Modern U.S. 
political parties are closely linked to conservative and progressive ideologies (Noel 
2014). Actors see themselves as conservatives or progressives and want to support 
conservative or progressive policy. However, because these ideologies are largely defined 
by the basket of issues supported by their extended party network rather than derived 
from first principles (Bawn et al. 2012), they are often incoherent. Actors compete to 
define issue positions as the true conservative or progressive position. Because party-
aligned think tanks have adopted a formal party organization-like role, they are trusted by 
large segments of their political party to define which positions a true conservative or 
progressive should support. Indeed, Rich (2005) found that Republican Congressional 
staff trusted conservative think tanks more than non-partisan think tanks because they 
could trust them to reliably support conservative policy. If they engage in framing 
strategies, we should expect party-aligned think tanks information to primarily work to 
change the dominant policy images surrounding a policy, rather than persuade the reader 
that the relationship between outputs and inputs. 
 The second strategy they may use is activating latent preferences. While party-
aligned think tanks are poorly positioned to directly affect electoral politics, they can 
support their co-partisans in policy debates. Party actors, both government officials and 
external party representatives, are often called upon to defend their party’s position in the 
public sphere. If the party loses these debates, their positions will become indefensible, 
and could carry an electoral cost. Party-aligned think tanks can provide the data, reports, 
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and arguments necessary to win these debates. Rich (2005) calls this type of information 
“ammunition,” and argues that it allows think tanks to push their allies toward more 
extreme policy positions. Under his framework, policymakers have values significantly 
distant from the positions that are defensible in public debates using conventional non-
partisan policy analysis. After they receive the necessary ammunition—policy analysis 
credible enough to field in a public debate—actors can move their position farther toward 
their latent preferences. If party-aligned think tanks engage in these strategies, we should 
expect them to produce information that is useful in media debates, such as talking points 
or quick rebuttals. They should also set their agenda closely to the formal agenda in order 
to respond quickly to demands for policy information.    
Finally, they can engage in strategies to convince their co-partisan elites that their 
beliefs about the relationship between outputs and outcomes is wrong, and thus they 
should support different positions. I label these strategies “elite persuasion.” By crowding 
out other information providers in an oversupplied market and exploiting the heuristics 
and cognitive biases of their co-partisans, party aligned think tanks are able to use policy 
analysis to convince their co-partisans to change their preferences. If they are successful, 
they will be able to co-opt the problem-solving instincts of their co-partisans, who often 
seek to enact policy outputs to solve problems for their constituents. Their co-partisans 
change their initial positions from one policy output to the party-aligned think tank’s 
preferred output.  If party-aligned think tanks engage in these strategies, we should 
expect the conclusions of their policy analysis to support different policy outputs than 
alternative knowledge regimes.  
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SUMMARY 
This chapter produced a new theory of how policy analysis can impact party 
position-taking. I first reviewed the literature on party position-taking, finding several 
explanations for why party positions change. Of these theories, I focused on two where 
policy analysis and organizations like party-aligned think tanks should be particularly 
influential: issue redefinition (Wolbrecht 2000) and extended party networks (Bawn et al. 
2012). I argued that while these theories suggest some of the mechanisms that 
information producers in knowledge regimes might use to influence party position-
taking, they are insufficient to explain much of party-aligned think tanks behavior. 
Therefore, we need to extend existing theories to also incorporate this behavior. 
Next, I proposed by own theory of position-taking by party actors. Information 
theory tells us that information about policy can rapidly shift policy preferences, and that 
the sources that actors draw from matters. At the same time, actors are boundedly 
rational, and must choose which information to trust and which to ignore. Party-aligned 
think tanks are able out-compete rival information sources by exploiting the heuristics 
and cognitive biases used by their co-partisans. I then proposed that preferences for 
policy outputs are a function of three factors. The first factor is the actor’s values, or 
actor’s preferences for policy outcomes ceteris paribus. The second factor is the actor’s 
incentives, external political, career or personal reasons affecting the policy outcome. The 
third factor is the policy analysis believed by the actor, the underlying beliefs about the 
relationship between policy outcomes and policy outputs. While previous theories tended 
to focus on values and incentives as drivers of party position-taking, I focus on policy 
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analysis. I argue that long-term interactions with knowledge regimes create general 
beliefs about how policy outputs impact policy outcomes. Actors rely on these general 
beliefs as a heuristic when evaluating new information. Finally, I use this theory to 
predict strategies that party-aligned think tanks will use to change their party’s 




Chapter 4: Comparative Policy Analysis 
 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that party-aligned think tanks could potentially 
use three mechanisms to change their party’s policy preferences. First, they might 
convince their co-partisans of a different relationship between their desired policy 
outcomes and policy outputs, thus changing their preferences for policy outputs. Second, 
they might reframe the policy by emphasizing different underlying aspects of its nature, 
thus changing the weights that their co-partisans assign to it. Finally, they might activate 
latent preferences by providing credible arguments that their co-partisans can use in 
public debates, thus allowing them to take more extreme policy positions.  
 In this chapter, in order to understand which of these mechanisms party-aligned 
think tanks use and under what conditions, I examine policy analysis produced by all four 
party-aligned think tanks. If these think tanks seek to change their co-partisan’s beliefs 
about the relationship between outputs and outcomes, they must produce policy analysis 
that offers different conclusions about the impact of policy compared with non-partisan 
sources. If their strategy is to reframe issues, they will accept the conclusions of non-
partisan sources, but focus the reader’s attention on other aspects of the policy. If their 
strategy is to activate latent preferences, their policy analysis might do either, but they 
will also produce shorter talking point-style products. This chapter will examine if and 
when party-aligned think tanks employ the former two strategies.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I discuss the literature on 
biased information, framing, and think tanks. I also define the concepts of bias in policy 
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analysis and framing of policy analysis. In the second section, I lay out a research design 
to study bias and framing in policy analysis from the four party-aligned think tanks. I do 
so by examining five cases where non-partisans and party-aligned think tanks performed 
comparable analyses of the impact of a policy on some outcome. In the third section, I 
examine each case. These include policy analyses of the impact of the American Clean 
Energy and Security Act’s cap and trade system on economic growth, the impact of the 
Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act of 2010 on the deficit, the impact of 
renewable portfolio standards on electricity prices, the impact of the 2013 comprehensive 
immigration reform bill on economic growth and the deficit, and the impact of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 on economic growth. Finally, I conclude. Republican-aligned 
think tanks are more likely to produce biased information, while Democrats tend to rely 
on framing. However, there is considerable variation across think tanks. The Center for 
American Progress and Heritage Foundation are more likely to produce biased 
information than the American Enterprise Institute and Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities. 
PARTY-ALIGNED THINK TANKS AND BIASED POLICY ANALYSIS 
Bias 
If a policy analyst wants to convince a policymaker to change their preferences 
for policy outputs by persuading them that the output has some different relationship to 
policy outcomes than she currently believes, the policy analysis must reach different a 
different conclusion than the policymaker’s beliefs. For example, a policymaker might 
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prefer that her constituents drink clean water, both because she expects to pay an 
electoral cost if her constituents’ water quality decreases and because she values clean 
water as an important goal for public policy. Under the status quo, she is advised by 
scientists and government agencies that a nearby mining project she might otherwise 
support will significantly increase the chances of a pollutant affecting her district’s water 
supply, and so she opposes the policy choice. However, if a rival information source, 
perhaps one that supports the new project, is able to convince her that the scientists are 
wrong, and the mine poses only a mild risk of impacting the water supply, she would 
change her preferences and support the policy change. In chapter 3, I refer to this process 
of changing policy preferences through policy analysis as elite persuasion. 
Elite persuasion relies on biased policy analysis. I define biased policy analysis as 
policy analysis which materially differs from the scientific or non-partisan consensus in 
the author’s preferred direction. The policy analysis published by the mine’s supporters 
in the above example is biased because it materially disagrees with the non-partisan 
consensus in support of the mine supporter’s preferred direction. While it is unlikely that 
they would publish such information, the policy analysis would not be biased if it erred in 
the opposite direction, e.g. away from the mine supporter’s preferences. Party-aligned 
think tanks, with their ideological missions and patrons, have a clear preference for 
policy to the left or right of center. Thus, if a Democratic-aligned think tank published a 
piece of research with conclusions supporting a more progressive conclusion than non-
partisan experts, that information would be biased. However, if they published a piece of 
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research that accepted the conclusions of non-partisans but emphasized the aspects of the 
issue which appealed to progressive values, it would not be biased.  
A number of studies have found that party-aligned think tanks tend to produce 
biased information. Most of these studies are on climate change. Carbon taxes and 
emissions trading policies were first developed as a market-based alternative to 
command-and-control policy designs by bureaucrats in the Environmental Protection 
Agency under the George H.W. Bush administration to address acid rain (Voß 2007). 
However, wealthy ideological conservatives such as the Koch brothers, who also happen 
to own a major oil and gas company, opposed any emissions trading program that 
targeted greenhouse omissions, and funded think tanks who published research opposing 
it (Brulle 2014). As a result, Republican-aligned think tanks became the primary source 
of information questioning climate science. Since the 1970s, over 90% of climate 
skepticism books were published by conservative think tanks or authors residing at 
conservative think tanks (Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 
2008). Nearly all conservative think tanks either produced numerous white papers, op-
eds, and other material supporting climate skepticism in various forms, or declined to 
publish research on climate change entirely  (Boussalis and Coan 2016). They 
successfully exploited strong journalistic norms toward balance in political debates by 
casting disagreements over the facts of climate change as political ones, rather than 
scientific ones (Bolsen and Shapiro 2018; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; McCright 2016; 
McCright and Dunlap 2003). They also spread their biased information throughout the 
extended party network (Albert 2019). Heterodox scientific researchers would likely have 
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been less successful at promoting climate skepticism than conservative think tanks, as 
they had no access to adversarial norms, and would have been expressing opinions 
outside of their field’s consensus.  
Although there is less research in other areas, Republican-aligned think tanks 
have successfully introduced biased information in other policy areas. On tax and budget 
policy, Republican-aligned think tanks argued extensively that tax cuts reduce long-run 
deficits, both by growing the economy and through a “starve the beast” mechanism, 
where governments cut spending in response to high deficits, despite a strong consensus 
from economists to the contrary (Jones and Williams 2008; Prasad 2018). More 
generally, Republican-aligned think tanks have elevated heterodox macroeconomic 
research such as the works of Austrian School economist Friedrich Hayek, a prominent 
critic of Keynesian economics and supporter of libertarian economic policies (Backhouse 
2005). Using Austrian arguments about fiscal and monetary policy during recessions, 
Republican-aligned think tanks argued that any increased government spending during 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis would have no impact on GDP (Watkins and Tyrrell 2009), 
despite strong predictions from most economists that increased government spending 
could make up for decreased aggregate demand (for example, see (IMF Fiscal Monitor 
Update 2012).   
On welfare policy, Republican-aligned think tanks subsidized studies finding that 
racial inequality was caused by hereditary differences in intelligence, rather than public 
policy, discrimination or other environmental factors (Medvetz 2014). The most notable 
of these is Charles Murray, a prominent conservative political scientist who wrote Losing 
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Ground and The Bell Curve while working at the Manhattan Institute and American 
Enterprise Institute. Losing Ground claimed that social welfare programs on net hurt the 
poor. The Bell Curve claimed that racial differences in income and education 
achievement were caused by hereditary differences in general intelligence, rather than 
environmental factors. Murray’s work formed the intellectual foundation of the 
conservative campaign to cut U.S. welfare spending in the 1990s (Medvetz 2014; 
O’Connor 2001). However, the core claims of the work were quickly rejected by social 
scientists (Devlin 1997; Heckman 1995). If Murray were a practicing social scientist 
engaging with his colleagues in a debate, his work would have lost its relevance long ago 
as a consensus formed that the weight of the evidence and repeated inquiries suggested it 
did not accurately describe reality. However, Republican-aligned think tanks continue to 
support his work and promote it to policymakers. Murray currently holds the Hayek 
Emeritus Chair at the American Enterprise Institute. In January 2020, he published a new 
book, Human Diversity: The Biology of Gender, Race and Class.    
There is little research assessing the nature of policy analysis produced by 
Democratic-aligned think tanks. Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) find that reports from 
progressive think tanks tend to include more citations, be authored by better-educated 
researchers, and are more likely to analyze original data. They argue that the difference in 
research quality is caused by differences in Republican and Democratic values, but do not 
examine individual reports or claims. Given their technocratic traditions (see Chapter 2), 
we should expect Democratic-aligned think tanks to generally produce information that is 
more in line with the scientific consensus. However, the Center for American Progress, 
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which was created in response to perceived over-reliance by Democrats on technocrats, 
should be more likely to produce biased information than the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, which was very much created in the technocratic tradition before 
Democrats sought an alternative knowledge regime. 
Framing 
If a policy analyst wants to convince a policymaker to change their preferences by 
focusing on a different aspect of the policy, rather than different conclusions, they must 
reframe it. I define framing as an attempt to change the dominant aspects of the policy’s 
issue definition. Policy analysts will attempt to shift the dominant aspects of issue 
definitions toward aspects that are more favorable to their preferences using policy 
analysis. For example, in the mining and pollutants example above, a policy analyst 
might argue that even though there is a risk of pollution from mining, the new mine will 
provide many new well-paying jobs for the community. Thus, even if the policymaker 
believes that the new mine may threaten the quality of her constituent’s drinking water, 
they might still support the project as a means of generating economic activity if they 
value the latter outcome over the former. 
 There is little research on party-aligned think tanks and framing specifically, but 
considerable research on the role that political parties and interest groups play in framing 
issues. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) find that changes in dominant policy images can 
break down the institutional legitimacy of policy subsystems, creating rapid and dramatic 
change in public policy. Changing media frames can also cause macropolitical actors 
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such as legislatures to change their preferences (Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 
2008; Rose and Baumgartner 2013). In political parties, changing the dominant issue 
definition can affect how elites in party coalitions weigh impacts of policy alternatives 
(Wolbrecht and Hartney 2014). Interest groups understand the importance of framing in 
determining policy outcomes, and thus attempt to reframe issues (Klüver and Mahoney 
2015). However, they are rarely successful; Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that 
lobbyists successfully reframed issues only about 5% of the time.  However, for the same 
reasons discussed in Chapter 3, party-aligned interest groups may be more successful at 
reframing issues when compared with other groups. As representatives of the broad party 
coalition afforded a privileged party organization-like role, they help define what it 
means to be conservative or progressive. Thus, they are better positioned to persuade 
their co-partisans that certain aspects of the policy should be more salient than others. In 
the mining example, a Democratic-aligned think tank might argue that a true progressive 
should care about the health of the policymaker’s constituents, rather than its impact on 
the local economy. Thus, a Democrat who sees themselves as progressive might increase 
the value, they place upon the public health consequences of the policy output after 
reading the report from their trusted think tank.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 For the purposes of this chapter, I assume that predictions by well-respected non-
partisan sources represent the best possible scientific estimate given the information 
available at the time. Estimates are biased when they are both more conservative or 
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liberal than the conclusions of non-partisan sources and the discrepancy is in the 
preferred direction of the organization that published it. I collected information produced 
by party-aligned think tanks and non-partisan information sources across a range of 
issues and compare their claims. I hypothesize that Democrats and Republicans will tend 
to produce information biased to the left or right of the non-partisan sources. However, 
Republican bias will be farther to the right than Democratic bias is to the left due to 
stronger Republican rejection of the technocratic knowledge regime. 
 One problem that arises with this research design is comparability. Researchers 
often make claims about policy that conflict, but they also ask slightly different 
questions. One report may ask about the efficacy of a specific plan to affect some 
outcome, while another may ask about the general efficacy of a policy option but not 
focus on specifics. Because reports often are based on different assumptions, it can be 
difficult to perform apples-to-apples comparisons between them. In a deep qualitative 
design, a researcher with subject-matter expertise could thoroughly document the claims 
made by both party-aligned think tanks and non-partisan experts and assess if the party-
aligned think tank information is biased to the left or right of non-partisans. However, 
such deep qualitative work is beyond the scope of this project. Rather, we can solve this 
problem using impact analyses. An impact analysis is an estimation by the information 
producer of an outcome, such as the effect of a policy on GDP, the deficit, 
unemployment, or some other output. If multiple information sources estimate the effect 
of the policy on the same output, we can make valid comparisons between the estimates. 
If information is biased, it will produce a more favorable result for its supporter’s party. 
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If it is unbiased, it will be similar to the result produced by non-partisan information 
sources.  
 Unfortunately, it is rare that a range of think tanks and non-partisan sources will 
produce apples-to-apples impact analyses of a policy output. Non-partisan information 
providers such as the Congressional Budget Office evaluate specific bills normally after 
they have emerged from committee. Outside information sources such as think tanks tend 
to produce policy analysis at the early stages of the policy process, before policy 
proposals are precisely defined (Mooney 1991). Often, party-aligned think tanks will 
produce a report on the impact of some proposed policy, but the proposal never advances 
far enough to garner attention from non-partisan providers. At other times, the proposal 
does advance, but the details change in between when the early report was issued and 
when the estimates produced by other sources. Because these factors rarely line up 
sufficiently to allow for comparison, this research design limits generalizability to 
information produced on policy that attracts the attention of multiple information 
producers over a short time period.  
 In order to collect a sample of impact analyses to examine, I searched for 
common predictions among reports issued by party-aligned think tanks and non-partisan 
information sources. I first searched each party-aligned think tank website using the 
search terms, “impact” and “cost estimate” to identify a universe of possible reports that 
conducted impact analyses. Because these rely on internet searches, I limited the time 
period to reports published after 2009. I then read each report and determined if it 
produced an independent quantitative estimate of the impact of policy on some variable. 
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Next, I identified non-partisan estimates of the same impact, both using internet searches 
and by following the citations of the party-aligned reports. For non-partisan information 
sources, I collected information from non-partisan think tanks, government agencies, and 
academics.  
 Finally, I extracted data on the common impact predictions offered by each set of 
reports. All reports modeled more than one outcome. Some of these were unrelated, such 
as the impact of a renewable energy standard on public health and electricity prices, 
while others were related, such as the impact of a tax cut on economic growth and 
therefore its impact on net tax revenues. Where estimates were unrelated, I collected all 
common impact estimates. Where they were related, I collected only the base estimate 
that others were based upon. In some cases, reports estimated the same impact in 
different units, such as estimating impact in terms of annualized or cumulative economic 
growth. In these cases, I converted the estimates to a common unit.  
 Two broad types of analyses emerged from these cases: primary and secondary 
analyses. Think tanks often performed their own primary analysis to predict the impact of 
a policy on some outcome. These analyses often require complex models and 
considerable expertise to set parameters and perform a credible estimate. Some think 
tanks retain this expertise in house, such as the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Data 
Analysis, which produced several of the reports analyzed below. Others contracted with 
outside firms or academics to produce a report to be released under the think tank’s 
brand, such as the Center for American Progress’ report on the impact of the Affordable 
Care Act on the deficit. However, many think tank reports on the impact of a policy are 
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themselves re-analyses of primary research. These secondary reports often accept the 
finding of the independent analysis it references, but also examine different aspects of the 
policy, such as how its impact differs across income distributions or geographies. In other 
cases, secondary reports modify the assumptions of the independent report they are 
referencing, creating a different estimate than the original source. For each case, I noted 
whether the report was a primary or secondary impact analysis. 
 This search yielded 30 reports across five issues, which are displayed in Table 
4.1. As they attracted the attention of multiple organizations over a short period of time, 
these issues comprise nearly all of the biggest partisan conflicts over policy during the 
Obama and Trump eras.31 These were the debate over the impact of the Affordable Care 
and Patient Protection act on the deficit, the impact of the cap and trade system proposed 
under the American Clean Energy and Security Act on long-term economic growth, the 
impact of a renewable energy standard on electricity prices, the impact of the 2013 
comprehensive immigration reform bill on the deficit, and the impact of the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 on economic growth. These issues represent five different policy 
areas—tax, environmental, energy, immigration and health care policy—across eight 
years. However, they represent a smaller cross section of outputs, focusing on cost, 




31 A notable exception is the debate over the repeal of the Affordable Care Act in 2017. While all four 
party-aligned think tanks released numerous reports and briefs on the issue, including criticisms of policy 
analysis performed by the Congressional Budget Office, none published their own impact analyses. 
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Policy Impact On? Time Dem. Non. Rep. 
American Clean Energy and Security 
Act GDP 2009 2 4 2 
Renewable Energy Standard Electricity Cost 
2009-
2012 2 1 2 
Affordable Care and Patient Protection 
Act Deficit 
2009-
2010 2 2 2 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Deficit 2013 1 1 1 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act GDP 2017 1 4 2 
 
Table 4.1:  Impact Analyses Used in this Chapter 
 
COMPARATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS CASE STUDIES 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
 The American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), would have implemented 
a federal cap and trade system for greenhouse gas emissions. It would have required that 
U.S. emissions decrease by 3% relative to 2005 levels beginning in 2012, slowly 
decreasing to 83% by 2050. The bill used an emissions trading system, where companies 
could bid on permits to emit carbon dioxide and trade those permits on an open market. 
The bill would have directed revenue from permit sales into subsidies for clean energy, 
carbon sequestration, and other technology. ACES passed the House of Representatives 
219-212, with just 8 Republicans supporting it, but did not receive a vote in the Senate. It 
was the last major anti-climate change legislative to significantly advance in the U.S. 
Congressional legislative process. 
 One of the key policy debates for analysts on ACES was the impact of its cap-
and-trade system on the economy. A cap-and-trade system sets hard limits on the amount 
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of greenhouse gases that can be emitted in a given year and relies on market forces to 
either reduce energy use or find alternative clean energy sources. If the economy 
develops cheap and available substitutes for carbon-burning energy, the cap should have 
a relatively small impact on the economy. If it does not, high energy prices could 
decrease economic activity. Thus, several analysts estimated the impact of the ACES cap-
and-trade system on long-run real GDP.  
 Seven sources produced impact analyses of the impact of the ACES Act on GDP 
in 2030, five of which were independent analyses and three of which were secondary (see 
Table 4.2). Four of these sources were non-partisan.32 The first, published by a group of 
scientists at the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change led by 
Sergey Paltsev (Paltsev et al. 2009), used the center’s Emissions Predictions and Policy 
Analysis (EPPA) model to estimate the impact of a number of climate policy alternatives 
on the economy, including ACES. Palstev and his coauthors expected ACES to have a 
relatively small impact on the economy, with 2030 GDP being only 0.37% smaller than 
the counterfactual of no policy change. Two government agencies also produced detailed 
reports. The first was published by the Energy Information Agency (EIA), the 
Department of Energy’s policy analysis organization (EIA 2009). The second was 
published by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2009)(EPA 2009). The 
agencies were split as to the bill’s impact; EIA estimated that GDP would be 0.30% 
lower, similar to the Palstev estimate, while the EPA estimated it would be 0.90% lower.  
 
32 Two additional independent non-partisan estimates of the bill’s impact on the economy was produced by 
the Brookings Institution and Congressional Budget Office. However, neither report specifically predicted 
the impact of the report on 2030 GDP, so they are not included below. 
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 Both the Center for American Progress and Center on Budget Policy Priorities 
produced secondary reports analyzing the impact of cap and trade. The CAP report 
summarized seven estimates of the impact of both the ACES cap and trade system and 
estimates of a similar bill proposed during the previous Congress (Pollin, Heintz, and 
Garrett-Peltier 2009). CAP noted that the EPA report represented the worst-case scenario, 
and even then, decreased annualized economic growth by just 0.05%. They also 
emphasized benefits of spending on renewable energy, arguing that any cap and trade 
system paired with large increases in public spending on renewable energy would have a 
net positive impact on growth. CBPP’s report also accepted the EPA’s analysis as 
credible and accurate but emphasized that the estimate did include the economic benefits 
of decreasing the risk of climate-related catastrophic environmental and economic effects 
(Stone 2009). Thus, both Democratic-aligned think tanks declined to produce biased 
estimates, and instead focused on a progressive framing of the policy analysis.  
 The two Republican-aligned think tanks published very different information on 
the impact of ACES. The Heritage Foundation commissioned a primary analysis from 
IHS Global Insight, an economics consulting firm (Beach et al. 2009). They projected 
that additional renewable energy capacity would not increase versus the counterfactual 
despite the price on carbon. Instead, electricity and transportation prices would rise in 
response to the cap on carbon emissions by as much as 90%. This increased price would 
decrease economic activity. They projected that 2030 GDP would be 2.31% lower than 
the counterfactual where no policy changed. Conversely, the American Enterprise 
Institute did not produce a primary analysis, or even a substantial report specifically 
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dedicated to the bill. However, AEI did produce commentary on ACES from Lee Lane, 
head of the organization’s geoengineering program. While much of his commentary 
focused on the challenges of a cap and trade strategy in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions given international collective actions problems, Lane commented on economic 
growth in one article titled, “What will the climate bill cost?” (Lane 2009), in which he 
criticizes non-partisan reports for being too optimistic about costs. Lane refers to a study 
by Charles Rivers Associates, an energy consulting firm, which projects 2030 GDP to 
decrease by 1%. Thus, the Heritage Foundation report created a primary estimate biased 
far to the right of non-partisans, while the AEI commentary produced a secondary report 
slightly to the right of the non-partisans, but largely focused on reframing. 
 These predictions are summarized in Table 4.2. The non-partisan sources 
predicted that the cap and trade program proposed under ACES would decrease GDP in 
2030 by between 0.3% and 0.9%. Neither Democratic-aligned think tank produced their 
own primary estimate of the impact of cap-and-trade, and accepted the EPA’s estimate, 
which was considerably more negative than even the other non-partisan sources, as the 
authoritative word on the bill’s impact. However, both think tanks also engaged in some 
mild reframing of the cost/benefit calculus offered by the EPA report. On the other side, 
both Republican aligned think tanks offered their own estimates on the impact of the bill. 
The Heritage Foundation’s secondary report was strongly biased to the right, estimating 
that GDP in 2030 would be 2.3% lower than the counterfactual. AEI provided only 
secondary analysis, referring to a third-party report by an energy consulting firm that 
estimated only a slightly larger impact on GDP than the EPA report, although AEI’s 
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framing deemphasized the environmental benefit of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions 
and strongly emphasized its economic impact.  
  Organization GDP (2030) Type 
Democratic    
 Center for American Progress1 -0.9% Secondary 
 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities2 -0.9% Secondary 
Non-Partisan    
 Palstev et al. 2009 -0.4% Primary 
 Energy Information Agency -0.3% Primary 
 Environmental Protection Agency -0.9% Primary 
Republican    
 Heritage Foundation -2.3% Primary 
  American Enterprise Institute3 -1.0% Secondary 
1. The Center for American Progress report uses both the EPA and Palstev et al. estimates  
2. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities report references the EPA estimates.  
3. The American Enterprise Institute report references predictions from a report by Charles Rivers Associates, an 
energy consulting firm. 
 
Table 4.2:  Analyses of the Effect of the American Clean Energy and Security Act on 
GDP in 2030 
Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act of 2010 
 The Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act of 2010 (ACA) was the signature 
legislative achievement of the Obama Administration. The ACA was the culmination of 
decades of advocacy by progressives to bring near-universal health care coverage to 
Americans (Hacker 2010). It resulted in between 24 and 26 million Americans receiving 
health insurance. 15 million received health insurance through an expansion of Medicaid 
above the poverty line and 10 million through subsidies that allowed working class 
families to purchase health insurance on publicly run individual exchanges (CBO 2016). 
The bill also created numerous consumer protections for Americans buying health 
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insurance. Most notably, it prohibited insurance companies from denying coverage to 
Americans with pre-existing conditions, only allowed them to vary premiums by age and 
location, banned lifetime caps on health insurance coverage and required insurers to 
spend a certain percentage of premiums on coverage (Meltzer 2011). Furthermore, the 
bill sought to “bend the cost curve” of American health insurance through a number of 
regulatory measures. These included a mandate that all individuals carry health 
insurance, changes to how the federal government pays providers and incentives to 
increase preventative care and vaccinations. It paid for these changes largely by 
increasing Medicare payroll taxes by 0.9% and 3.8% on investment income for wealthy 
households, as well as cuts to federal Medicare spending (CBO 2010). The bill also 
included a significant change to federal student loan financing under the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 that was unrelated to health care. The analyses below only 
consider the health care portion of the ACA.  
 The biggest policy analysis debate surrounding the ACA was its cost. The policy 
analysis debate centered around the cost of new government spending on health care, 
rather than the impact of the taxes. All but one of the reports agreed that the ACA would 
raise $420 billion in new tax revenue and cut $511 billion in federal spending, primarily 
to Medicare. Analysts disagree on both the impact of new regulations on overall health 
care costs and how much the complex regime of subsidies and Medicaid expansion 
would cost. Two non-partisan sources modeled the impact of the ACA on the deficit. The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the ACA would increase government 
spending by $730 billion. It would spend $358 billion on subsidies to the individual 
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marketplaces and $434 billion from the Medicaid expansion. Thus, the bill would 
decrease the deficit by $124 billion over the 10-year budget window (CBO 2010). The 
RAND Corporation also released its own independent estimate, using its in-house 
COMPARE simulation model (RAND 2010). RAND estimated that government 
spending on health care would increase by $899 billion. RAND’s model assumed that 
plans on the individual market would cost considerably more than CBO’s estimate, thus 
increasing the cost of federal subsidies and slightly increasing taxes paid by non-
compliant individuals. It also estimated slightly different spending costs. RAND 
estimated that subsidies would cost the federal government $499 billion. However, it also 
estimated a slightly lower cost of the federal Medicaid expansion at $400 billion. Thus, 
while RAND did not estimate the revenue side of the occasion, its estimates on federal 
spending imply that the bill would decrease the deficit by $32 billion. 
 Both Republican-aligned think tanks produced reports estimating the impact of 
the ACA on the deficit. The AEI report was written by Scott Harrington, a respected 
professor of insurance and risk management with an endowed chair at the Wharton 
School who also held an affiliation with AEI (Harrington 2010). The report summarized 
and deferred to the CBO estimates of the bill’s impact on health care spending and the 
deficit. He argued that the cuts to Medicare would likely have to be revisited or reversed 
by a future Congress, and that the same problems could have been solved with free-
market policy alternatives contained in the 2008 Republican Party Platform. The Heritage 
Foundation, on the other hand, created its own primary estimate by modifying the 
assumptions used by CBO to determine the bill’s “real” cost (Capretta 2010). The report 
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argued that the CBO’s estimated double-counted many of the spending cuts contained in 
the bill, and expected Congress to continue to raise Medicare and Medicaid payments to 
providers (known as the “Doc Fix”). It concluded that the true cost of the spending 
provisions in the House version of the bill33 would be $1.495 trillion, implying that it 
would increase the deficit by $564 billion. 
 Both Democratic-aligned think tanks also issued reports. The Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities published three secondary analyses on the impact of the ACA on the 
deficit, all of which referred to the CBO estimate (Lueck et al. 2010; Van De Water 2010; 
Van De Water and Horney 2010). The reports framed the ACA as a victory for working- 
and middle-class families who struggle with health care costs, but also one that would 
bend the cost curve on health care and improve the federal government’s long-term 
budget outlook. The Center for American Progress, on the other hand, performed its own 
primary analysis of the impact of the ACA on the deficit which it co-published with the 
Commonwealth Fund (Cutler, Davis, and Stremikis 2010). The primary author, David 
Cutler, is an endowed chair in economics at Harvard University who had advised 
numerous Democratic presidents and presidential campaigns on health care issues. The 
report argued that the ACA would actually decrease the deficit by $505 billion from the 
health care provisions of the bill,34 largely due to the bill’s payments, modernization and 
regulatory reforms. Specifically, it estimates that the federal savings from the Medicare 
 
33 The Heritage report was released on January 16th, 2010, before the final reconciled version of the bill 
was available.  
34 Because the report uses the CBO’s report on the full bill, including the education provisions, it estimates 
savings of $524 billion. I subtracted the CBO’s $19 billion savings from the education provisions from 
their estimate. 
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payments cuts would be $171 billion greater than CBO’s $511 billion estimate, the 
reforms would decrease the growth of Medicare costs by $124 billion, and lowered 
private health care costs would result in employers shifting compensation from tax-free 
health insurance to taxed wages, resulting in an additional $86 billion federal revenue. 
The report argues that the inefficiencies in health care systems when compared with our 
private sector industries create enough slack for the federal reforms to target and reduce 
costs.  
 These predictions are summarized in Table 4.3 The non-partisan sources 
predicted that the ACA would decrease the federal deficit by between $32 billion and 
$124 billion over 10 years. The CBO and RAND corporation both forecast that almost all 
of the savings in the bill would come from relatively straightforward tax increases and 
direct cuts to federal spending. The two centrist-leaning party-aligned think tanks, AEI 
and CBPP, both accepted this assessment with the barest reframing. However, CAP and 
Heritage each issued reports that were biased in their preferred direction in similar 
magnitudes. CAP predicted that the payment and regulatory reforms in the ACA would 
decrease the bill’s cost, saving an additional $381 billion. Heritage predicted that many of 
the cuts would fail to materialize in actual spending due to “double-counting” and 




  Organization Deficit Type 
Democratic    
 Center for American Progress $-505 billion Primary 
 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities1 $-124 billion Secondary 
Non-Partisan    
 Congressional Budget Office $-124 billion Primary 
 RAND Corporation2 $-32 billion Primary 
Republican    
 Heritage Foundation $400 billion Primary 
  American Enterprise Institute3 $-124 billion Secondary 
1. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities report references the CBO report.  
2. The RAND Corporation report only estimates the cost of the ACA's spending. I calculated the impact on the 
deficit using the CBO's tax revenue estimates.  
3. The American Enterprise Institute report references the CBO report. 
 
Table 4.3:  Analyses of the Effect of the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act on 
the Deficit 
Clean Energy Portfolio Standards 
In addition to a cap and trade system, the American Clean Energy and Security 
Act included a federal requirement that utility companies generate a gradually increasing 
proportion of their electricity output using renewable energy. Beginning in the late-
1990s, 29 states adopted renewable energy portfolio standards, including several 
Republican-controlled states like Texas (Barbose 2018). Roughly half of the growth of 
new renewable energy capacity since 2000 can be attributed to state RPS laws (Barbose 
2018). In addition to reducing carbon emissions, state RPS policies also considerably 
reduced other types of harmful air pollution, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) (Mai et al. 2016). After ACES failed to pass the Senate, the climate change 
debate shifted to a federal RPS law independent of a cap and trade system. Because the 
RPS laws were popular and effective in both blue and red states, advocates were 
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optimistic about its prospects in Congress. Republican Senators like Lindsey Graham and 
Sam Brownback signaled support for a RPS during the 112th Congress (Howell 2010). 
 The most advanced RPS proposal in the Senate was the Clean Energy Standard 
Act of 2012 (CES), which was introduced by Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman. CES 
would require electric utilities to generate 24% of their electricity from clean sources 
beginning in 2015, slowly increasing to 54% by 2025 and 84% by 2035. It would have 
set up a credit-trading scheme allowing states with less access to cheap solar or wind 
power to pay states with better access to over-produce clean electricity and make up for 
their shortfall (Ye 2012). Carbon emissions from electricity generation in 2035 would 
drop to 60% of 2010 levels. However, although a similar bill was bipartisan during the 
111th Congress, no Republicans joined Democrats in cosponsoring CES in the 112th. It 
never received a vote.  
 Similar to the debate over cap and trade, the policy analysis debate over the 
portfolio standards contained in CES centered around the ability of utility companies to 
adjust to a post-coal paradigm. If utilities could generate clean electricity cheaply, there 
would be a relatively small impact on electricity prices. If they could not, prices would 
increase under constrained electricity supply. These prices would be paid by retail 
consumers and businesses, resulting in loss of household income and potentially lower 
economic growth. Unlike the cap and trade estimates, analysts could use data from the 29 
states who adopted renewable energy portfolio standards to estimate the impact of a 
federal standard on prices. Because the law phased in electricity prices over time, 
analysts predicted the impact of the policy change at different time intervals. 
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 The Energy Information Agency (EIA), a Department of Energy policy advisory 
organization, performed a detailed analysis of the impact of CES (EIA 2012). EIA 
estimated that the 54% requirement in 2025 would increase average retail electricity 
prices from $0.0929/kWh to $0.0965/kWh, a 4% increase. In 2035, the impact would be 
stronger, shifting prices from $0.0954/kWh to $0.1129/kWh, an 18% increase. CBO also 
published an extensive report on various clean or renewable portfolio standards in 2011, 
but only estimated the impact of a more modest 25% clean energy standard (CBO 2011). 
 On the Democratic side, just the Center for American Progress published a report 
estimating the impact of CES on electricity prices (Caperton 2012). Borrowing a method 
from Hickey and Carlson (2010), the CAP report examined the difference in electricity 
prices before and after states implemented a renewable energy standard. It found that, on 
average, state electricity prices did not increase following the introduction of a portfolio 
standard. Therefore, the report concluded, consumers should not expect any net increase 
in electricity prices from CES or similar laws. The report’s conclusions differ from the 
EIA report because it ignored the size of the standards. While many states implemented 
portfolio standards, none at the time had approached the ambitious thresholds that the 
CES would require. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities did not produce a report 
on renewable portfolio standards. 
 Both the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute produced reports 
skeptical of RPS standards, but for different reasons. During the 111th Congress, Heritage 
published a report on renewable portfolio standards in response to the requirements 
included in the ACES bill (Kreutzer et al. 2010). The Heritage report assumed that 
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utilities would have to substitute coal electricity generation for wind and solar at current 
costs to comply with any portfolio standard, rather than the cost coming down with 
technological change or scale. Coal cost $78/mWh and natural gas cost $140/mWh, while 
onshore wind cost $149/mWh and photo-voltaic solar electricity cost $396/mWh.35 The 
report calculated that shifting from coal and natural gas to renewable energy would 
increase electricity prices by 22.5% in 2025 and 36% in 2035, dramatically increasing 
household costs by $189 per month in 2035. AEI, on the other hand, accepted the EIA 
data (Zycher 2012). Zycher instead argued that recent changes in natural gas extraction 
technology will make renewables less competitive, especially as they attempt to scale up. 
He also emphasized the long-term negative impact that higher energy prices would have 
on the economy, and deemphasized the potential risks associated with climate change.  
 Table 4.4 summarizes these predictions. The Energy Information Agency 
predicted that real retail electricity prices would increase under a renewable energy 
portfolio standard by 4% in 2025 and 18% in 2035, as utility companies adapted to the 
changing environment by switching from lower-cost coal to higher-cost renewable 
energy sources.  The American Enterprise Institute published a secondary analysis which 
largely accepted this finding with some reframing, while the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities did not issue a report on the topic. The Center for American Progress published 
a report which argued that there should be no short-term increases in electricity prices 
 
 35 These rates refer to the estimated levelized cost per megawatt hour for new capacity as estimated by 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “2016 Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources from the 
Annual Energy Outlook 2010. Today, EIA estimates that new capacity for photovoltaic and onshore wind 
in 2023 at $49/mWh and $43/mWh (EIA 2020).  
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under a renewable portfolio standard, although they did not predict the impact of one on 
long-term prices. This short-term prediction is slightly to the left of the EIA’s prediction 
of a 4% increase. However, we might also consider the report’s omission of a longer-term 
prediction to be biased in and of itself, since EIA predicted a significant 18% price 
increase in 2035, as the RPS became more constraining on utility companies, while CAP 
ignored the more stringent standards of the federal bill relative to state standards. The 
Heritage Foundation, on the other hand, aggressively predicted that prices would rise by 
22.5% in 2025, nearly four times as much as the non-partisan sources, and 36% in 2035. 
The short-term prediction is biased much farther to the right than CAP’s is to the left. 
However, the long-term prediction is arguably equally biased if we interpret CAP’s 
silence on long-term prices as a prediction of zero change. 
  
  Organization Prices (2025) Prices (2035) Type 
Democratic     
 Center for American Progress 0 n/a Primary 
 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities2 n/a n/a n/a 
Non-Partisan1    
 Energy Information Agency 4.0% 18.0% Primary 
Republican     
 Heritage Foundation 22.5%3 36% Primary 
  American Enterprise Institute4 4.0% 18% Secondary 
1. The Congressional Budget Office released an extensive report on the impact of renewable energy standards, but 
their analysis was based on the EIA analysis.  
2. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities did not issue an impact analysis of renewable energy standards.  
3. The Heritage Foundation's report released estimates for 2012 and 2035, as well as cumulative impacts in between. 
The 22.5% figure is interpolated.  
4. AEI based its analysis off the Energy Information Agency report. 
 
Table 4.4:  Analyses of the Impact of Proposed Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards 
on Electricity Prices 
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Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 
 After the 2012 election, the Republican National Committee wrote a report 
diagnosing the party’s loss in the election and examining its long-term electoral 
prospects. The report concluded that the Republican Party needed to embrace 
immigration reform in order to be successful in the long term, 
“If Hispanic Americans perceive that a GOP nominee or candidate does not want 
them in the United States (i.e. self-deportation), they will not pay attention to our 
next sentence. It does not matter what we say about education, jobs or the 
economy; if Hispanics think we do not want them here, they will close their ears 
to our policies. In the last election, Governor Romney received just 27 percent of 
the Hispanic vote. Other minority communities, including Asian and Pacific 
Islander Americans, also view the Party as unwelcoming. President Bush got 44 
percent of the Asian vote in 2004; our presidential nominee received only 26 
percent in 2012… 
… We are not a policy committee, but among the steps Republicans take in the 
Hispanic community and beyond, we must embrace and champion comprehensive 
immigration reform.” (RNC 2013, 8) 
 
 The Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act 
of 2013 (hereafter referred to as “the immigration bill.”) was an attempt to enact the 
policy change recommended by the RNC report. The bill was structured as a compromise 
between the pro and anti-immigration sides of the debate. For pro-immigration 
proponents, the bill would have allowed most undocumented immigrants in the United 
States who came to the country before 2012 to pay a $500 penalty and become permanent 
residents and eventually citizens. It also provided an easier path to citizenship for 
undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children. For the 
anti-immigration side, it would provide large increases in funding for border security, 
with the goal of intercepting 90% of crossings on the Southern border. It would 
implement a national E-Verify system to prevent undocumented immigrants from legally 
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working. Many of the policy changes affecting undocumented immigrants would not go 
into place until after the Southern border targets were met. Finally, the bill also made a 
number of important changes to the legal immigration system with support from both 
sides, including replacing country-based quotas with a Canadian-style merit system and 
increasing employment-based visas for high-skilled immigrants.  
 The immigration bill was bipartisan. It was introduced to the Senate by a “Gang 
of Eight” Senators, including Republican Senators McCain, Graham, Rubio and Flake in 
April of 2013. The bill was supported by a number of key interest groups, most notably 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2013). It quickly moved 
through the Judiciary Committee and passed the full Senate on a 68-32 vote in late-June. 
All Democrats and fourteen Republicans voted in aye.  However, the bill received intense 
opposition from ideological conservatives. In particular, Rush Limbaugh, an influential 
conservative talk radio host, argued relentlessly against it on grounds that it would hurt 
Republicans at the ballot box, 
“But regardless, whenever they get the vote, if it’s 10 years, if it’s two hours, if 
it’s five years, if there are 11, 12 million people here currently unable to vote, 
and they are Hispanic, and if they fit the profile that polling data gives us, a full 
70% of them are gonna vote Democrats. So the numbers work out this way. If 
you got 11 or 12 million people here that can’t vote right now, not legally, but 
someday will be able to, and 70% of those people are gonna vote Democrat, how 
in the world does the Republican Party stay — I hate using this word ’cause it’s 
used incorrectly, but viable, how does the Republican Party stay viable, when 
they get 30% of whatever that number of millions of new people is?” (Limbaugh 
2013) 
 
Two related policy analysis debates emerged from contentious parts of the bill. 
First, analysts asked what impact legitimizing tens of millions of undocumented 
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immigrants and eventually granting them citizenship would have on economic growth. 
Relatedly, analysts also asked what impact the bill would have on the deficit. The impacts 
of changes to legal immigration and increased enforcement were not the subject of 
partisan debate.  
Unfortunately, the complex nature of the immigration bill resulted in 
organizations estimating its impact on slightly different outputs (for a detailed 
comparison, see (Enchautegui, Lindner, and Poethig 2013). Three organizations produced 
independent estimates of the impact of the changes in immigration law on the economy 
and deficit. However, each estimated slightly different impacts of the bill on slightly 
different outcomes. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the impact of the 
individual components of the bill on economic growth and the impact of the total bill, 
including its large changes to legal immigration and new spending on border security, on 
the deficit over the 10-year budget window. It also provided a brief estimate of the bill’s 
impacts on the deficit in following decade. The two party-aligned think tanks that 
produced independent estimates, the Center for American Progress and Heritage 
Foundation, wrote reports on the impact of the portion of the bill that legitimized, and 
eventually granted citizenship to, undocumented immigrants (Lynch and Oakford 2013; 
Richwine and Rector 2013). The CAP report estimated both the impact of legalizing 
undocumented immigrants on both GDP and tax revenue over the 10-year budget 
window, while the Heritage report estimated the impact of doing so on the deficit over 50 
years, although they also estimated the impact over the first 13 years. While I perform the 
best possible apples-to-apples comparisons below, these comparisons are not how the 
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reports were received (Enchautegui, Lindner, and Poethig 2013). In particular, the 
Heritage report was reported contemporaneously as a cost estimate of the bill, 
comparable to the CBO report (Palmer and Vogel 2013), and thus likely impacted the 
debate over the bill as if it were an apples-to-apples comparison. While these estimates 
are comparable to some degree, due to their complexity I do not list them as a table 
below.  
The Congressional Budget Office produced two reports on the bill. The first 
examined the cost of the bill (CBO 2013a), while the second examined its economic 
impact (CBO 2013b). The cost estimate examines the net cost of the entire bill, including 
the border security expansions and legal immigration changes. It estimates that the 
overall bill will decrease the federal deficit by $197 billion over ten years. On the revenue 
side, it would increase federal revenue by $459 billion, about $451 billion of which 
would come from increased income and payroll tax revenue from newly legitimized 
residents and increased legal immigration, with the remainder coming from visa fees and 
revenue from fines paid by formerly undocumented residents. The bill would increase the 
population of prime-age taxpayers by allowing more immigrants into the country, all of 
whom would be employed and many of whom would be highly skilled immigrants 
earning high wages. On the spending side, it would increase spending by $262 billion.36 
Of the new spending, $238 billion would come in the form of refundable earned income 
tax credits, child tax credits, and federal health care spending. The report notes that most 
 
36 CBO anticipated that Congress would authorize an additional $15 billion in annual spending on border 
security, but did not include these potential appropriations in the cost estimate.  
 109 
new adult immigrants would not be eligible for most federal means-tested benefits. While 
CBO also did not break down spending estimate between the two groups, although most 
of the costs would likely be concentrated in the lower-skilled, poorer group of formerly 
undocumented immigrants. In the second report on the impact of the bill on economic 
growth, CBO estimates that real GDP in 2023 would be 3.3% higher if the bill was 
passed versus the counterfactual of the bill not being passed.37 While the report did not 
break down the impact of the expansion of legal immigration and legitimization of 
undocumented immigrants, it does specify that the majority of increased economic 
growth would come from increasing the size of the U.S. population through increased 
legal immigration and increases to total factor productivity caused by a more skilled U.S. 
workforce. The legitimization of undocumented immigrants would have a smaller effect, 
as those workers are already in the labor force, through increased productivity. 
 Both Democratic-aligned think tanks produced reports on the impact of 
immigration reforms on the economy and deficit. The Center for American Progress 
produced a primary analysis of the impact of the legalization portion of the immigration 
bill, while the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities only produced a secondary analysis. 
The CAP report, which was co-authored by a CAP research associate and an economist at 
Washington College, produced three different scenarios on the impact of legalizing 11 
million undocumented immigrants on tax revenue and economic growth, varying the time 
when citizenship was granted in each scenario (Lynch and Oakford 2013). Based on 
 
37 The cost estimate noted that this increased economic growth should lead to macroeconomic feedback 
effects and thus further increase tax revenues, but did not perform a dynamic analysis of the bill’s cost. 
 110 
research on the 1980s amnesty, the report concludes that granting undocumented 
immigrants citizenship increases their economic productivity. Under its most optimistic 
scenario, where undocumented immigrants are granted citizenship shortly after being 
granted legal status, they project GDP in 2023 to be 3.20% larger than under the 
counterfactual of current law. They did not include the changes to legal immigration 
proposed by the bill in their estimates. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
published one detailed secondary analysis, authored by two CBPP researchers, on the 
impact of the immigration bill on the economy and deficit. The report was a detailed 
summary and explanation of the CBO cost estimate and made little effort to reframe the 
issue (C. Stone and Parrot 2013)  
 The immigration bill encountered strong opposition from the Heritage 
Foundation. Heritage had opposed the Bush Administration’s previous attempt at 
compromise immigration reform bill during the 110th Congress (2007-2008), publishing 
over 60 reports opposing it.38 The American Enterprise Institute did not produce a report 
on the immigration during the debate over the 2013 bill.39 The Heritage report, written by 
longtime Heritage Foundation researcher Robert Rector and a Jason Richwine, a newer 
Heritage staffer who earned his Ph.D. from Harvard in 2009 and briefly worked at the 
American Enterprise Institute, was controversial. The report estimated the cost of 
legitimizing 11 million undocumented immigrants over 50 years to be $5.3 trillion. If 
 
38 Author’s count based on data 
39 AEI did produce considerable commentary supporting immigration reform, including using similar 
political logic as the RNC report. See (Olson 2010; Ponnuru 2013).  
 111 
legitimized, Rector and Richwine estimated they would receive federal, state and local 
services and transfers totaling $9.4 trillion, while paying $3.1 trillion in taxes. Under 
current law, their net cost during the same time period would be just $1 trillion. Services 
included everything from means-tested benefits to the use of roads, public schools and 
the criminal justice system. While the $5.3 trillion figure seems large, its 50-year time 
period and combination of federal, state and local analysis exaggerate the bill’s impact; 
the report’s estimate comes out to just $106 billion annually. However, the figure was 
reported as if it were comparable to the CBO’s cost estimate of the entire bill (Palmer and 
Vogel 2013).  
There was a quick and decisive backlash to the report. Two days after it was 
released, Dylan Matthews, a Washington Post blogger, pointed out significant 
methodological errors made by Rector and Richwine, including assuming no 
macroeconomic feedback effect from legalizing 11 million undocumented immigrants 
despite considerable evidence that previous amnesties had increased their productivity 
and human capital, assuming that all of the current undocumented population would 
return to their home countries when they hit retirement age, and selectively counting tax 
expenditures and spending (Matthews 2013a). Two days later, Matthews published an 
article on Richwine’s 2009 dissertation, “IQ and Immigration Policy”, and its argument 
against Latino immigration because Latinos are genetically inferior to Whites, 
“Richwine's dissertation asserts that there are deep-set differentials in intelligence 
between races. While it's clear he thinks it is partly due to genetics — "the totality 
of the evidence suggests a genetic component to group differences in IQ" — he 
argues the most important thing is that the differences in group IQs are persistent, 
for whatever reason. He writes, "No one knows whether Hispanics will ever reach 
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IQ parity with whites, but the prediction that new Hispanic immigrants will have 
low-IQ children and grandchildren is difficult to argue against." (Matthews 
2013b) 
 
Following an intense media backlash, the Heritage Foundation immediately noted that the 
dissertation was not published by the Heritage Foundation (Palmer and Vogel 2013). 
Richwine resigned from Heritage two days later (Blake 2013). 
 To summarize, the think tanks and non-partisan sources made a variety of 
predictions on the impact of the Border Security Economic Opportunity and Immigration 
Modernization Act of 2013 on the economy and deficit. While some of these predictions 
are comparable, they do not cleanly line up, and thus are not easily summarized in a 
table. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities published a secondary analysis that 
accepted the CBO report’s conclusions with little reframing. AEI did not publish a report 
on the impact of the bill or similar reforms on the economy or deficit. The Center for 
American Progress published a primary analysis which predicted that legalizing 11 
million undocumented immigrations would increase GDP by 3.2% after 10 years, as the 
formerly undocumented immigrants would increase their wages and human capital. 
While this estimate is similar to the 3.3% increased GDP forecasted by CBO, it does not 
include the changes to legal immigration that CBO expects to make up the bulk of the 
impact on GDP growth. Because CBO did not break down its economic impact estimate 
between the various components of the immigration bill, we cannot directly compare 
these estimates, other than to say that the CAP estimate is considerably biased in the 
progressive direction. CAP did not publish their own estimate of the bill’s deficit impact, 
but we can assume that if they did so using the same economic growth forecasts, it would 
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project a significantly larger decrease to the deficit than CBO. The Heritage Foundation 
published its own primary analysis on the impact of legalizing 11 million undocumented 
immigrants on the deficit, but not economic growth. However, Heritage’s estimate is also 
difficult to compare directly to the CBO estimate, as it estimated the impact of 
legalization on combined federal, state and local spending net of revenue, rather than just 
federal spending. It also primarily estimated the cumulative impact of legalization over 
50 years, likely in order to inflate the headline number, rather than a more modest short-
term impact. While it is difficult to directly compare the Heritage estimate that net 
spending would increase by $5.3 trillion to the CBO’s estimate that the entire bill would 
decrease the deficit by $459 billion, the impact analysis is clearly biased strongly in the 
conservative direction. 
 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) was the signature legislative achievement of 
the 115th Congress. The law reduced federal taxes by $2.3 trillion over ten years (CBO 
2018). Its largest reductions were focused on corporations and the very rich. TCJA 
reduced the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21%, allowed pass-through 
corporations to claim income at the lower corporate rate rather than as income, and 
moved U.S. corporate taxes from a worldwide to a territorial system. TCJA also raised 
the threshold on the estate tax from $5.6 million to $11.2 million and tweaked the 
structure of income tax brackets to decrease taxes on the rich and slightly increase taxes 
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on the poor. It also raised the standard deduction and changed the way that some tax 
deductions are claimed. TCJA narrowly passed both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate with no Democratic votes in December of 2017.  
 Much of the debate over TCJA centered around macroeconomic feedback effects. 
While all involved estimated that the law would cause a small macroeconomic boost and 
large increase in the deficit in the short-term, they disagreed about the long-term impact 
of the law on economic growth and therefore the deficit. Republicans argued that the 
corporate tax cuts in TCJA were designed to encourage investment into economy, and 
thus greatly increase economic growth while only marginally impacting the deficit over 
the long run. Democrats argued that they were pro-cyclical giveaways to the rich that 
would explode the deficit. These arguments mirror the same debates that the two parties 
had over the two tax cuts under George W. Bush and many of the Reagan-era tax cuts 
(Jones and Williams 2008; Prasad 2018). In both previous cases, the tax cuts failed to 
spur economic growth enough to beat their deficit projections (Jones and Williams 2008).  
Four non-partisan information sources published primary estimates of the impact 
of TCJA on real GDP in 2027, at the end of the 10-year budget window required by the 
Senate’s budget reconciliation procedure. The Congressional Budget Office published 
estimates for each version of the bill as it passed the House, Senate and eventually 
emerged from conference committee. However, a rushed legislative process meant that it 
did not have time to conduct its most thorough estimate of the version of the bill which 
eventually emerged from conference committee. The preliminary CBO cost estimate 
released on December 15th forecasted that the final bill would increase real 2027 GDP by 
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0.7%, therefore increasing the deficit by $1.46 trillion CBO 2017).40 The Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) produced a similar estimate of 0.8% GDP and $1.5 trillion 
over 10 years. Two outside groups also provided detailed primary estimates of TCJA’s 
macroeconomic impact. The first was published by an academic research group at the 
University of Pennsylvania led by economist Kent Smetters, who estimated the 
macroeconomic impact of the bill using a model known as the Penn-Wharton Budget 
Model (PWBM 2017). They published two predictions. If they assume that the bill 
increases productivity with a high return to capital investments into the economy, the 
model estimates that 2027 GDP will increase by 1.1% while the deficit increases by 
$1.94 trillion. If they assume a lower return to capital investments, GDP increases by 
0.6% and the deficit increases by $2.23 trillion.41 Finally, the Tax Policy Center (TPC), a 
joint program of the Brookings Institution and Urban Institute, produced their own 
estimate led by Benjamin Page, a former CBO analyst (B. R. Page et al. 2017). They 
predicted that TCJA would have a much smaller impact on the economy, increasing 2027 
GDP by just 0.4%. Both the PWBM and TPC also estimated the long-run impact of 
TCJA on GDP, coming to much different conclusions. PWBM predicted that the bill 
would increase 2040 GDP by between 0.7% and 1.6%. TPC predicts that it will have no 
long-run impact on GDP by 2037. 
 
40 CBO released a more detailed report on April 30th, 2018. It estimated that the deficit impact would be 
larger, at $1.9 trillion. This chapter uses the December 15th estimate, as it is most comparable to the other 
impact analyses, which also had little time to perform their final analyses. 
41 The estimates in Table 4.5 average the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios together. 
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No Democratic-aligned think tank produced their own impact analysis of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act. The Center for American Progress published numerous reports 
criticizing the bill but focused on how it would raise middle class taxes while lowering 
taxes for the rich, rather than its impact on the deficit or economy (for example, see 
(Rowell and Schwartz 2017). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities published two 
detailed secondary analysis on the macroeconomic impact of the bill. The first compared 
the impact estimates of the four non-partisan sources, averaging their predictions together 
(Friedman and Stone 2017). The second argued that many of the bill’s most popular tax 
cuts were set to expire in the middle of the 10-year budget window in order to keep the 
headline cost of the bill down, that even a Democratic-controlled Congress would likely 
feel pressure to maintain these tax cuts, and therefore the true headline cost of the bill 
would likely cost $200 billion over the official estimates. In both cases, the Democratic-
aligned think tanks engaged in framing, rather than elite persuasion. 
Both the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute published 
primary estimates of the impact of TCJA on economic growth. Both reports estimated the 
impact of TCJA on economic growth but did not estimate its impact on the deficit. Each 
used in-house models to estimate the impact of tax changes on the economy but came to 
different conclusions. The AEI report, written by two resident AEI researchers, estimated 
the macroeconomic impact of both the House and Senate versions of the bill, but not the 
conference report. They predicted that the Senate version of the bill would increase 2027 
GDP by 0.92% and long-run GDP by 2.2%. Two Heritage researchers used their own 
model to estimate the macroeconomic impact of TCJA. They released a more detailed 
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report on the House and Senate bills in November (Sheppard and Burton 2017a) and a 
brief updated estimate using the same model on the conference report in December 
(Sheppard and Burton 2017b). They predicted that the TCJA would dramatically increase 
capital stock and working hours, resulting in an increase a 2.2% increase in long-run 
GDP. While they did not estimate the bill’s impact 2027 GDP, they noted that, “most of 
the increase in GDP would likely occur within the 10-year budget window” (Sheppard 
and Burton 2017b, 1). Neither the AEI nor Heritage report estimated the impact of the 
TCJA on the deficit, although we can assume that it would be smaller than estimates 
predicting a weaker feedback effect on economic growth.42  
 Table 4.5 shows all of these estimates. The four non-partisans predicted that the 
TCJA would increase 2027 GDP by between 0.4% and 0.85% and increase the deficit by 
between $1.1 trillion and $2.05 trillion. In the long run, they predicted that GDP would 
increase by between 0 and 1.1%. Democratic-aligned think tanks accepted these 
conclusions, instead focusing their efforts to reframe the issue as one of rich versus poor. 
Republican-aligned think tanks, on the other hand, chose to engage in elite persuasion by 
publishing biased research which found a much larger impact of the tax cuts on the 
economy. This bias showed up most strongly in their long-term analysis. Both predicted a 
much larger long-run impact on economic growth than the non-partisan sources who 
attempted to long-run growth. In the short-term, AEI’s prediction was in line with the 
high end up of non-partisan expectations. While Heritage did not offer a specific short-
 
42 One further Republican-aligned think tank report from the Tax Foundation received considerable 
attention (Tax Foundation 2017). It predicted that the TCJA would increase 2027 GDP by 2.68% and the 
deficit by $448 billion. 
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term prediction, the report states that most of their long-run 2.2% prediction would come 
in the first 10 years, which would far exceed non-partisan predictions for the bill’s short-
term impact. Finally, while the Republican-aligned think tanks did not formally estimate 
TCJA’s impact on the deficit, their predictions suggest a much lower cost than the non-
partisan estimates.  
 





Democratic      
 Center for American Progress1 n/a n/a n/a No 
 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities2 0.66% n/a $1.6 trillion No 
Non-Partisan      
 Congressional Budget Office 0.70% n/a $1.46 trillion Yes 
 Joint Committee on Taxation 0.80% n/a $1.1 trillion Yes 
 Penn-Wharton Budget Model3 0.85% 1.15% $2.05 trillion Yes 
 Tax Policy Center 0.40% 0.00% $1.8 trillion Yes 
Republican      
 Heritage Foundation n/a4 2.20% n/a Yes 
  American Enterprise Institute5 0.92% 2.05% n/a Yes 
1. CAP did not issue a report on the impact of TCJA on the economy.  
2. The CBPP report averaged together the four non-partisan sources 
3. The Penn Wharton Budget model estimated both a high and low scenario for the impact of TCJA on economic 
growth. 0.85% is the average of the two scenarios.  
4. The Heritage Foundation report did not estimate the impact of TCJA on 2027 GDP, but noted that "most of the 
increase in GDP would likely occur within the 10-year budget window." (Shepard and Burton 2017, 1) 
 5. The AEI report estimated the impact of the House and Senate versions of the bill, but not the conference report. 
Estimates here are for the Senate version. 
 
Table 4.5:  Analyses of the Impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on Real GDP in 2027 
SUMMARY 
 This chapter compared estimates of the impact of five proposed policy changes 
made by party-aligned think tanks and non-partisan information sources. On all of these 
issues, at least one party-aligned think tank published a report that predicted an outcome 
considerably to the left or right of the non-partisan sources, and in their preferred 
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direction. The think tanks also engaged in considerable reframing of issues toward more 
conservative or liberal aspects of the policy. All else being equal, we should expect a co-
partisan who reads these reports and finds them persuasive to shift their preferences away 
from the recommendations of non-partisan information sources and toward the extremes. 
 However, there was considerable variation, both between and within political 
parties. In each case, Republican-aligned think tanks produced impact estimates 
considerably to the right of non-partisans. One Democratic-aligned think tank, the Center 
for American Progress, produced estimates to the left of non-partisans in two of the five 
cases, but actually produced a result considerably to the right in one case.  The analysis 
also suggested that two party-aligned think tanks are considerably closer to the center 
than their co-partisan counterparts. The American Enterprise Institute produced one 
estimate to the right of non-partisans, did not produce a report in one case, and accepted 
non-partisan analysis in two cases. In the remaining case, they referenced a third-party 
report with conclusions only slightly to the right of the non-partisan consensus. The 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities never produced their own estimates or even 
referenced the biased estimates of their co-partisans. Instead, they always relied on the 
consensus of non-partisan estimates. 
 Using these results, we can roughly map out the four party-aligned think tanks in 
ideological space. First, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is firmly planted 
slightly to the left of center. While they did not produce any biased estimates, they did 
work to reframe issues to focus on more progressive aspects of the policy, such as how it 
would affect the poor. Next, the American Enterprise Institute sits in the center-right, 
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although farther from the center than the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. AEI 
produced one biased report out of five cases, reframed issues to focus on more 
conservative aspects of the policy, but also tended to defer to the non-partisan consensus 
on issues. Further to the extremes, both the Center for American Progress and Heritage 
Foundation sit considerably farther from the center. Both organizations tend to produce 
biased information rather than rely on the non-partisan consensus. However, Heritage is 
also clearly farther to the right than CAP is to the left. In each case, Heritage produced its 
own independent estimate of the impact on policy that was biased in a more conservative 
direction, while CAP only did so in three of five cases. In two of those three cases, 
Heritage’s estimates were considerably farther from the center than CAP’s.  
There were considerably differences in rigor between the various think tanks. 
CAP and the American Enterprise Institute tended to work with respected scholars in 
their field. AEI, through their adjunct and visiting scholar programs, often produced 
reports and commentary authored solely by respected scholars. CAP researchers tended 
to co-author with academics working in their field. While both think tanks likely selected 
these scholars by seeking out progressive or conservative-minded academics, their 
presence likely prevented the information from veering too far from the non-partisan 
consensus. Heritage, on the other hand, produced all of its independent reports either in-
house or by contracting analysis from a for-profit consulting firm. This lack of concern 
for scientific rigor likely enabled their divergence from the scientific consensus, although 
in one case it backfired and created significant controversy around the report. 
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However, we should resist generalizing too much from results based on five cases 
that may not be representative of all policy analysis produced by these party-aligned 
think tanks. By limiting comparisons to cases where multiple think tanks produced 
comparable estimates of the impact of a policy on some output, we ignore several types 
of issues. First, we ignore cases where the policy never advances far enough in the 
agenda to produce multiple impact analyses. These excluded cases may be less salient 
than the included cases, and thus party-aligned think tanks may have less incentive to 
produced biased information on them. Relatedly, agenda setting limitations make it 
difficult to compare information produced by decentralized university-structured think 
tanks, like the American Enterprise Institute, with advocacy think tanks, like the other 
three. Advocacy think tanks respond strategically in response to the policy agenda, while 
decentralized think tanks allow their researchers to set their own agenda. As a result, the 
AEI reports analyzed here tended to be shorter, less detailed, and more commentary-
oriented than the reports from the other think tanks. These reports may not be 
representative of AEI reports produced on other issues. Second, we ignore cases where 
party-aligned think tanks do not disagree strongly enough with non-partisan estimates or 
each other to produce their own primary or secondary impact analyses. In these cases, 
party-aligned think tanks may still reframe issues or simply cast doubt on non-partisan 
information without producing a counter-estimate of their own. Finally, we ignore cases 
where impact analyses are difficult to produce or unnecessary in policy debates. 
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Chapter 5: Polarization and Party-Aligned Think Tanks Over Time 
 
 Up until this point, I have examined the historical context and causes of party 
disagreement over policy analysis. I’ve argued that after adopting a consensus knowledge 
regime during the middle of the 20th century centered around non-partisan expertise, both 
political parties eventually adopted their own alternative knowledge regime toward the 
end of the century centered around party-aligned think tanks. I then integrated the 
knowledge regime framework, which is drawn from sociology, into political science 
theories of party position-taking. I argued that party-aligned think tanks could influence 
party positions using a variety of strategies. Finally, I compared the policy analysis of 
party-aligned think tanks to non-partisan information, finding that it tends to either be 
biased in the party’s preferred direction or works to reframe the issue to focus on aspects 
of the party’s core priorities. 
 In the second half of this dissertation, I move to testing whether party-aligned 
think tanks are ultimately successful at influencing their party’s positions. This 
relationship has been examined by a various single-issue studies, on climate change 
(Albert 2019; Bonds 2016; Brulle 2014, 2018; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Farrell 2015; 
McCright and Dunlap 2003; Merkley and Stecula 2018), education policy (Haas 2007; 
Lubienski, Brewer, and La Londe 2016; McDonald 2014), welfare (O’Connor 2001), 
health care (Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Lynch 2016) and taxes (Hertel-Fernandez 
and Martin 2018). While these studies suggest a link between party-aligned think tanks 
and party positions, even as a group they cannot test the hypothesis generally. By 
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focusing on individual issues, each potentially suffers from a selection bias. These issues 
likely drew the attention of scholars because they are all highly salient areas of intense 
partisan conflict where party positions are quite polarized and are thus unrepresentative 
of party positions generally.  
 In Chapters 5 and 7, I test the general relationship between party positions and 
party-aligned think tanks by examining polarization in Congress. While the polarization 
and party positions literatures are often theoretically separated, they fundamentally 
examine the same phenomenon. Polarization occurs when party positions move farther 
apart. These positions are often revealed through roll call voting in Congress, where most 
polarization studies occur. Therefore, we can infer changes in party positions by 
examining increased party disagreement in roll call voting in Congress. Party-aligned 
think tanks prefer more progressive or conservative positions. If they are successful at 
persuading their co-partisans to adopt different positions, parties in Congress will move 
their preferences in a progressive or conservative direction, which we can measure as a 
change in levels of polarization. Thus, we can use polarization to measure the influence 
of party-aligned think tanks on party positions.   
 This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I review the literature on 
polarization in Congress. While the literature has evolved over time, I find broad 
agreement on an order of events: Congress polarized before the public did, the 
Republican Party polarized before the Democratic Party, and the House of 
Representatives polarized before the Senate. However, I find little agreement on the 
causes of polarization. Scholars identify a broad range of causes, many of which only 
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manage to explain polarization at a particular time. I conclude that we must seek out an 
explanation for rapid changes in elite preferences over.  
In the second section, I argue that elite persuasion by party-aligned think tanks 
can explain the rise in polarization. I introduce three datasets of party-aligned think tank 
outputs over time: think tank testimony before Congress, real revenue and citations in 
major newspapers. I hypothesize that polarization will increase only after the outputs 
increase. Finally, I propose a number of time series models to evaluate these hypotheses.  
In the third section, I present the results of these models. I find a strong and 
persuasive correlation between polarization and think tank revenue and witness testimony 
over time and some evidence of a temporal ordering for each variable that supports a 
causal connection between them. I also find that newspaper citations of party-aligned 
think tanks increased well before polarization, but the relationship is more likely to be 
spurious than the other two outputs. 
In the final section, I summarize my findings. I conclude that there is strong 
evidence of a connection between polarization in Congress over time and increased 
activity from party-aligned think tanks. However, the evidence on temporal ordering only 
suggestive rather than convincing on its own. I argue that time series analysis alone is 
insufficient to characterize the relationship between party elites at party-aligned think 




RESEARCH ON POLARIZATION 
 
Dozens of scholars spanning multiple decades have contributed to the literature 
on polarization in Congress. Polarization, or the distance between the preferences of 
political parties, began to increase in 1978. Poole and Rosenthal first observed the 
increase as early as 1984, when they observed that same-state senators who share a party 
affiliation tend to vote very similarly, but same-state senators who differ in party 
affiliation tend to vote very differently (Poole and Rosenthal 1984). They inferred that the 
geographic forces pushing senators to represent the local median voter’s preferences over 
national party preferences were breaking down. They also observed that while senators 
were increasingly polarized, their elections were also competitive.  In most races, either 
party had an opportunity to win any given race. They speculated post hoc that activists 
and interest groups operating on the party’s extremes were the cause of the shift toward 
polarization, although they did not test their intuition. 
Since then, scholars have searched for causal explanations of the shift toward 
polarization in Congress. While the literature offers multiple non-mutually exclusive 
explanations for increased polarization, it does agree on one basic order of events: elected 
officials polarized long before the public. Median voter theory (Downs 1957; Holcombe 
1980) (Downs 1957; Holcombe 1980), and some related electoral-based theories of 
Congressional behavior (Mayhew 1974), predict that elected officials and parties will 
support policy that is close to the median voter’s preferences in order to compete in 
elections. Thus, a shift in preferences, such as the shift that occurs when a legislature 
polarizes, should follow a shift in the distribution of opinion in the electorate. However, 
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scholars find clear evidence that the mass public polarized much later than their elected 
officials (Dimock et al. 2014; Fiorina 2017; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011). While 
there was some ideological shift by the electorate during the early period of polarization, 
it was confined to only a few issues such as gay rights and abortion (Fiorina, Abrams, and 
Pope 2011). The electorate only began to sort into coherent ideological groups in the 
2010s (Dimock et al. 2014). Therefore, polarization could not have been caused by a shift 
in public opinion in the general electorate. 
Similarly, there is little evidence that changes in districts or primary elections 
caused the shift (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006; M. Barber and McCarty 
2015; Hirano et al. 2010; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2006; McGhee et al. 2014). Although the mass electorate did not become more 
polarized until long after elites did, a combination of redistricting and primary elections 
could have caused members to adopt more extreme policy positions in order to respond to 
changes in the preferences of the median voter in their district or primary electorate. 
However, research consistently rejects both explanations (M. Barber and McCarty 2015; 
Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). Republican representatives in more 
gerrymandered districts are equally conservative as their colleagues in more competitive 
districts, and Democratic representatives are only slightly more liberal (M. Barber and 
McCarty 2015; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Increased gerrymandering is only 
related to polarization to the extent that it has created more Republican representatives, 
who tend to be more extreme than their Democratic colleagues (McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2009). There is also little evidence that changes in primary elections have an 
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impact on polarization (M. Barber and McCarty 2015; Hirano et al. 2010; McGhee et al. 
2014). These factors also could not have caused elite polarization. 
The consensus literature thus concludes that elites were not polarized by the 
electorate. While these studies leave open the possibility that the very recent and sharp 
increases in polarization are related to changing districts or electorates, historically these 
factors are not related to polarization in Congress. Indeed, the direction of causation 
likely runs in the other direction. Elites likely transferred their preferences to the public 
through cue-taking and conflict extension mechanisms (Layman and Carsey 2002; Zaller 
1992). The election of Barack Obama also likely played a role in the polarization of the 
electorate in the 2010s, as voters sorted more heavily on racial lines (Sides, Tesler, and 
Vavreck 2018).  
If the public did not push elites to polarize, then why did elites become more 
extreme? One explanation argues that geographic sorting made the party positions more 
coherent (Jacobson 2015; Rohde 1991; Theriault 2003). When Lyndon Johnson signed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he famously declared that in doing so, he signed away the 
South for the Democratic Party for a generation. Segregation and other civil rights issues 
were the most important sources of intraparty disagreement dividing the Democratic 
Party. Absent a key wedge issue, legislative party leaders were able to demand more 
unity of their caucuses (Rohde 1991). Southern whites became increasingly Republican, 
putting pressure on their elected officials to leave a Democratic party that was 
increasingly progressive on racial issues. However, while Johnson was eventually proven 
correct, he was off by a generation. While Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan were 
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successful at winning Southern states in Presidential elections, Democrats remained 
competitive in the South well into the 1990s (Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 2019). 
While these post-Civil Rights Act Southern Democrats were generally more conservative 
than their colleagues, both grew more progressive as similar rates (Jones, Theriault, and 
Whyman 2019). While geographic sorting did in fact make the parties more ideologically 
coherent, it fails to explain why polarization began to increase in 1978, rather than the 
late-1990s. It also fails to explain contemporaneous ideological shifts on other issues, 
such as environmental policy (Karol 2019), and average ideology shifting toward the 
extremes due to adaptation (Theriault 2006). 
Another explanation for elite polarization is increased partisan competition (Lee 
2009, 2016; Theriault 2008, 2013). The parties have increasingly disagreed not only on 
ideological policy positions but have used the legislative process to fight the other party. 
Lee (2009) observes that party disagreement in the 1990s and 2000s grew sharp not only 
on traditionally ideological issues, but also issues with no obvious conflict between 
conservatives and progressives, such as anti-corruption or “good governance” issues or 
uncontroversial spending issues such as the NASA budget. Lee argues that parties 
strategically use these issues to attack the other party, such as supporting anti-corruption 
actions on the executive branch only when it is held by the opposition. Lee argues that 
parties increasingly used these strategies when control of the chambers of Congress 
became less certain as the Democratic New Deal coalition slowly disintegrated (Lee 
2016). Indeed, Theriault (2013) finds that Newt Gingrich and other members of the 
House Republican caucus elected after 1978 quickly adopted partisan warfare tactics, 
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pushing their colleagues to become more extreme. He also finds that changes in 
Congressional procedures caused much of the early polarization in roll call voting, rather 
than votes on final passage (Theriault 2008). While increased partisan competition can 
explain the shift away from cooperation and toward more teamsmanship, it does not offer 
much to explain substantive changes in party positions over time and is thus necessary 
but insufficient to explain why elites polarized. 
Scholars have identified a number of other factors external to the parties which 
contributed to polarization. Rising inequality and the entrance of billionaire donors may 
have tilted Republican Party politicians to the right (Hertel-Fernandez 2019; McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2009; B. I. Page, Seawright, and Lacombe 2019). Highly 
ideological small donors may have pushed candidates toward the extremes (M. J. Barber 
2016). Polarization and increased partisan warfare may have resulted in moderate 
candidates opting out of running for office (Thomsen 2014, 2017). Partisan media or 
cable news may have created more partisan warfare (Zelizer 2006).  While many of these 
factors are convincing theoretical explanations for polarization, none to date have been 
shown to persuasively explain polarization over the full time period (M. Barber and 
McCarty 2015).  
Finally, the parties themselves may have caused their own shift toward 
polarization. If party actors change their preferences for policy, they may be able to 
transmit those new preferences to the behavior of elected officials. By the early 1960s, 
both political parties developed coherent progressive and conservative ideologies (Noel 
2014). If by some mechanism these ideologues transmitted their preferences to elected 
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officials, they could be responsible for polarization. Jones et al (2019) argue that the rapid 
expansion of the scope of the federal government policy agenda created an opening for 
conservative ideologues to capture the Republican Party. In both parties, ground-level 
party actors, such as convention delegates, changed their preferences long before elected 
officials (Schickler 2016; Wolbrecht 2002). Party platforms themselves tended to use 
similar language to talk about policy until 1980, when they sharply diverged more 
quickly than polarization in roll call voting (Wood and Jordan 2017). Legislative party 
leaders in Congress have some ability to exert agenda control, which can increase 
polarization if their preferences are to the left or right of the median voter (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993). Party actors may also be able to exert control of party nominations, 
ensuring member replacement with friendly candidates (Bawn et al. 2012).  
A party-level explanation for polarization is appealing for two reasons. First, the 
parties polarized at different times (Theriault 2008). The Republican Party moved earlier 
and farther to the left than the Democratic Party. Therefore, the most important cause of 
polarization should affect the parties unequally and at different times. Second, over the 
long term legislative parties as a whole moved to the left and right, rather than individual 
factions of the party (M. Barber and McCarty 2015). Therefore, the most important cause 
of polarization affected the entire party, rather than individual members or factions of 
members.  
The multiplicity of explanations for polarization suggest that no one independent 
variable caused it to rise or, or that causes varied throughout the past four decades. The 
systems determining policy preferences for members of Congress and political parties are 
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complex and will defy monocausal analysis. Indeed, many of these proposed causes are 
themselves interrelated. In this chapter, I focus on one powerful cause of polarization 
over time: the increased influence of highly ideological and well-organized information 
producers at party-aligned think tanks. However, we should acknowledge the complexity 
of the polarization story, and understand that the monocausal analysis that I perform is 
one interrelated piece of a larger story.  
Elites at Party-Aligned Think Tanks and Polarization 
 
Legislators have preferences for policy outputs that are revealed by roll call 
voting in Congress. These preferences are derived from their values, incentives and 
policy analysis (see Chapter 3). Party-aligned think tanks can modify these preferences, 
by reframing the issue, activating latent preferences or through elite persuasion. If they 
are successful, they will move their co-partisan’s preferences to the left or right. As they 
do so, the ideological distance between the political parties will increase. Thus, if we 
observe greater influence of party-aligned think tanks in Congress and on broader 
American politics at one point in time, we should observe greater polarization at a future 
point in time.  
 To measure the dependent variable, polarization in Congress over time, I used the 
difference of party means as measured by the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE data 
from Lewis, Poole and Rosenthal (2019). These data use a scaling procedure to represent 
each legislator’s roll call voting behavior on a spatial map. They are the most commonly 
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used data to measure polarization in Congress. As the distance between the average 
legislator in each party grows larger, polarization increases. To measure the activity of 
party-aligned think tanks over time, I compared three different outputs by party-aligned 
think tanks with polarization. If party-aligned think tank outputs cause polarization, their 
activity will increase before polarization. I have no a priori expectations for the size of 
the lag. All data is measured at the Congress unit of analysis, as DW-NOMINATE is 
measured by Congress rather than annually. 
First, I examine party-aligned think tank testimony before Congressional 
hearings. As they become more influential, party-aligned think tanks will be called to 
testify before Congressional hearings more often. Members of Congress use hearings to 
gather information on emerging policy problems, build external and internal support for 
policy proposals, or to interrogate bureaucrats (K. Bawn 1997; Lewallen, Theriault, and 
Jones 2016; Shafran 2015; Workman 2015; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017)(Bawn 
1997; Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016; Shafran 2015; Workman 2015; Workman, 
Shafran, and Bark 2017). If party-aligned think tanks are considered more valuable 
information sources, they will be called to testify more often. While hearings are public, 
the vast majority of hearings receive little to no media attention. Thus, party-aligned 
think tanks are more likely to use hearings to engage in elite persuasion and framing, 
rather than activating latent preferences. To measure the number of times that party-
aligned think tanks testified before Congress, I identified each instance of testimony 
recorded in the ProQuest Congressional database using keyword searches, aggregating by 
Congress. This process yielded 856 witnesses between the 93rd and 114th Congresses. 
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Because the total number of Congressional hearings varies over time, I then divided the 
number of witnesses by the total number of hearings. 
Second, I measure think tank size over time. As think tanks become bigger, they 
produce and disseminate more information using all three strategies. Ideally, I would 
measure the overall expenditures of each think tank. These data are extractable from IRS 
Form 990s, which are publicly available back to 2001 in the ProPublica Non-Profit 
Explorer database. However, these data are not available before 2001. Given that the unit 
of analysis is necessarily one Congress, this yields only eight observations between 2001 
and 2016, and are thus not sufficient to test a time series hypothesis, nor does it examine 
the periods where polarization first began increasing (the late-1970s) or dramatically 
accelerated (the mid-1990s). However, I was able to reconstruct the real revenue of the 
Heritage Foundation going back to its creation in 1973 using a variety of archival 
sources.43 While I would prefer to measure the size of all four think tanks over the whole 
period, the Heritage Foundation is the largest and most influential organization of the 
group (Weidenbaum 2011). This limitation decreases the representativeness of any 
results using these data. 
Finally, I measured think tank newspaper citations over time. Party-aligned think 
tanks often represent the progressive or conservative side in media debates (Groseclose 
and Milyo 2005; Rich and Weaver 2000). Their research tends to gain more frequent 
media attention than academic research, both due to aggressive marketing by the think 
 
43 See Appendix Table 5.1 
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tanks themselves (McGann 2016; Rich 2005) and their ability to exploit journalist 
equivalency norms when reporting politics (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Haas 2007). 
While both mass publics and elites receive much of their policy information through the 
media (Wolfe 2012), these activities are more likely than direct outreach or 
Congressional hearings to be aimed at a broader public, and thus more likely to reflect 
strategies where think tanks activate latent preferences or reframe issues. If these 
activities cause polarization in Congress, polarization should increase shortly after party-
aligned think tanks are cited more frequently in the media. Using keyword searches, I 
identified each story where a think tank was cited by name in a New York Times, 
Washington Post, Reuters, or Associated Press story in LexisNexis’ database between 
1977 and 2016.44 This process yielded 20,635 citations over the period.45 I aggregated 
citations annually.  
RESULTS 
Party-Aligned Think Tanks and Polarization in Congress 
Figure 5.1 shows the overall trend of polarization in Congress between 1973 and 
2016. Between 1933, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt assembled the New Deal 
coalition, and 1978, the average difference in party means for both chambers remained 
between 0.50 and 0.60.  It began increasingly slowly, but steadily, from 1978 through 
1995. During this period, policymaking was still quite bipartisan. Democrats controlled 
 
44 Ideally, I would also include Wall Street Journal stories, but these data are not available. 
45 Unlike revenue and witness testimony, these data suffer from not knowing the total number of political 
stories produced by these media organizations over the time period. A change in total citations may not be 
indicative of a change in the total rate of citations.   
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the House of Representatives during the full period, while the Senate and Presidency 
were split between the two parties. Even though polarization was increasing, Congress 
passed major bipartisan reforms against entrenched interests in the trucking, airline, 
natural gas and telephone industries ( Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 2019). Under 
divided government, Congress passed some of the most significant tax and budget 
legislation in American history, an issue area of historic partisan disagreement (Gerring 
2001). These laws included the largest tax cut ever in 1981, a massive bipartisan tax 
reform in 1986 that reduced rates by closing loopholes and reducing inefficiencies 
(Birnbaum and Murray 1988), a major Social Security reform, and two significant deficit 
reduction deals that featured both spending cuts and tax increases (Mayhew 2005). On 
environmental policy, Congress passed the Superfund Act and Clean Air Act, as well as 
numerous laws to regulate and clean up toxic waste (Karol 2019; Mayhew 2005). Major 
environmental groups were strongly non-partisan, only endorsing a Presidential candidate 
during the 1988 race because of the strong Texas oil connections of George H.W. Bush 
(Karol 2019). Congress established the Department of Education, the federal job training 
system, sanctioned the apartheid government in South Africa over the President’s veto, 
passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, and enacted two major immigration reforms 
(Mayhew 2005). While the parties disagreed on many issues, they were able to come 
together to solve problems effectively. 
This period ended in 1995, when Republicans took control of both chambers of 
Congress following the 1994 mid-term elections. Polarization sharply increased from 
0.69 in during the 103rd Congress to 0.73 during the 105th, plateauing for most of the late-
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1990s and 2000s. During this period, members of Congress increasingly broke 
established norms for conduct in Congress (Theriault 2013). Newt Gingrich, the newly-
elected Speaker of the House, used aggressive tactics against the Democratic Party, 
including shutting down the government twice in 1995 and the investigation and 
impeachment of President Bill Clinton in 1998 (Mason 2018; Rosenfeld 2018; Theriault 
2013). Polarization accelerated again after the 2010 elections, reaching a high of 0.85 in 
the 114th Congress.46 The modern Congress is more polarized today than at any point 
since the creation of the modern two-party system.     
 




46 While the scope of this chapter stops at 2016 due to data availability, polarization continued to increase 
in the 115th and 116th Congresses. The average difference of party means in the 116th Congress, as of the 
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 The growth of the Heritage Foundation very closely matches the trend in 
polarization. Heritage was founded in 1974 by Paul Weyrich, Edwin Feulner, two former 
Republican Study Committee staffers, and Joseph Coors, the heir to the Coors Brewing 
fortune. Discontent with the cooperation between Richard Nixon and Democrats in 
Congress, they sought to push the Republican Party toward a more conservative ideology 
(Edwards 1997). The Heritage Foundation grew at almost exactly the same pace as 
polarization increased. Figure 5.2 shows the trends for polarization in Congress and the 
real revenue of the Heritage Foundation. The two series are closely correlated (rho = 
0.98). The Heritage Foundation grew steadily from its founding until the mid-1990s, 
when it doubled in size, and the late-2000s, when it doubled again. While both series are 
significantly related to a trend variable (p<.001), they are also significantly related when 
the trend is removed. Figure 5.3 shows the detrended polarization series on the y-axis and 
the detrended Heritage Foundation series on the x-axis.47 There is a positive and 
significant relationship between the two variables at time t (r2 = 0.37 p = .003).48 The 
relationship between Heritage Foundation revenue at t-1 and polarization at t (r2 = 0.29 p 
= 0.012) is also significant, while the reverse is not (r2 = 0.13, p=0.139), suggesting that 
the Heritage Foundation increased before polarization, although relationship at time t is 
stronger. These results provide persuasive evidence of a non-spurious relationship 
 
47 Each axis contains the residuals of the series when regressed on a trend variable. 
48 The relationship remains positive and significant if the 113th Congress, which appears to be an outlier, is 
excluded (p=0.012).  
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between the two variables, and slightly less persuasive evidence that the relationship is 
lagged.  
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Figure 5.3:  Polarization and Heritage Foundation Revenue, Detrended 
 
Next, I turn to witnesses. Unlike the revenue series, these data encompass all four 
party-aligned think tanks in the sample. Figure 5.4 shows party-aligned witnesses per 
Congressional hearing and average difference of DW-NOMINATE party means. There is 
a similar pattern as with revenue, but with important differences. Like revenue, party-
aligned think tank witnesses start out slow. During the early period, only the American 
Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation existed, as the two Democratic-aligned think 
tanks were not founded until 1981 and 2003. They slowly increase in influence through 
the early period of polarization, before making a big spike after Republicans take over 
Congress in 1995. During the 104th Congress, researchers at both Republican-aligned 
think tanks testified heavily to support the passage of policy promises contained in the 
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Contract for America (Gayner 1995). Many of these promises were based on proposals 
authored at the think tanks, including severe cuts to Congressional staff and legislative 
support organizations, the 1996 welfare reform law, cuts to the discretionary budget of 
the federal government, and a change in the structure of the federal tax code for dual-
filers to eliminate the “marriage penalty” (Gayner 1995; Stahl 2016). After these 
promises were considered, the witness series reverts back to the polarization trend in the 
following Congress. It begins increasing again in the late-2000s, in part due to a 
substantial increase in the rate of Democratic-aligned think tank witnesses. The series 
drops off considerable during the 114th Congress. This may be due to the 114th’s status as 
a historically unproductive Congress in terms of legislation.  
There is stronger evidence to conclude that the rate of party-aligned think tank 
testimony increased before polarized when compared with revenue. Figure 5.5 compares 
the detrended polarization series with detrended witness testimony. There is a positive 
and significant relationship between the rate of party-aligned think tank testimony at t-1 
and polarization at t (r2 = 0.21 p = 0.035), but no relationship between the variables at 
time t (r2 = 0.01 p = 0.746). This relationship is consistent with a process where party-
aligned think tanks witnesses cause polarization to increase, rather than the reverse, or a 
mutually reinforcing relationship. It also suggests that party-aligned think tanks engage in 
successful elite persuasion strategies, as hearings are largely attended by and directed to 




Figure 5.4:  Polarization and Party-Aligned Think Tank Witnesses 
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 Finally, I explore newspaper citations of party-aligned think tanks. Similarly, 
increased media citation of party-aligned think tanks may indicate that more conservative 
or liberal views are becoming mainstream and may thus be an indicator of their success 
rather than a cause of it. Figure 5.6 shows the number of citations of party-aligned think 
tanks in the New York Times, Washington Post, Associated Press and Reuters from 
1977-2016. While both are increasing over the time period and thus correlated (p<.001), 
there is little relationship at t once the series are detrended (p=0.409), and no significant 
relationship at times t-1 through t-4. There is a significant relationship between 
polarization at time t and newspaper citations at time t-5 (p=0.005), but overall the 
relationship is more likely to be a product of similar trends than directly causal. These 
data suggest that the role of think tanks in activating latent preferences through media 
debates is less strongly linked to polarization than the other strategies, although their 
media presence did increase considerably during the time series. 
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Figure 5.6:  Party-Aligned Think Tank Newspaper Citations and Polarization 
 
Party-Aligned Think Tanks and Cuts to Congressional Capacity 
 
In addition to a dramatic increase in the influence of party-aligned think tanks, 
another important and related event happened in the realm of information processing in 
Congress in 1995. Fulfilling a promise made in the Contract for America, Republicans in 
Congress severely cut the budgets of Congressional committee and professional staff and 
analytical bureaucracies (Baumgartner and Jones 2015b; Glastris and Edwards 2014). 
These cuts had the effect of significantly lowering internal Congressional capacity to 
process information. Figure 5.7 shows the number of staff working at the Congressional 
Budget Office, Congressional Research Service and Office of Technology assessment. 

















































(Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Fagan and McGee 2020; Kevin Kosar 2016). For 
example, the Congressional Research Service creates “reports, memoranda, customized 
briefings, seminars, videotaped presentations, information obtained from automated data 
bases, and consultations in person and by telephone” (Brudnick 2008, iv). Between 1997 
and 2017, CRS published 13,536 reports on a broad range of domestic and foreign policy 
issues (Fagan and McGee 2020). Collectively, they lost about a quarter of their staff in 
1995, and another 12% due to the Budget Control Act of 2011.  
 
Figure 5.7:  Party-Aligned Think Tank Witnesses Per Hearing and CBO, CRS and OTA 
Staff, 1973-2016 
 
The cuts to Congressional staff was even more severe. Figure 5.8 shows the 
trends in committee staff and party-aligned think tanks per hearing during the same 
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Most personal staff focus primarily on constituency services and communication, while 
committee staff tend to be more focused on substantive policy concerns (Baumgartner 
and Jones 2015). Much of the specialized knowledge in Congress lies with professional 
committee staff, who develop long-term relationships with stakeholders, bureaucrats and 
experts (Krehbiel 2006). Formal caucuses also lost nearly all of their professional staff. 
These organizations provided considerable information to members of Congress, often 
addressing local concerns that cut across party lines (Ainsworth and Akins 1997; Ringe, 
Victor, and Gross 2013; Victor and Ringe 2009).  
 
Figure 5.8:  Party-Aligned Witnesses Per Hearing and Committee Staff, 1973-2016 
 
Congress lost about a third of these staff to the 1995 cuts, forcing individual 
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leadership offices, who sought to centralize control over policy and legislative 
information (Curry 2015; Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016). They also were forced to 
rely upon more external information sources, either in the executive branch (Mills and 
Selin 2017) or outside of government entirely (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Rich 2005).  The 
result was a decline in Congress’ ability to search for and define problems, identify 
solutions, and ultimately take action to pass laws (Glastris and Edwards 2014; Jones, 
Theriault, and Whyman 2019; Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016).  
 Conservative Republicans saw the decline of Congressional capacity as a feature, 
rather than a bug or just a side effect of reducing costs. A legislature with a reduced 
ability to search for policy problems will pass less legislation to solve those problems, 
reducing the size of the government’s policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). 
While the Republican rhetoric in the Contract with America focused on over-spending in 
Congress, earlier work made it clear that their goal was to reduce Congressional capacity 
to process information. In an influential 1989 book, two Heritage Foundation authors 
argued that an “Imperial Congress” had stymied public mandates given to Republican 
presidents Richard Nixon49 and Ronald Reagan to reduce the size and scope of 
government, and it needed to be cut back in order to maintain the separation of powers 
(G. S. Jones and Marini 1988). Newt Gingrich, then the Republican Minority Whip, 
wrote the book’s foreword. These ideas were eventually incorporated into a promise in 
the Contract with America to cut staffing (Gayner 1995). 
 
49 The book ignores the degree to which the expansions of government under Richard Nixon were by 
Nixon himself, rather than the Democratic-controlled Congress (see B. D. Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 
2019).  
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 Thus, the reduction of Congressional capacity represents an important 
confounding variable in our analysis. Congress may not have sought out more partisan 
information, but rather more information from outside of government to compensate for 
losses in staff. A reduction in capacity for rank-and-file members of Congress (as 
opposed to leadership) could increase polarization, as they become forced to rely on the 
judgment of party leaders (Curry 2015). We can test for this potential confounding 
variable by examining trends in testimony from external non-partisan information 
sources. While the data structure does not allow us to search for all sources of non-
partisan information, we can collect data on individual organizations. I selected four 
organizations to measure demand for external non-partisan policy analysis. The first 
three, Harvard, Stanford and Yale, were leading research universities during the entire 
period. The fourth, the Brookings Institution, is the leading non-partisan think tank in the 
United States (McGann 2019). Figure 5.9 compares frequency of testimony per 
Congressional hearing of these organizations and the four party-aligned think tanks. 
During this same period, all three universities saw significant declines in testimony. As a 
group, they declined from 0.07 witnesses per hearing to 0.03 witnesses per hearing. All 
three universities declined by at least 50%. Brookings Institution testimony was stable, 
ranging between 0.01 and 0.02 witnesses per hearing. These data suggest that 
Congressional demand for external non-partisan information decreased during this 
period. Therefore, demand for external information in general is unlikely to be a 
confounding variable causing both demand for party-aligned think tank information and 
polarization. Indeed, if Congress consumes more party-aligned think tank information 
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and less non-partisan information, the impact of party-aligned think tank information 
should be greater than if non-partisan information was stable as the balance of the overall 
information environment becomes even more partisan. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Party-Aligned Think Tank Witnesses Per Hearing and Selected Non-
Partisan Witnesses Per Hearing 
 
We can conclude from these results that conservative Republicans chose to not 
only cut Congressional capacity to process information, but to also replace it with 
partisan information. Indeed, the same process has played out in U.S. states. States with 
lower legislative professionalism are more likely to pass laws supported by the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and conservative corporate-funding interest 
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Brothers, and the State Policy Network, a group of state-based conservative think tanks  
(Hertel-Fernandez 2019).  
SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the relationship between party-aligned think tanks and 
polarization in Congress from the beginning of the polarization period to the present day. 
Parties in Congress began to polarize in the late 1970s, long before the public became 
intensely polarized. While scholars have identified certain factors that enabled or 
contributed to elite polarization, such as the slow realignment of Southern Democrats into 
the Republican Party, conflict extension to new issues, increased partisan competition 
and changes to rules and procedures, much of the process remains difficult to explain. In 
this chapter, I theorized that much of the increase in polarization was caused by the 
persuasion of elites by party-aligned think tanks. As these organizations displaced the old 
non-partisan knowledge regime, members of Congress adopted more extreme 
preferences.  
Using time series analysis of party-aligned think tank outputs and polarization, I 
found a strong and positive association between the activities of party-aligned think tanks 
and polarization in Congress. As the Heritage Foundation grew larger in terms of 
revenue, Congress became more polarized. As all four party-aligned think tanks were 
called to testify more frequently before Congressional hearings, Congress also became 
more polarized. Both of these trends hew closely to the shape of the change in 
polarization and come slightly earlier, suggesting that a causal connection is plausible. 
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While news citations also increased during the time period, the relationship is more likely 
to be spurious.  
I also tested an important alternative explanation for the relationship between 
polarization and party-aligned think tank information. Congress significantly cut much of 
its own capacity in the mid-90s and early 2010s, periods in which both party-aligned 
think tank activity and polarization also spiked. If these cuts caused polarization to 
increase independently but also increased demand for external information processing, 
they could create a spurious relationship between party-aligned think tanks and 
polarization. However, non-partisan external information appeared to decrease during 
this period, rather than increase, allaying these concerns. 
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Chapter 6: Measuring Polarization Across Issues 
  
Most political scientists studying polarization on Congress, including the analysis 
in Chapter 5, estimate polarization across all roll call votes using DW-NOMINATE 
scores (Lewis et al. 2019).  Scholars may also seek to estimate polarization across 
individual issues in order to understand the processes that influence polarization in 
Congress. In the Chapter 7, I use these data to examine the relationship between party-
aligned think tanks and polarization. However, measuring polarization across issues 
presents significant challenges. This chapter examines the problems associated with 
doing so, solves many of those problems and finally introduces new data on polarization 
across issues. 
 Chapter 6 proceeds as follows. In the first section, I examine the problems 
associated with measuring polarization across issues. I begin by reviewing the brief 
literature where scholars attempted to do so. I argue that scaling estimation procedures 
like DW-NOMINATE scores will struggle to estimate polarization across issues in 
smaller time periods. Instead, I use party disagreement scores, an older and simpler 
operationalization that can measure polarization in shorter time periods. Next, I argue that 
an accurate measure of polarization across issues that we must include both roll call votes 
and legislation that passes with non-roll call processes, such as suspension of the rules, 
unanimous consent or voice vote procedures. I introduce a new procedure to locate laws 
that passed either chamber without a roll call vote.  Finally, I explore the data, finding 
interesting variation in polarization across time and issues.  
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MEASURING POLARIZATION ACROSS ISSUES 
In order to measure polarization of outputs across issues, we must first select a 
system to categorize outputs into issues. I use the topic doing scheme from the Policy 
Agendas Project50 (PAP) (Baumgartner, Jones, and Wilkerson 2002). PAP is a 
collaboration between dozens of scholars across countries to categorize the issue content 
of policy outputs using a system that allows for valid comparisons across time and 
context. The PAP system assigns each policy output to one of 20 major topic areas,51 
such as energy or defense policy, and one of 220+ subtopic areas, such as nuclear energy 
and weapon sales. The U.S. Policy Agendas Project has coded over a dozen datasets of 
policy outputs over long time series, allowing us to relate polarization across issues to the 
activities of political parties, media, Congress, the public, and the presidency. For this 
chapter, I used the PAP roll calls and public laws datasets.52  
While numerous scholars have focused on polarization increasing on individual 
issues or groups of issues (for example, see: Karol 2019; Layman and Carsey 2002; 
Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002), only a handful of scholars have attempted to 
measure polarization across the 20 PAP major topics. Jochim and Jones (2013) examined 
changes in polarization across policy topics and time. They use a scaling procedure 
 
50 The Policy Agendas Project (PAP) is related to the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). PAP was 
created by Baumgartner, Jones and Wilkerson to measure the issue content of U.S. policy outputs. Scholars 
in other countries later created their own projects using the PAP topic coding system. Eventually, these 
individual country projects, including the U.S. project, organized to create CAP. The U.S. CAP project 
refers to itself as PAP but can also be accurately identified as the U.S. Comparative Agendas Project. 
51 The CAP codebook defines one additional major topic area, culture policy. Because few such 
observations are present in U.S. data, the PAP codebook defines these observations as an education policy 
subtopic. 
52 These datasets are available online at www.comparativeagendas.net/us 
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similar to NOMINATE to compare the dimensionality of issues. Due to the large number 
of roll call votes necessary to use the scaling procedure, they estimate change in 
dimensionality across two periods of fifteen years each. They find that most of the 
increased polarization occurred in a handful of major topics: education, science and 
communication, public lands, transportation, health care and business, while the other 
topics did not change significantly. Thus, they attribute increased polarization to 
increased disagreement over specific issues, rather than general partisanship. Lee (2009) 
uses party disagreement scores to measure cross-sectional polarization across issues and 
substantive, procedural or parliamentary votes. She finds considerable variation in party 
disagreement by policy topic, although disagreement goes up on all policy topics when 
votes move from substantive to procedural or parliamentary. Thus, Lee attributes the bulk 
of increased polarization to general partisanship, rather than increased policy differences.  
Most modern political science studies use the difference of party means in the 
first dimension of DW-NOMINATE to measure polarization in Congress (Lewis, Poole 
and Rosenthal 2019). However, DW-NOMINATE scores are a poor tool to measure 
polarization across issues, as it requires a large number of annual observations to estimate 
the difference between party means. Modern Congresses hold between 1,500 and 2,000 
roll call votes over each two-year period. When these votes are broken up into 20 issue 
categories, some of which contain many more votes than others, the bins become very 
small. For example, the 112th Congress (2011-2012) held the most votes on energy issues 
in decades with just 176 roll calls, while the previous Congress held just 55. More votes 
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are necessary to calculate a reliable scaled variable. Instead, I follow Lee (2009) and use 
party disagreement scores, which require many fewer observations to reliably estimate. 
Party disagreement scores are calculated using equation 6.1. The party 
disagreement score of roll call vote i is defined as the absolute value of the proportion of 
Democrats voting yea minus the proportion of Republicans voting yea. If all members of 
one-party vote yea and no members of other party do, the score is 1. If the same 
proportion of each party vote yea, the score is 0. I drop abstentions, missed votes and 
third party or independent members. A value of 0 indicates that the parties voted Aye in 
equal proportions. As the score increases, it indicates greater differences between the 
parties. A score of 1 represents a strictly party-line vote. 








Next, I improve upon existing measures of party disagreement across issues by 
incorporating laws passed without roll call votes. Both traditional party disagreement 
scores and DW-NOMINATE scores overstate the amount of polarization in the 
legislative process because they only measure party conflict in roll call votes. Congress 
processes only some of its legislation through roll call voting. Chambers pass the 
majority of legislation using voice votes or unanimous consent mechanisms (Clinton and 
Lapinski 2008).53 Laws are more likely to pass using these procedures when they are less 
 
53 There are various processes through which a chamber can approve the final passage of a law without 
individual members recording their expressed preferences with a roll call vote, such as asking for 
unanimous consent or for a voice vote. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to all of these processes as “voice 
votes.” 
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important, involve particularistic goods, and in the second session of each Congress 
(Clinton and Lapinski 2008). They were most common during the textbook Congress era 
and have declined since (Shepsle 1989). While they are used more commonly for less 
important legislation, many laws that are approved by voice vote are substantively 
meaningful. For example, in late December 2018, the 115th Congress used voice votes to 
approve reauthorizations of the National Flood Insurance Program, Public Health 
Services Act and Museum of Library Services Act, a major reform of sexual harassment 
policies in Congressional offices, an expansion of reporting requirements for electronic 
service providers in child sexual abuse and child pornography cases, funding for new 
unmanned marine weather data collection systems, new program to care for Alzheimer’s 
patients, several bills providing benefits to veterans, $1.5 billion in additional foreign aid 
to East Asian countries threatened by China and North Korea, and a major reform to 
juvenile justice systems. While party leaders may use voice votes to prevent their 
members from having to take a tough vote on the record, neither party objected to using 
voice votes to pass a law, and thus there is little meaningful party conflict on it. They are 
also all absent from analyses of polarization of roll call votes. Their absence will inflate 
the overall level of polarization. If voice votes are unevenly distributed across issues, 
they will bias estimates of polarization across issues.  
 I measured voice votes on final passage by inference, using a similar procedure as 
Clinton and Lapinski (2008). I started with the U.S. Policy Agendas Project laws and roll 
call votes datasets. These contain all laws or roll call votes passed by Congress between 
1973 and 2018. During this time, Congress passed 11,068 public laws and held 43,272 
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roll call votes.54  In each chamber-Congress pair, I searched for the bill number of each 
non-commemorative law in the roll call votes data. Where no roll call vote was record, I 
inferred that the law was passed in the chamber using a voice vote procedure.55 This 
process yielded 5,431 laws passed by voice vote in the House and 7,616 in the Senate 
between 1947 and 2018. Note that this process excludes bills passed by voice vote but not 
signed into law, bills that passed the chamber but were folded into other public laws 
before final passage, and non-legislative voice votes such as on nominations. Figure 6.1 
plots these votes over time in the House and Senate. We see that the House and Senate 
each passed hundreds of laws annually using voice votes but trending downward since 
90th Congress (1967-1969). Voice votes decreased in the House faster than the Senate for 
most of the period. A second large drop-off occurred when Republicans took control of 
the House of Representatives in the 2010 midterm election, although the House did 
rebound in the 115th Congress. I calculated an adjusted party disagreement score where 
each voice vote was assigned a score of zero disagreement. 
 
54 Note that some laws receive roll call votes in one chamber but are passed through voice votes in the 
other chamber.  
55 I drew a random sample of 25 of these inferred voice votes to and checked them by hand. All 25 were 
correctly identified as voice votes. 
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Figure 6.1:  Laws Passed without Roll Call Votes in the House and Senate, 1947-2018 
 
 Next, I validate voice-vote adjusted party disagreement scores as a valid 
measurement of polarization in Congress. Party disagreement scores, adjusted for voice 
votes or not, should be highly correlated with existing methods of measuring polarization 
like DW-NOMINATE.  Figure 6.2 compares the average party disagreement score, 
voice-vote adjusted party disagreement score and DW-NOMINATE difference of party 
means for both chambers of Congress from 1973-2018. The three series are closely 
related. All three begin accelerating during the 96th Congress (1979-1980), sharply 
increase around the 104th Congress (1995-1996), and further after the 112th (2011-2012). 

















votes and unadjusted, are a strong substitute for DW-NOMINATE difference of means as 
a method for measuring polarization in Congress. 
 
Figure 6.2:  Comparison between party disagreement scores, voice-vote adjusted scores, 
and DW-NOMINATE, 1973-2018 
 
Table 6.1 shows the correlations between the three variables for each chamber 
and the average of both chambers. The unadjusted party disagreement scores and 
adjusted disagreement scores are almost perfectly correlated (rho = 0.98 for both 
chambers averaged). Thus, while the inclusion of voice votes changes the y-intercept of 
party disagreement scores, it does little to change the trend in polarization over the time 
series. Excluding laws passed by voice vote increases party disagreement scores by about 
0.15. We can examine how voice votes change the overall distribution of party 
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shows the distribution of party disagreement scores of just roll call votes in the House of 
Representatives. The distribution is bimodal, with zero or close to zero disagreement 
being the modal outcome. The second most common outcome is a party-line vote, with 
about half as many observations as zero disagreement votes. Votes are mostly evenly 
distributed in between the two polls, with a slight uptick approach each poll. Figure 6.4 
shows the distribution once voice votes are added in. Zero disagreement votes now 
dominate the distribution, at about four times the number of party line votes. Overall, 
these results suggest that the level of polarization in Congress is significantly overstated 
by analyzing just roll call votes, while an analysis of the change in polarization over time 
using just roll call votes is accurate.  
 
 House 
 Adjusted Unadjusted DW-NOMINATE 
Adjusted 1   
Unadjusted 0.83 1  
DW-NOMINATE 0.84 0.99 1 
 Senate 
 Adjusted Unadjusted DW-NOMINATE 
Adjusted 1   
Unadjusted 0.96 1  
DW-NOMINATE 0.82 0.76 1 
 Congress 
 Adjusted Unadjusted DW-NOMINATE 
Adjusted 1   
Unadjusted 0.98 1  
DW-NOMINATE 0.94 0.92 1 
 
Table 6.1:  Correlations Between Party Disagreement Scores, Voice-Vote Adjusted 





Figure 6.3:  Distribution of Party Disagreement of Roll Calls, House of Representatives 
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Next, I apply these results to measuring polarization across issue areas. If voice 
votes are unevenly distributed among issue areas, excluding them from party 
disagreement scores will change the overall distribution of polarization across issue areas. 
Unadjusted party disagreement scores will overstate polarization in policy topics that 
over-index voice votes and understate polarization in policy topics that under-index voice 
votes. Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of voice votes and roll call votes by policy topic 
during the 1947-2018 period. Six policy areas, civil rights, macroeconomics, labor, 
energy, foreign affairs, social welfare and education, each have a ratio greater than 3:1 
roll call votes to voice votes, with civil rights having a nearly 10:1 ratio. On the other end 
of the spectrum, law and crime, agriculture, trade, transportation and public lands each 
have a ratio of 1.6:1 or fewer roll call votes to voice votes, with public lands as the outlier 
with 0.38:1 roll call votes per voice vote. Thus, excluding voice votes would make the 
former group appear less polarized than they are relative to other issues and vice versa for 
the latter group. If voice vote practices change over time, this cross-sectional variation 




Figure 6.5:  Total Laws Passed by Voice Vote and Total Roll Call Votes in Congress, 
1947-2018 
 
We can see these results play out across time by comparing the two different party 
disagreement scores across all 20 policy topics from 1947-2018 in Figure 6.6. Unlike the 
time series compared in Figure 6.2, we see that the two series often diverge over time, 
likely due to changing voice vote practices. Issues like domestic commerce, health care, 
law and crime, agriculture, and environmental policy go through long consensual periods 
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where Congress is passing a large number of laws via voice vote. Adjusted and 
unadjusted party disagreement scores are correlated at less than 0.70 on all of these 
policy topics (see Table 6.2).  Other issues, such as civil rights, labor, foreign affairs 
defense, and social welfare are correlated at greater than 0.90 during the same period. 
Thus, we should also include voice votes in analyses of change in polarization across 
issues and time, even though it is not necessary to include them in analyses of overall 
polarization in Congress.  
 
 
Figure 6.6:  Comparison between voice vote-adjusted party disagreement scores and 
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Policy Topic Rho 
Trade 0.56 
Health 0.57 
Law and Crime 0.57 
Transportation 0.6 






Science & Communication 0.75 
Immigration 0.79 
Government Operations 0.81 
Macroeconomics 0.86 
Education 0.87 
Social Welfare 0.87 
Defense 0.91 
Foreign Affairs 0.93 
Civil Rights 0.94 
Labor 0.96 
 
Table 6.2:  Intra-Topic Correlation Between Voice-Vote Adjusted and Unadjusted Party 
Disagreement Scores, 1947-2018 
Finally, we can now explore these data descriptively to understand the variation in 
polarization across issues. Table 6.7 shows the mean annual voice vote-adjusted party 
disagreement score across each of the 20 policy topics from 1947-2018. We see 
considerable variation between the policy topics. The most polarized issues tend to 
subjects of what (Gerring 2001) calls the “Great Debate” between those who favor 
greater redistribution and government intervention into domestic economic policy and 
those who favor less. These issues—labor, macroeconomics, social welfare, housing and 
education—often define the traditional left-right spectrum in both American politics and 
other party systems. On the other end of the spectrum, issues with local dimensions, such 
as public lands, transportation and law and crime, and issues that emerged during the 20th 
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century, such as science, technology and communication and environmental policy, tend 
to be far less polarized on average during the full 1947-2018 period.  
 
Figure 6.7:  Mean Annual Voice Vote-Adjusted Party Disagreement Score by Policy 
Topic, 1947-2018 
 While every issue has become more polarized over time, the rate of increase 
varies considerably between issues. Figure 6.8 plots the change in voice vote-adjusted 
party disagreement from the early 1970s to present day. During this time, overall 
polarization as measured by party disagreement scores more than doubled, from an 
average of about 0.20 to about 0.50 (see Figure 6.2). However, some issues changed 
considerably more or less than the average. Table 6.3 shows the slope of a trend variable 
regressed on the time series for each issue. We see that environmental policy polarized at 
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the fastest rate, reflecting the rapid shift from environmental policy as a bipartisan 
consensus issue to one defined by sharp conflict (Karol 2019). Energy, immigration, civil 
rights and education policy also became more sharply polarized. On the lower end, we 
see that defense, foreign affairs and trade policy all polarized at a much slower rate. This 
slower rate of change suggests that the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy remains 
strong, although it is not immune to the forces polarizing politics generally. Overall, these 
results support that both the Lee (2009) and Jochim and Jones (2013) stories: forces are 
both increasing the general level of partisanship in Congress, but much of the change also 
appears to be related to increased conflict on certain issues. 
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Finance and Commerce 0.016 
Health Care 0.015 
Housing 0.014 
Macroeconomics 0.013 
Law and Crime 0.012 
Public Lands 0.012 
Transportation 0.011 
Science and Communication 0.011 
Social Welfare 0.011 
Defense 0.01 
Government Operations 0.009 
Trade 0.009 
Foreign Affairs 0.005 
Notes: Slope represents the beta coefficient returned 
when voice vote-adjusted party disagreement scores are 
regressed on a trend variable 
 
Table 6.3:  Change in Voice Vote-Adjusted Party Disagreement Over time by Issue, 
1973-2018 
SUMMARY  
This chapter introduced a new dataset on polarization across issues from 1947-
2018. Scholars after often interested in variation between polarization across issues but 
have been limited by data availability. Scaling methods like DW-NOMINATE scores 
struggle to estimate polarization of roll call votes across issues in a time series due to 
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small subgroup sizes. I solve this problem using party disagreement scores, which other 
scholar have used to measure the average proportion of each party in a chamber voting in 
opposition to the party. I add to the existing literature by incorporating laws that were 
signed into law but passed either or both chambers without a roll call vote. Throughout 
much of modern Congressional history, most laws passed using voice votes, unanimous 
consent, or other consensus procedures in one or both chambers. While these laws are on 
average less salient than laws passed with roll call votes, large and important legislation 
often passes without roll call votes. Because the use of these procedures is unevenly 
distributed across issues, I show that any measurement of polarization across issues must 
include them. 
Next, I briefly explored the data. There is considerable cross-sectional variation in 
the average polarization across issues during the full time period. Less polarized issues 
like public lands, transportation and law and crime are approximately half as polarized as 
issues like macroeconomics, labor and civil rights. Issues have also become more 
polarized at different rates over time. While all issue became more polarized after the 
1970s, party conflict on some issues grew dramatically. Environmental policy, energy 
and immigration policy polarized three-to-four times faster than foreign affairs, trade and 
government operations. 
These data will allow researchers of Congress and public policy to answer 
research questions that they were unable to answer previously. In Chapter 7, I use them to 
examine the impact of one treatment effect, party-aligned think tank activity, on issues in 
Congress. However, other scholars could use them to examine other treatment effects. 
Presidential attention to issues may increase polarization (Lee 2009). The incorporation 
of interest groups into party coalitions may increase polarization by expanding the scope 
of conflict on an issue (Fagan, McGee, and Thomas 2019). Intense media coverage of 
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issues may increase polarization by increasing anti-partisan dislike of the other party’s 
positions or it may decrease polarization by encouraging voters to moderate their own 
positions (Levendusky and Malhotra 2016). Parties may take time to sort out issue 
positions after new issues emerge (Jones, Theriault and Whyman 2019). Finally, 
comparative studies may also find that issue polarization tends to be correlated across 
party systems, suggesting that the qualities of the issues themselves lead to polarization, 




Chapter 7: Polarization and Party-Aligned Think Tanks Across Issues  
 
In Chapter 5, I established a strong and robust relationship between party-aligned 
think tanks and polarization in Congress. As party-aligned think tanks became larger and 
testified more frequently before Congress, polarization increased. These changes 
coincided with reductions in Congressional capacity, but similar non-partisan 
organizations did not see a similar increase in influence in Congress. However, these 
results are limited by the monotonically increasing nature of the polarization trend since 
the 1970s. We can solve this problem by breaking Congressional activity up into 
individual issues and comparing polarization and party-aligned think tank activity on 
those issues. By doing so, we can examine many individual cases, rather than one history. 
This chapter uses the data on polarization of issues from Chapter 6 as well as new data on 
the activities of the four party-aligned think tanks to do so, finding a strong and robust 
relationship between the two variables.  
The generalized causes of issue polarization remain largely unexplored by 
political science. Numerous scholars have examined the causes of party conflict on 
individual issues such as environmental policy (Karol 2019), education policy (Haas 
2007), health care (Hertel-Fernandez 2016), labor market policy (Hertel-Fernandez 2018) 
and women’s rights (Wolbrecht 2000). These studies tend to offer specific explanations 
of polarization across each issue area, rather than a generalized explanation of the 
variation in polarization across issues. They also tend to focus on issues of current or 
traditional partisan conflict while ignoring less salient, less conflictual issues like 
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transportation policy, public lands and science and technology. These issues often make 
up a larger portion of the Congressional agenda than many of the other issues studied, but 
rarely receive attention from scholars of polarization and party positions.  
 There is also little scholarly literature examining the variation in levels of 
polarization across issues. Jochim and Jones (2013) use procedures similar to DW-
NOMINATE to estimate the number of dimensions present across issues over time. As 
issues are reduced to a single dimension, they become more polarized. They find 
considerable variation in polarization across issues during both the less polarized period 
(1965-1980) and the more polarized period (1981-2004). Further, they find that increases 
in polarization were concentrated in about a third of issue areas, while the majority of 
issues did not change significantly. Lee (2009) finds that issues become more polarized 
when the President takes a position on the vote thus raising its profile. Jones, Theriault, 
and Whyman (2019) find that the parties do not immediately incorporate emerging issues 
into their platforms, suggesting a brief period of low levels of polarization on new issues 
before the parties eventually diverge.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I introduce four 
datasets on party-aligned think tank activities across issues from 2004-2016. These are 
white papers drawn from think tank websites, testimony by party-aligned think tanks in 
hearings, citations of think tanks by name in the Congressional Record, and bills 
mentioned in lobbying disclosure reports. These outputs measure a range of activities: 
information production, use of information by members of Congress and active lobbying 
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by think tanks. Finally, I briefly explore the distribution of think tank attention in each 
output.  
In the second section, I first compare attention to policy by party-aligned think 
tanks for each output with polarization across issues during the full 2004-2016 period. I 
find a strong and robust positive relationship between polarization and think tank issue 
attention. Next, I explore some potential confounding omitted variables in issue salience 
and issue ownership. I find no evidence that they create a spurious relationship between 
polarization and party-aligned think tank attention, although I note the limitations of 
testing these relationships cross-sectionally. Finally, I examine the dynamic relationship 
between issue attention and polarization across both time and issues, finding a robust 
long-term relationship but little evidence of a short-term relationship between the parties. 
MEASURING PARTY-ALIGNED THINK TANK ACTIVITY ACROSS ISSUES 
In order to measure the distribution of attention to issues in party-aligned think 
tank activities, I collected data on the policy content of four different party-aligned think 
tank outputs. These outputs were white papers posted on the think tank websites, bills 
identified in lobbying disclosure reports, citations by members of Congress in the 
Congressional Record and testimony before Congressional hearings. For each output, I 
measured both the absolute levels of policy attention from party-aligned think tanks and 
attention relative to a comparative Congressional output. In this section, I first explain the 
content analysis methods used to identify their policy content. I then lay out how each 
output was collected, coded and compared to baseline levels of Congressional attention. 
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I coded each output for its policy content using the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) 
topic coding system. PAP is a collaboration between dozens of scholars across countries 
to categorize the issue content of policy outputs using a system that allows for valid 
comparisons across time and context. The PAP system assigns each policy output to one 
of 20 major topic areas, such as energy or defense policy, and one of 221 subtopic areas, 
such as nuclear energy and weapon sales. The U.S. Policy Agendas Project has coded 
over a dozen datasets of policy outputs over long time series, allowing us to relate U.S. 
think tank outputs to the activities of political parties, Congress, the public, and the 
presidency. Table 5.1 shows the 20 PAP major topic areas,56 along with examples of 
party-aligned think tank white papers coded under each. Each output was assigned to a 
single topic area. If an output contained policy content in multiple topic areas (for 
example, a report on the fiscal health of Medicaid and Social security), it was assigned to 
a single topic area based upon the rules of the PAP codebook. 
  
 
56 The international CAP system uses a twenty-first major topic, cultural policy, that is not used in the U.S. 
codebook, and thus not used for this project. 
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Major Topic Area Example 
Macroeconomics "A Territorial Tax System Would Create Jobs and Raise Wages for U.S. Workers" - Heritage Foundation 
Civil Rights "The Unintended Consequences of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act" - American Enterprise Institute 
Health 
"Health Reform Law Makes Clear That Subsidies Will Be Available 
in States with Federally Operated Exchanges" - Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities 
Agriculture "Food Safety: Background, Analysis and Recommendations" - American Enterprise Institute 
Labor “Real Family Values: Raising the Federal Minimum Wage” – Center for American Progress 
Education "The Future of Teacher Compensation" - Center for American Progress 
Environment "Impact of the Waxman-Markey Climate Change Legislation on the States" - Heritage Foundation 
Energy “Electricity Pricing to U.S. Manufacturing Plants, 1963-2000” – American Enterprise Institute 
Immigration "The Senate Immigration Bill Rewards Lawbreaking: Why the DREAM Act Is a Nightmare" - Heritage Foundation 
Transportation “It’s Time for States to Invest in Infrastructure” – Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
Law and Crime “Changing Priorities: State Criminal Justice Reforms and Investments in Education” – Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
Social Welfare "Would Private Accounts Provide A Higher Rate of Return than Social Security?" - Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
Housing "Retrofitting Foreclosed Homes: A Matter of Public Trust" - Center for American Progress 
Commerce "Is There a Way to Create a Transatlantic Securities Market?" - American Enterprise Institute 
Defense "Afghanistan: Zero Troops Should Not Be an Option" - Heritage Foundation 
Science and 
Communication 
“Bundles of Trouble: The FCC's Telephone Competition Rules” – 
Heritage Foundation 
Trade “Global Value Chains and the Continuing Case for Free Trade” – American Enterprise Institute 
Foreign Affairs “A Plan B with Teeth for Darfur” – Center for American Progress 
Government 
Operations 
“Federal Pay is Out of Line with Private Sector Pay” – Heritage 
Foundation 
Public Lands "A Continued Push for Reform Is Needed on Public Lands’ Energy Leasing" - Center for American Progress 






To measure attention to policy in party-aligned think tank information production, 
I collected data on their white papers from 2004-2016. Writing and disseminating 
research or policy arguments in the form of reports, books, explainers, and other 
documents is the heart of any think tank’s mission. Each think tank in the sample 
produced thousands of white papers during this period on a wide range of policy issues. 
These documents varied in size. They ranged from a two-page analysis on a pending 
piece of legislation to a comparisons of cost estimates for a range of policy options to full 
economic analyses that would not be out of place in an academic journal. House styles 
varied by institution. For example, the Heritage Foundation tended to produce a greater 
number of shorter white papers focused on making arguments about policy but without 
much original research, while the American Enterprise Institute tended to produce fewer 
long white papers or books conducting original research. 
I first collected all of the white papers listed on each think tank’s website from 
2004-2016. I collected the title, abstracts or summaries, and any available metadata listed 
under the website’s “Reports” or “Research” section, using filters where available to 
eliminate blog posts, press releases, or other non-report outputs (see Figure 7.1 for an 
example). This yielded 14,255 reports. I then read each title and any available abstract or 
summary and assigned it to one of 20 Policy Agendas Project major topic codes.57 If I 
 
57 Two trained graduate students coded a random sample of 500 observations using the procedures of the 
Policy Agendas Project. They agreed with the major topic codes assigned to these 86% of these data. 
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was unable to assign a code based on these shorter observations, I read the full report to 
determine which issue the report addressed and assigned it to a major topic area.  
 
Figure 7.1:  White Paper Data Collection Example 
 
For each issue, I then measured the proportion of attention from each side’s think 
tanks, weighted by each think tank’s contribution by the organization’s expenditures. 
This solves two problems. First, it allows us to account for each think tank’s overall size. 
Larger think tanks have more party elites producing information for them. Second, it 
allows us to account for heterogeneity in the style of think tank reports. Some 
organizations, such as the Heritage Foundation, tend to produce more short issue brief-
style reports, while others, such as the American Enterprise Institute, tend to produce 
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fewer longer white papers. If we simply counted the number of reports, we would 
overrepresent the longer reports. We would also count the total impact of organizations 
equally, even though we expect the larger organizations to be more influential. To solve 
both problems, I weighted the attention by the organization’s annual expenditures using 
the formula in Equation 7.1.  





Figure 7.2 shows the percentage of white papers assigned to each of the 20 major 
policy topics. We see huge variation in the issues that party-aligned think tank white 
papers address. Macroeconomics, defense, health care and foreign affairs collectively 
make up about 40% of all white papers. Public lands, agriculture, science and 
communication, and transportation all receive very small shares of issue attention. 
However, these raw numbers are difficult to interpret, because the government’s policy 
agenda is distributed unevenly across categories. In order to adjust for the baseline 
demand for white paper-like information by Congress, I compared white paper attention 
to the policy content of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports (see McGee and 
Fagan 2019). CRS is Congress’ internal think tank. It provides detailed policy reports on 
a broad range of issues. Figure 7.3 shows the natural log of the ratio of the percentage of 
party-aligned think tank white papers to CRS reports. A positive result indicates that 
party-aligned think tanks devote relatively more attention to the issue, while a negative 
result indicates the opposite. Think tanks tend to focus on social welfare, 
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macroeconomics, health care, education, housing and civil rights when compared to CRS 
reports. With the exception of civil rights, these are all core issues of redistributive 
domestic economic policy. The ideological debate over these issues has remained 
constant since the middle of the 19th century, even as parties shifted their positions on 
other issues (Gerring 2001). On the other end of the spectrum, public lands, agriculture, 
science and communication and transportation policy receive relatively little attention. 
All of these issues have local dimensions and are fundamentally distributive, which may 





Figure 7.2:  Distribution of White Paper Policy Attention 
 
 
Figure 7.3:  Distribution of White Paper Policy Attention Relative to CRS Reports 
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Congressional record citations 
 
To measure the distribution of attention in Congressional consumption of party-
aligned think tank information, I used think tank citations by members of Congress in the 
Congressional record. Members of Congress frequently make arguments about policy 
either on the floor of Congress or in committee. Their arguments often invoke various 
forms of policy analysis, including information from party-aligned think tanks. When 
they cite party-aligned think tanks, it indicates that they have both received the 
information and are using it in policymaking. The information either directly impacted 
policy decision-making or is being used to support one side in public policy debates. By 
observing the distribution of policy attention in citations, we can infer the policy topics 
on which members tend to consume party-aligned think tank information. 
I collected party-aligned think tank citations using keyword searches of the 
Congressional record from 2004-2016. I searched for each organization’s name and 
acronym and recorded the page in the Congressional record in which the search appeared. 
A trained research assistant then went to each page and retrieved the text of the citation, 
including any necessary contextual sentences. The assistant then identified and 
eliminated all instances where the citation was incidental,58 where the keyword search 
returned a reference to a different organization, where members were referring to the 
organization negatively or where the member was using referencing the think tank as a 
foil.59 Nearly all of the remaining observations are direct references to party-aligned think 
 
58 Such as a reference to the think tank on the chamber calendar 
59 Such as a Democrat stating, “Even the ultra-conservative Heritage Foundation supports my plan.” 
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tank reports or events, such as “According to a report by [organization name]…” This 
process yielded 1,868 citations from 2004-2016, 763 by Democrats and 1,105 from 
Republicans.  
Figure 7.4 shows the overall distribution of attention to policy in party-aligned 
citations. The distribution is much more concentrated in its top category, 
macroeconomics, than white papers. Health care and social welfare policy also receive 
considerable citations. These issues are often motivating issues for political parties as 
they are owned by the Democratic Party as their core redistributive policy goals and 
important to laisse-faire policy goals of the Republican Party (Fagan 2019). The same 
five issues with significant local dimensions, science and communication, public lands, 
transportation, agriculture and trade, receive few citations. Next, Figure 7.5 compares 
citations relative to Congress attention using the natural log of the ratio of the percent of 
citations to the percent of congressional hearings. We see a similar distribution to white 
papers, with a few exceptions. Immigration policy, one of the emergent highly 
contentious issues of the 2004-2016 period, is significantly overrepresented by party-
aligned think tank citations. Foreign affairs, a historically consensus issue, is significantly 
under-represented. Because these citations are drawn from relatively high-profile 
statements on the floor of Congress, they may represent members using party-aligned 
think tank citations in public debates, and thus are more likely to use them on contentious 





Figure 7.4:  Distribution of Party-Aligned Think Tank Citation Policy Attention 
 
 
Figure 7.5:  Distribution of Citation Policy Attention Relative to Hearings 
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Lobbying disclosure reports 
 
While all four party-aligned think tanks are primarily 501(c)3 non-profit 
corporations who cannot directly lobby, the Heritage Foundation, Center for American 
Progress and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities maintain companion 501(c)4 
lobbying organizations. These organizations employ both full-time lobbyists to directly 
advocate for the organization’s policy goals and also pay a portion of the 501(c)3 
employees’ salaries in order to allow them to directly advocate for legislation without 
violating tax law. 501(c)4 organizations file quarterly Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) 
reports with the House and Senate to identify all bills that they advocated for. Unlike the 
other datasets, which capture public activity, these lobbying disclosure reports allow us to 
observe behind-the-scenes lobbying by think tank. The Center for Responsive Politics 
extracts the bill numbers for each bill named in an LDA report. I collected all 909 bill 
identifiers named in these reports. I then paired the extracted bills to the Congressional 
Bills Project dataset in order to identify their policy content.  
 Figure 7.6 shows the overall distribution of bills named in think tank lobbying 
disclosure reports. Unlike other outputs, government operations is the standout category. 
This difference is likely due to lobbying on provisions in annual omnibus appropriations 
bills, which are coded under government operations when considered as one package, 
rather than coded for the policy content of their individual components. Other than 
government operations, the policy content of lobbying disclosure reports strongly 
resembles the other outputs, with a heavy focus on domestic redistributive economic 
policy and a smaller focus on policy with a more localized dimension. However, the 
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picture changes slightly when compared to all Congress bills. In Figure 7.7, we see that 
agriculture policy is the fourth most over-represented topic in LDA reports. As with 
government operations, this may be due to the structure of bills and the PAP coding 
system; large farm bills often include both agriculture policy and means-tested food aid. 
When means-tested food aid is discussed on its own it would be coded as social welfare 
policy, which is in line with the party-aligned think tanks’ focus on redistributed 
domestic economic policy, but the larger bill would be categorized as agriculture policy. 
 
Figure 7.6:  Distribution of Attention to Policy in Bills Named in Lobbying Disclosures 
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Finally, I measured party-aligned think tank testimony before Congressional 
hearings using the same data that I introduced in Chapter 5. Members of Congress use 
hearings to define problems, identify potential solutions, and field public arguments 
(Bawn 1997; Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). 
Party-aligned think tanks frequently testify before these hearings to help members 
achieve their goals. While a handful of hearings receive substantial media attention each 
year, many are lower-profile affairs where members of Congress genuinely seek 
information that may be useful in policymaking (Lewallen, Theriault, and Jones 2016). I 
identified each instance of testimony recorded in the ProQuest Congressional database 
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using keyword searches, aggregating by Congress. I then paired each identified hearing to 
one coded by the Policy Agendas Project for policy content. This process yielded 443 
witnesses between 2004 and 2016.  
Figure 7.8 shows the overall distribution of attention to policy in hearings where 
party-aligned think tanks testified. The distribution is more mixed than the other three 
outputs. Think tanks are called to testify frequently before foreign policy, defense, 
commerce and energy hearings, as well as the traditional domestic economic policy areas 
of health care and macroeconomics. On the low end, they are rarely called to testify 
before the issues with local dimensions, as well as education. Given that education 
scholars point to the important role of think tanks in structuring debates over education 
reform during this period (Haas 2007; McDonald 2014), their decreased presence in 
hearings is surprising. However, when we compare their testimony to all hearings in 
Figure 7.9, we find that macroeconomics, social welfare and housing are top issues. 
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Figure 7.8:  Distribution of Testimony Attention to Policy 
 
 
Figure 7.9:  Distribution of Relative Testimony Policy Attention Relative to Hearings 
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PARTY-ALIGNED THINK TANK ISSUE ATTENTION AND POLARIZATION 
Bivariate Cross-Sectional Models 
Next, I examine the relationship between issue polarization and party-aligned 
think tank activities. Issues that are more polarized will receive more attention from 
party-aligned think tanks relative to Congress. I first test this hypothesis by comparing 
relative attention to policy from each of the four outputs to polarization on their own. 
Each operationalization of issue attention from party-aligned think tanks is measured 
independently from the others, while polarization is constant across issues. Thus, we can 
produce a fifth test by averaging together each of the four independent variables to 
produce an average.  
First, we examine the relationship between relative attention to policy in party-
aligned think tank white papers compared with Congressional demand for non-partisan 
information from the Congressional Research Service. Figure 7.10 shows the relationship 
between white paper policy attention and voice-vote adjusted party disagreement scores. 
There is a positive and significant relationship between the two variables (p = 0.002, ß = 
0.06). Issues that are more polarized receive more attention from party-aligned think 
tanks. While the model as a whole produces a strong fit (r2 = 0.44), there are some 
notable outliers. Out of the twenty issues, five are much more polarized than the model 
predicts, and three are much less polarized. The over-polarized issue areas include labor, 
macroeconomics, civil rights and agriculture, while the under-polarized areas include 
public lands, foreign affairs and social welfare.  The error on agriculture and social 
welfare are likely related to the difference between roll call votes on food stamps and 
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policy reports. When food stamps are discussed individually, they are coded as food aid, 
in the social welfare major topic. However, they are generally voted on by Congress as 
part of the farm bill, which also contains a number of less contentious agriculture 
provisions.  Thus, many votes that should be highly contentious social welfare policy are 
coded as agriculture, but not policy reports on individual subjects.  
 
Figure 7.10:   Relative White Paper Policy Attention and Polarization 
 
 Next, we turn to the relationship between policy attention in Congressional record 
citations and polarization across issues. Figure 7.11 shows the bivariate relationship. 
Members of Congress are more significa0ntly likely to cite party-aligned think tanks on 
the floor of Congress on more polarized issues (p = 0.001, ß = 0.04). While the overall 
amount of error is similar to white papers model (r2 = 0.45), the error is more balanced 
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policy are less polarized than predicted by the rate party-aligned think tank citations, 
while labor, macroeconomics, civil rights and energy are more polarized.  
 
Figure 7.11:   Congressional Record Citations and Polarization Across Issues 
 
Next, we compare the policy content of bills named in party-aligned think tank lobbying 
disclosure reports and polarization (see Figure 7.12). When compared with the previous 
two models, we see a very similar positive and significant relationship between 
polarization and relative attention from party-aligned think tanks (p = 0.001, b.= 0.04). 
Model fit is also similar (r2 = 0.44). The similarity between these three models is 
remarkably as each independent variable is measured independently of the other three. 
While the three datasets are correlated (rho = 0.65, see Table 7.2), they are not strongly 
multicollinear. Each output emphasizes different issues, but all three share a similar 
relationship with polarization. 
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Figure 7.12:  Lobbying Disclosure Reports and Polarization 
 
 Next, we turn to party-aligned think tank testimony before Congressional 
hearings. Figure 7.13. shows the relationship between relative party-aligned think tank 
testimony and polarization. While the relationship is still positive and significant (p = 
0.026 b = 0.04), there is considerably more error than the other three models (r2 = 0.26). 
Error in both directions increases as relative party-aligned think tank testimony increases. 
Given that there are just 774 witnesses during the observation period, the error could be 
due to sample size issues. There could also be strong selection effects, where party-
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Figure 7.13:  Witness Testimony and Polarization 
 
Each of the four operationalizations of relative think tank attention derived from 
independent measurements of party-aligned think tank activities. If the distribution of 
attention to issues is also sufficiently independent, we can average the four independent 
variables together to produce one measurement of party-aligned think tank policy 
attention across outputs. Table 7.2 shows the correlations between each of the four 
outputs. The most closely related outputs are the relative attention to issues in 
Congressional Record Citations and hearing witnesses, which is expected given that they 
share a denominator (ρ = 0.81). The least closely related datasets are white papers and 
bills (ρ = 0.48).  Figure 7.14 shows the relationship between this averaged variable and 
polarization. Model fit improves slightly over the other models (r2 = 0.50), while the 
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confidently that issues that are more polarized receive more attention from party-aligned 
think tanks relative to Congress.  
  
White Papers 







White Papers / CRS  1    
Citations / Hearings 0.72 1   
Lobbying / Bills 0.48 0.75 1  
Witnesses / Hearings 0.78 0.81 0.51 1 
Notes: All tests are of the natural log of the ratios reported. 
 
Table 7.2:  Correlations Between Relative Think Tank Attention Across Outputs 
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Multivariate Testing for Omitted Variables  
While the result is robust across bivariate models, we must also rule out potential 
confounding omitted variables that are endogenous to both polarization and party-aligned 
think tank attention. Party-aligned think tanks tend to prioritize issues that are owned by 
their party (Fagan 2019). Issue ownership describes the relationship between the core 
priorities of a political party and the electorate’s trust in the party to handle the issue 
(Egan 2013). As parties in government prioritize an issue over the long term, the 
electorate trusts the party to handle that issue in office. If the parties prioritize some 
issues over others, those issues might polarize. If so, issue ownership presents a potential 
confounding variable in these models. 
 Fagan (2019) uses two different specifications of issue ownership across Policy 
Agendas Project major topics. Table 7.3 displays these specifications. The first, long-run 
issue ownership, is a continuous variable derived from survey data gathered by Egan 
(2013). A negative score indicates Democratic ownership, while a positive score 
indicates Republican ownership. The second, a binary measure, assigns each major topic 
to either Republican, Democrat or neither. Each has its flaws, as the issue ownership data 
do not cleanly map onto the Policy Agendas Project major topic areas. The continuous 
measure has no data on domestic commerce or housing policy and fails to capture both 
parties’ prioritization of different types of macroeconomic policy. The binary measure 
accurately measures these three issues but fails to capture the degree to which the parties 
own issues. Because of these limitations, I run models using both measures. Table 7.4 
shows the results of a multivariate OLS regression of polarization of issues. We see no 
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evidence that issue ownership is confounding variable. In Model 1, which contains the 
continuous issue ownership operationalization, there is no relationship between 
polarization and issue ownership (p = 0.788). In Model 2, which contains the binary 
ownership variables, there is a negative relationship between issue ownership and 
polarization. Core party priorities do not drive polarization across issues, and thus are not 




Major Topic Area Egan (2013)12 
Binary 
Ownership3 
Agriculture 0 Neither 
Civil Rights n/a n/a 
Defense 14 Republican 
Domestic Commerce n/a Republican 
Education -10 Democratic 
Energy -3 Neither 
Environment -18 Democratic 
Foreign Affairs 6 Republican 
Government Operations 0 Neither 
Health Care -12 Democratic 
Housing n/a Democratic 
Immigration 9 Republican 
Labor -12 Democratic 
Law and Crime 7 Republican 
Macroeconomics 1 Both 
Public Lands 0 Neither 
Science and Communication 0 Neither 
Social Welfare -14 Democratic 
Trade 5 Republican 
Transportation 0 Neither 
1 Values are the coefficient on Egan's (2013) estimate of long-run issue ownership 
coefficients in public opinion surveys. Negative scores are more Democratic, positive 
scores are more Republican. Defense is assigned the average of Egan's "Domestic 
Security" and "Military" category. Macroeconomics is assigned the average of 
“Inflation,”, “Taxes,” “Economy,” “Jobs,” and “Inequality” categories. Agriculture, 
government operations, public lands, science and communication and transportation 
policy were coded=0. No data exist for these areas, all of which tend to have very low 
levels of party polarization and issue salience (Jochim and Jones 2013).  
2 Civil rights excluded due to conflicting issues contained in the Comparative Agendas 
Project coding (abortion and civil rights issues), and its failure to meet Egan’s consensus 
issue criteria. Domestic commerce, and housing excluded due to a lack of survey data. 
3 Binary values are coded=1 to the issue area where Egan’s data are greater than 5 or less 
than -5. For housing and commerce, there is no data. I assigned housing to Democrats as 
a dimension of social welfare policy and Domestic Commerce to Republicans as a 
dimension of their advantage on “big government” business or regulatory policy 
(Petrocik, Benoit and Hansen 2004).   
  
Table 7.3:  Issue Ownership Values by Comparative Agendas Project Major Policy 
Topic Area (Fagan 2019) 
Next, I test if issue salience is a potential endogenous omitted variable. Party-
aligned think tanks may produce more information on highly salient issues, either in 
anticipation of those issues hitting the agenda or because partisan conflict on issues 
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increases issue salience. If these issues are also more polarized, salience would confound 
estimates of the relationship between party-aligned think tanks and polarization. Table 
7.4 also displays OLS estimates of polarization across issues. There is no evidence that 
issue salience drives polarization across issues, either on its own (Model 3, p = 0.776) or 
when interacted with party-aligned think tank attention (Model 4, p = 0.512). We can rule 
out issue salience as a potential source of endogeneity.  
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Logged Average Think Tank Attention 0.07** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Issue Ownership     
Republican Owned -0.05    
 (0.03)    
Democratic Owned -0.03    
 (0.04)    
Long-Run Issue Ownership (Squared)  -0.0001   
  (0.001)   
Issue Salience     
Most Important Problem (MIP)   0.06 -0.14 
   (0.20) (0.36) 
MIP * Think Tank Attention    0.18 
    (0.26) 
r2 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.51 
n 19 17 20 20 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001. Civil rights policy 
excluded from both models. Commerce and Housing excluded from Model 2 due to missing 
issue ownership data. 
 
Table 7.4: OLS Estimation of Polarization Across Issues, Testing for Issue Ownership 
and Salience as Confounding Variables 
PANEL MODELS 
 
 Finally, we can examine the short-term relationship between polarization and 
party-aligned think tank attention using time series cross sectional methods, where each 
major topic area represents one panel with multiple observations across congresses. 
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Agenda setting scholars frequently use error correction or autoregressive distributed lag 
models to test if an input can “set the agenda” for an output (Bevan and Jennings 2014; 
Bevan and Rasmussen 2017; Fagan 2018; Froio, Bevan, and Jennings 2017; Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Lovett, Bevan, and Baumgartner 2015; Peter Bjerre 
Mortensen et al. 2011), such as if an executive speech or party platform can set push 
legislative agenda toward some issues and away from others. Other political scientists use 
error correction or autoregressive distributed lag models to examine the short-term 
impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable, such as the impact of changes 
in public preferences for spending on appropriations (Jennings 2009; Soroka and Wlezien 
2010, 2019; Wlezien 1995). In this section, I use similar methods to measure the impact 
of party-aligned think tanks on polarization. 
In Chapter 3, I introduced three strategies that party-aligned think tanks could use 
to influence party positions. These were elite persuasion, activating latent preferences and 
framing. These strategies suggest different relationships between short-and-long term 
party-aligned think tank attention and polarization. An activating latent preferences 
strategy, where party-aligned think tanks produce “ammunition” for their co-partisans to 
use in public debates, suggests a strong short-term relationship. As issues move into the 
later stages of the policy agenda and are debated in the media, party-aligned think tanks 
will produce greater information on those issues. When the debate moves on, they will 
move on to other issues with it. On the other hand, an elite persuasion strategy, where 
party-aligned think tanks convince legislators to trust different conclusions from policy 
analysis, suggests a longer-term relationship. Party-aligned think tanks convince 
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legislators over the long-term of a different relationship between an issue’s policy outputs 
and policy outcomes. A reframing strategy suggests both short and long-term 
relationships, as they both work to define issues on the current agenda as more 
conservative or liberal and to change stickier longer-term issue definitions. 
Panel methods have a number of strengths and weaknesses for these purposes. 
Most importantly, they allow models to control for unobserved heterogeneity across 
panels. They also allow us to separate short-term effects from long-term effects. 
However, panel models have a number of important weaknesses when estimating the 
relationship between polarization and party-aligned think tank activities. While party 
disagreement scores require fewer observations than DW-NOMINATE scores to reliable 
estimate, estimates for many policy topics with fewer votes are much less reliable. While 
low reliability won’t bias estimated beta coefficients, it will increase standard errors. On 
the independent variable side of the equation, it limits the available data to party-aligned 
think tank white papers, as the other three datasets lack enough observations biannually 
to reliably estimate attention to policy across 20 major topics. Finally, we are limited to 
just seven congresses, or six observations per panel with lags. Having so few time periods 
limits some of the inferences we can make, such as Granger non-causality tests 
(Dumitrescu and Hurlin 2012).  
I use error correction models to estimate the relationship between polarization and 
relative attention to policy in party-aligned think white papers.60 Because polarization in 
 
60 I use an error correction model instead of an autoregressive distributed lag model. While they produce 
identical estimates, error correction models offer a simpler interpretation of the short-term impact of an 
independent variable on a dependent variable.  
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Congress trends upward during the time period but party-aligned think tank attention 
always sums to 1 across the 20 issues, I include a trend variable in the equation. I also 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity in panels61 using both fixed effects and panel-
corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Because both the dependent variable and 
independent variables are AR(1), I also include an AR(1) disturbance term.  Equation 7.1 
shows the basic model (Model 2 in Table 7.5):62 
 
Equation 7.1:  Error Correction Model of Polarization Across Issues and Time 
 
∆𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!$
= 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!$&' +	∆𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑘	𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠!$ +	𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑘	𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠!$&' +	𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑$
+ 𝑒 
The results of these models are presented in Table 7.5. In seven of eight model 
specifications, party-aligned think tank attention significantly increases polarization of 
issues over the long-term but has little impact on polarization in the short-term (p< 0.05). 
The one exception is Model 4, which contains both the trend variable and fixed effects. 
Given that these models contain only six observations for twenty panels, a fixed effects 
model will struggle to distinguish between long-term relationships and fixed effects and 
inflate standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). The long-term effect is significant in 
Models 6 and 8, which include the trend variable but substitute fixed effects for panel-
 
61 A Hausman test suggests fixed effects are appropriate over random effects (p<.001).  
62 Because panel models are vulnerable to model specification and I have no a priori expectation of which 
model best defines the time series cross-sectional relationship between the two variables, I report each 
different model specification in Table 7.5. 
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corrected standard errors. In seven of eight models, there is no significant short-term 
relationship between polarization and party-aligned think tank attention. Model 8, which 
both includes the trend and includes a disturbance term to correct for the AR(1) structure 
of the dependent variable panels, returns a significant short-term coefficient in a one-
tailed test (p<0.1). If there is a short-term impact of think tank attention to issues on 
polarization, it is much weaker than their long-term impact. Overall, these results suggest 
that party-aligned think tanks engage in long-term elite persuasion rather than activating 
latent preferences. 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Party Disagreement (t-1) -0.64*** -0.74*** -0.93*** -1.17*** -0.64*** 0.26 -0.65*** -0.82*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Δ Relative Think Tank Attention (t)  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Relative Think Tank Attention (t-1) 0.03** 0.03*** 0.06* 0.03 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Major Topic Fixed Effects No  No  Yes Yes No  No  No  No 
Trend1 No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors No  No  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel-Specific First-Order Autocorrelation No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes Yes 
r2 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.38 0.29 0.38 
n 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis. + p<.1 * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001  
1 Trend is positive and significant (p<.001) in all models 
 
Table 7.5: Time Series Cross Sectional Estimates of Δ Party Disagreement (t) 
 
SUMMARY 
When legislators search for policy analysis on a given issue, the information they 
find can vary considerably by issue. On some issues, their searches will return a variety 
of non-partisan information from sources like the federal bureaucracy, Congressional 
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research service, and other credible experts. On some issues, the non-partisan sources 
will face intense competition from partisan information producers such as party-aligned 
think tanks. These differences in the balance of the information environment has 
substantive implications for legislative behavior on issues. When the information 
environment is largely non-partisan, issues tend to have lower levels of polarization. 
When partisans compete for the information environment, polarization increases 
dramatically.  
These differences hugely impact our understanding of the policy process. On the 
issues where non-partisan information is still dominant, our understanding of agenda 
setting centered around problem-solving persists. These issues tend to be more localized, 
such as transportation, agriculture, public lands and science and communication. On these 
issues, the government’s agenda will be set by emerging problems and an impetus to 
offer effective solutions to those problems. The parties will find it easier to come to a 
consensus around problem-solving. If they disagree over who will bear the trade-offs of 
those policies, the parties can bargain over the policy response. On the other hand, areas 
of traditional ideological conflict over domestic redistributive economic policy attract the 
most attention from party-aligned think tanks, such as social welfare, labor, 
macroeconomics and housing policy. When one of these issues comes up before the 
Congressional agenda, the partisan disagreement is unlikely to be limited to a simple 
ideological disagreement over the proper role of government. Rather, legislators of 
opposite parties are likely to be believe that enacting certain policy outputs will lead to 
vastly different outcomes. They will struggle to come to a bipartisan consensus on these 
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issues, because even as they may agree that the problem requires a policy solution, they 
disagree about whether the solution will solve the problem or its secondary 
consequences. These disagreements will break down the problem-solving process driving 
agenda setting. Problems will continue to become more severe until one party is able to 
act narrowly on its own to enact some sort of policy solution or things become bad 




Chapter 8: Democracy During the Information Wars 
 
  
The error correction model of agenda setting (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) 
creates a framework through which governments solve society’s problems. Because 
cognitive and physical resources are limited, governments must ignore most problems 
most of the time. As problems bubble up through society and become more severe, 
policymakers are forced to attend to those problems. Because the problem has become 
severe enough to demand their attention, both government and opposition parties feel 
pressure to address it. They search for viable policy alternatives to address the problem, 
enact a change reduce its severity, and move on to the next issue. Where possible, they 
set up subsystems to maintain the new status quo until their attention is required again. 
Over time, the cycle of ignoring and then attending to problems assures that policymakers 
represent their constituents by dealing with the most important problems facing the 
country at any given time. Governments are slower to solve problems in authoritarian 
systems or democracies with less efficient representational systems, leading to larger 
policy punctuations when they finally do act (Baumgartner et al. 2017; Fagan, Jones, and 
Wlezien 2017).  
The error correction framework requires that policymakers understand the 
relationship between the policy outputs they enact to address the problem and their 
intended impact on a policy outcome. Because elected officials and high-level executives 
are at best generalist policymakers, choosing a policy output requires policy advice 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015). The framework assumes that policymakers will choose a 
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solution that has some effectiveness at solving the problem, even if they don’t always 
choose the most effective at any given time. If their policy advice is wrong or they are 
unable to reach a sufficient consensus to enact a major policy change, errors continue to 
accumulate. For some problems, error accumulation ends in a sudden and violent 
catastrophe. Because policymakers are more likely to trust experts in times of crisis 
(Shafran 2015), they may eventually receive good policy advice and enact an effective 
solution.  
However, most problems slowly bubble up and fester, rather than fail suddenly 
and spectacularly. In the United States, these include problems such as the high health 
care costs but poor outcomes, racially discriminatory policing, gun violence, a deficit 
skyrocketing during good economic times, rising inequality or rapidly increasing deaths 
from opioids in rural areas. There are solutions to these problems; many cities, states and 
countries have very different policy outcomes than the United States as a whole. 
However, there is intense disagreement between experts and one or both political parties 
on what solutions are effective to address each. Because U.S. institutions necessitate 
bipartisan policymaking to enact large-scale policy changes, the only way these problems 
will be addressed by public policy is that both parties form a consensus on policy 
solutions. In the past, consensus tended to form around the recommendations of experts. 
This resolution is impossible when both parties adopt knowledge regimes that are at odds 
with each other. Thus, errors will continue to accumulate, but they require larger and 
larger policy punctuations in order to return a system to where it should be. 
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This dissertation argued that party-aligned think tanks are particularly important 
components of U.S. knowledge regimes. Because U.S. political parties do not directly 
control their own policy advisory organizations, they rely on privately funded think tanks 
to serve in a role reserved for formal party organizations in most democracies. However, 
these organizations have very different incentives than formal party organizations. 
Instead of seeking to maximize the party’s seat share in the next election, they seek to 
achieve policy goals. These policy goals often conflict with the conclusions of non-
partisan experts, and thus party-aligned think tanks often produce recommendations that 
conflict with them. Because they hold a privileged position in their political parties and 
design their organizations to maximize advocacy, their co-partisans tend to listen to 
party-aligned think tanks over neutral experts. Over time, they develop a heuristic that 
information from the neutral experts is biased, and information from organizations that 
are on their side is unbiased. 
Because party-aligned thinks have policy goals far to the left or right of center, 
parties that rely on their policy advice will shift their positions to toward the extremes. 
When positions move in opposite direction, the party system polarizes. This dissertation 
tested this theory by examining the relationship between polarization in the U.S. 
Congress and party-aligned think tank activities. It found a strong, significant and robust 
relationship between the two variables. After the technocratic knowledge regime began to 
collapse in the 1970s, party-aligned think tanks grew larger and testified more frequently 
in Congress. Their growth is closely related to polarization in Congress but occurred just 
before polarization increases. There is also no evidence that the relationship is caused by 
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cuts to Congressional capacity and thus demand for external information production. 
Rather, the balance of the information in environment in Congress shifted away from 
non-partisans and toward partisan knowledge regimes. When their activity is 
disaggregated into individual issues, we see a very close and consistent connection 
between party-aligned think tank activity and polarization. Issues where party-aligned 
think tanks produce more white papers, testify more frequently before hearings, are cited 
in the Congressional record, and lobby on bills tend to be more polarized. When 
measured dynamically across time and issues, the issues that receive more party-aligned 
think tank attention are more polarized over the long term, but not in the short term. 
Taken as a whole, these results suggest a strong and non-spurious relationship between 
the two variables. The connection may be directly causal, where party-aligned think tanks 
are a powerful treatment effect on their own. However, because polarization is a complex 
phenomenon, party-aligned think tanks may be one bigger piece of a story of party elites 
changing their preferences. 
Think tanks, party-aligned and otherwise, deserve more attention from political 
science. Our discipline tends to conceive of politics as a struggle for political power 
among strategic and rational actors who seek power for its own sake. Interest groups are 
able to achieve their policy goals when they contribute to this struggle in a way that 
furthers those goals. Think tanks should be smaller players in political parties under this 
model than sociologists, historians and political participants regard them to be. Most 
think tanks are many steps removed from the electoral fortunes of elected officials and 
political parties. They act by influencing the ideas, capacity and objective understanding 
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of reality of policymakers. These activities are often more difficult to measure and model 
than more directed and overt activities like campaign contributions, direct political 
actions or endorsements, but they likely have a powerful impact on outcomes.  
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WARS 
 
While both parties created their own knowledge regimes, there are also clear 
asymmetries. The Republican knowledge regime is older, more influential and more 
distant from technocratic knowledge regime than the alternative regime set up by the 
Democratic Party. On most issues, Democrats maintain a close connection to the 
scientists, universities and government agencies that make up the technocratic knowledge 
regime (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). Republicans, on the other hand, continue to 
move away from it. Conservatives since the 1970s understand that an error accumulation 
model leads to a broader role for government in daily life. Voters demand that their 
elected officials work to solve their problems (Egan 2014). Some of these problems may 
be best solved by decreasing government activity, such as the deregulation of the 
trucking, airline, natural gas and communications industries during the 1970s. Despite the 
entrenched interests fighting policy change, they were supported by both political parties, 
ideological conservatives and non-partisan experts (Jones, Theriault, and Whyman 2019). 
However, more often than not, experts support policies involving government 
intervention to solve problems. Conservatives, be they libertarians who believe in a laisse 
fare political theory, religious conservatives who believe in traditional family, cultural or 
moral values or some of the other groups contained within the contemporary Republican 
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coalition, often believe that these interventions are wrong, but understand that their 
elected officials will always be pressured by voters to do something when problems 
become salient. Thus, they need to interrupt the link between the experts that recommend 
government interventions and elected officials. Ideological conservatism formed long 
before the U.S. party system began to materialize. It was not able to begin to shape the 
behavior of the Republican Party until after conservatives established their own 
knowledge regime. Breaking this link may not have been a sufficient condition; 
conservatives may have needed The Great Broadening to react to (Jones, Theriault, and 
Whyman 2019). However, this dissertation argues that it was an important piece of the 
causal story of how the Republican Party shifted from the party of Eisenhower, Nixon 
and Ford, who retained and valued the advice of non-partisan experts (Williams 1998) to 
where it is today.  
Democrats, on the other, seek to use public policy as an instrument to accomplish 
other goals, such as reducing inequality, eliminating racial and gender inequities, or 
protecting the environment. Because public policy is an instrument, rather than an end in 
itself as with conservatism, progressives need it to be effective. Thus, progressives must 
value expertise in order to accomplish their goals. They may seek to minimize the 
secondary consequences of policy, such as its cost or impact on non-target populations, 
but their tether to expertise is necessarily much stronger than it is for ideological 
conservatives.  
The asymmetry has never been clearer than during the Trump Administration. 
Immediately after taking power, the Trump Administration eliminated public references 
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to climate change from federal government websites (Davenport 2017). In an attempt to 
force out career scientists in federal agencies, it aggressively reassigned civil servants to 
new locations and responsibilities (Clement 2017). It blocked career federal scientists 
from traveling to conferences (L. Friedman 2017) and testifying before Congress 
(Friedman 2019). It prevented the release of dozens of peer reviewed studies from the 
Agricultural Research Service funded by taxpayers (Evich 2019). It retaliated against 
economists in the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service for publishing 
research finding that farmers were harmed by the Administration’s trade policies and 
changes to tax law (Mccrimmon 2019). It created a process of “red team, blue team” 
exercises to question peer-reviewed research funded by the federal government (Plumer 
and Davenport 2019). It imposed onerous requirements on scientific research that could 
be used to inform EPA regulations, such as requiring that public health studies use non-
anonymized data (Friedman 2019). It proposed eliminating the Congressional Budget 
Office’s role in estimating the cost of legislation and replacing it with outside estimates, 
including those from the Heritage Foundation (Klein 2017). The President himself 
contradicted National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) forecast for 
the path of Hurricane Dorian, saying that it would veer West toward Alabama rather than 
continuing East (Baker, Friedman, and Flavelle 2019). After NOAA scientists clarified 
that their forecast did not project the hurricane to move toward Alabama, the 
Administration threatened to fire the scientists (Baker, Flavelle, and Friedman 2019). 
Many conservative reformers recognize that their party’s relationship with science 
and expertise is unsustainable and are attempting to do something about it. These include 
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a number of think tanks created by conservative Republicans who seek to reconnect the 
party to science and expertise. The Niskanen Center was founded in 2015 by a number of 
former Cato Institute staffers with the goal of promoting libertarian policy solutions when 
those solutions are supported by experts, such as an open immigration policy or market-
based carbon pricing systems.63 Niskanen’s founder, Jerry Taylor, describes himself as a 
reformed climate skeptic and Ayn Rand devote who slowly became aware that the 
rampant climate skepticism in the conservative movement and many other libertarian 
orthodoxies about public policy were wrong (Skibell 2017). Similarly, a group of former 
Heartland Institute staffers working on insurance policy resigned from the organization 
and founded the conservative R Street Institute (Graves 2012). The staffers objected to a 
billboard that featured a mugshot of Ted Kaczynski and the message, “I still believe in 
Global Warming. Do you?” R Street employs a number of former Republican Party 
staffers. Their research includes both expert-supported solutions in support of 
conservative priorities such as reforming the Post Office and National Flood Insurance 
Program, but also support for climate change legislation and increased Congressional 
capacity to process information. Just as the Republican Party changed endogenously in 




63 Niskanen describes it’s mission, theory of change and relationship with expertise in detail in their 
Conspectus, available online at https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Niskanen-





1973-1976 1976 IRS Form 990 (retrieved from document cloud) 
1977 1977 IRS Form 990 (retrieved from document cloud) 
1978-1980 1983 Heritage Foundation Annual Report 
1981-1991 1991 Heritage Foundation annual report 
1992 Interpolated 
1993-1994 1994 Heritage Foundation Annual Report 
1995 Solomon 1996 
1996 1996 Heritage Foundation Annual Report 
1997-2016 Various IRS Form 990s (retrieved from ProPublica Non-Profit Explorer) 
 






Abelson, Donald. 2004. “The Business of Ideas: The Think Tank Industry in the USA.” 
In Think Tank Traditions. Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas, Manchester, 
UK: Manchester University Press. 
Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. 2006. “Incumbency, 
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections.” The 
Journal of Politics 68(1): 75–88. 
Adler, E. Scott, and John D. Wilkerson. 2013. Congress and the Politics of Problem 
Solving. Cambridge University Press. 
Ainsworth, Scott H., and Frances Akins. 1997. “The Informational Role of Caucuses in 
the U.S. Congress.” American Politics Quarterly 25(4): 407–30. 
Albert, Zachary. 2019. “Partisan Policymaking in the Extended Party Network: The Case 
of Cap-and-Trade Regulations.” Political Research Quarterly: 
1065912919838326. 
Albert, Zachary, and David J. Barney. 2018. “The Party Reacts: The Strategic Nature of 
Endorsements of Donald Trump.” American Politics Research: 
1532673X1880802. 
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties 
in America. University of Chicago Press. 
Analysis of the Clean Energy Standards Act of 2012. 2012. Energy Information Agency. 
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/bces12/pdf/cesbing.pdf. 
Applebaum, Binyamin. 2020. Economists Hour: False Prophets, Free Markets, and the 
Fracture of Society. S.l.: BACK BAY BOOKS. 
Backhouse, Roger. 2005. “The Rise of Free Market Economics: Economists and the Role 
of the State since 1970.” History of Political Economy 37(5): 355–92. 
Baker, Peter, Christopher Flavelle, and Lisa Friedman. 2019. “Commerce Chief 
Threatened Firings at NOAA After Trump’s Dorian Tweets, Sources Say.” The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/climate/hurricane-dorian-
trump-tweet.html (April 25, 2020). 
Baker, Peter, Lisa Friedman, and Christopher Flavelle. 2019. “Trump Pressed Top Aide 
to Have Weather Service ‘Clarify’ Forecast That Contradicted Trump.” The New 
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/us/politics/trump-alabama-
noaa.html (April 25, 2020). 
 214 
Barber, Michael J. 2016. “Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization 
of American Legislatures.” The Journal of Politics 78(1): 296–310. 
Barber, Michael, and Nolan McCarty. 2015. “Causes and Consequences of Polarization.” 
In Political Negotiation: A Handbook, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution 
Press, 39–43. 
Barbose, Galen. 2018. U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards: 2018 Annual Status Report. 
Lawrence Berkeley National Labratory. 
Baumgartner, Frank R. et al. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, 
and Why. University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., Suzanna De Boef, and Amber E. Boydstun. 2008. The Decline of 
the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American 
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2015. The Politics of Information: Problem Definition and the Course of Public 
Policy in America. University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., Bryan D. Jones, and John D. Wilkerson. 2002. “Studying Policy 
Dynamics.” In Policy Dynamics, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 29–
46. 
Bawn, K. 1997. “Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, 
Oversight, and the Committee System.” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 13(1): 101–26. 
Bawn, Kathleen et al. 2012. “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and 
Nominations in American Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 10(3): 571–97. 
Beach, William W., David Kreutzer, Karen Campbell, and Ben Lieberman. 2009. Son of 
Waxman-Markey: More Politics Makes for a More Costly Bill. Heritage 
Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/son-waxman-
markey-more-politics-makes-more-costly-bill. 
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-
Series Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89(3): 634–47. 
Bertelli, Anthony M., and Jeffrey B. Wenger. 2009. “Demanding Information: Think 
Tanks and the US Congress.” British Journal of Political Science 39(02): 225. 
 215 
Bevan, Shaun, and Will Jennings. 2014. “Representation, Agendas and Institutions.” 
European Journal of Political Research 53(1): 37–56. 
Bevan, Shaun, and Anne Rasmussen. 2017. “When Does Government Listen to the 
Public? Voluntary Associations and Dynamic Agenda Representation in the 
United States.” Policy Studies Journal 00(00): 1–22. 
Birnbaum, Jeffrey H., and Alan S. Murray. 1988. Showdown at Gucci Gulch: 
Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform. 1st Vintage 
Books ed. New York: Vintage Books. 
Blake, Aaron. 2013. “Jason Richwine Resigns from Heritage Foundation.” Washington 
Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/05/10/jason-
richwine-resigns-from-heritage-foundation/ (February 27, 2020). 
Bolsen, Toby, and Matthew A. Shapiro. 2018. “The US News Media, Polarization on 
Climate Change, and Pathways to Effective Communication.” Environmental 
Communication 12(2): 149–63. 
Bonds, Eric. 2016. “Beyond Denialism: Think Tank Approaches to Climate Change.” 
Sociology Compass 10(4): 306–17. 
Boussalis, Constantine, and Travis G. Coan. 2016. “Text-Mining the Signals of Climate 
Change Doubt.” Global Environmental Change 36: 89–100. 
Boykoff, Maxwell T, and Jules M Boykoff. 2004. “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and 
the US Prestige Press.” Global Environmental Change 14(2): 125–36. 
Braml, Josef. 2006. “U.S. and German Think Tanks in Comparative Perspective.” 
German Policy Studies 3(3): 222. 
Brown, Heath. 2011. “Interest Groups and Presidential Transitions.” Congress & the 
Presidency 38(2): 152–70. 
Brudnick, Ida. 2008. The Congressional Research Service and the American Legislative 
Process. Congressional Research Service. 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/511/. 
Brulle, Robert J. 2014. “Institutionalizing Delay: Foundation Funding and the Creation of 
U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations.” Climatic Change 
122(4): 681–94. 
———. 2018. “The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis of Lobbying Spending on 
Climate Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016.” Climatic Change 149(3): 289–303. 
 216 
Cama, Timothy. 2016. “Trump Asked for ‘meaningful’ Climate Change Policy in 2009 | 
TheHill.” The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/282782-trump-
asked-for-meaningful-climate-change-policy-in-2009 (April 22, 2020). 
Campbell, John L., and Ove K. Pedersen. 2014. The National Origins of Policy Ideas: 
Knowledge Regimes in the United States, France, Germany, and Denmark. 
Princeton University Press. 
Caperton, Richard W. 2012. Renewable Energy Standards Deliver Affordable, Clean 
Power. Center for American Progress. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2012/04/11/11397/renewa
ble-energy-standards-deliver-affordable-clean-power/ (February 11, 2020). 
Capretta, James. 2010. The Real Budgetary Impact of the House and Senate Health Bills. 
Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/the-real-
budgetary-impact-the-house-and-senate-health-bills (February 6, 2020). 
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1990. Issue Evolution: Race and the 
Transformation of American Politics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, 
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton 
University Press. 
CBO. 2010. H.R. 4872, Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Final Health Care Legislation). 
Congressional Budget Office. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/21351. 
———. 2016. Federal Subsidies for Health Insurance Coverage for People Under Age 
65: 2016 to 2026. Congressional Budget Office. 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51385 (February 24, 2020). 
Clement, Joel. 2017. “Opinion | I’m a Scientist. I’m Blowing the Whistle on the Trump 





Clinton, Joshua D., and John Lapinski. 2008. “Laws and Roll Calls in the U.S. Congress, 
1891–1994.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 33(4): 511–41. 
Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2009. The Party Decides: 
Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform. University of Chicago Press. 
 217 




Cooke, Morris L. 1915. “Scientific Management of the Public Business.” The American 
Political Science Review 9(3): 488–95. 
Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party 
Government in the House. 1. Aufl. Berkely, Calif.: Univ. of California Press. 
Curry, James M. 2015. Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of 
Representatives. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Cutler, David M., Karen Davis, and Kristof Stremikis. 2010. The Impact of Health 
Reform on Health System Spending. Center for American Progress. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2010/05/21/7731/the-
impact-of-health-reform-on-health-system-spending/ (February 6, 2020). 
Daschle, Thomas. 2008. Critical: What We Can Do about the Health-Care Crisis. 1st ed. 
New York: Thomas Dunne Books. 
Davenport, Coral. 2017. “With Trump in Charge, Climate Change References Purged 
From Website.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-white-house-website.html 
(April 25, 2020). 
DeGood, Kevin. 2019. Why an All-of-the-Above Transportation Strategy Doesn’t Work. 
Center for American Progress. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/11/13/477004/tra
nsportation-strategy-doesnt-work/ (March 11, 2020). 
Desmarais, Bruce A., Raymond J. La Raja, and Michael S. Kowal. 2015. “The Fates of 
Challengers in U.S. House Elections: The Role of Extended Party Networks in 
Supporting Candidates and Shaping Electoral Outcomes.” American Journal of 
Political Science 59(1): 194–211. 
Devlin, Bernie, ed. 1997. Intelligence, Genes, and Success: Scientists Respond to The 
Bell Curve. New York: Springer. 
Dimock, Michael, Carol Doherty, Jocelyn Kiley, and Russ Oates. 2014. “Polarization in 
the American Public.” Pew Research Institute. https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf. 
 218 
Dionne, E.J. 2019. “Bob Greenstein’s Life Proves the Washington Cynics Wrong.” 
Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bob-greensteins-
life-proves-the-washington-cynics-wrong/2019/12/29/a80d83a8-28b4-11ea-9c21-
2c2a4d2c2166_story.html (March 19, 2020). 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy.” 
Journal of Political Economy 65(2): 135–50. 
Dreyfuss, Bob. 2004. “An Idea Factory for the Democrats.” 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/idea-factory-democrats/ (January 31, 
2020). 
Druckman, James N., and Mary C. McGrath. 2019. “The Evidence for Motivated 
Reasoning in Climate Change Preference Formation.” Nature Climate Change 
9(2): 111–19. 
Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. “How Elite Partisan 
Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation.” American Political Science 
Review 107(1): 57–79. 
Dumitrescu, Elena-Ivona, and Christophe Hurlin. 2012. “Testing for Granger Non-
Causality in Heterogeneous Panels.” Economic Modelling 29(4): 1450–60. 
Dunlap, Riley E., and Peter J. Jacques. 2013. “Climate Change Denial Books and 
Conservative Think Tanks: Exploring the Connection.” American Behavioral 
Scientist 57(6): 699–731. 
Economic Impacts of S. 1733: The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009. 
2009. Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2016-
07/documents/epa_s1733_analysis.pdf. 
Edwards, Lee. 1997. The Power of Ideas: The Heritage Foundation at 25 Years. Ottawa, 
Ill: Jameson Books. 
Egan, Patrick J. 2013. Partisan Priorities: How Issue Ownership Drives and Distorts 
American Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2014. “‘Do Something’ Politics and Double-Peaked Policy Preferences.” The 
Journal of Politics 76(2): 333–49. 
Enchautegui, Maria E., Stephen Lindner, and Erika Poethig. 2013. Understanding the 




Energy Market and Economic Impacts of H.R. 2454. 2009. Energy Information Agency. 
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/2009/hr2454/pdf/sroiaf(2009)05.pdf. 
Erickson, Rosemary J., and Rita J. Simon. 1998. The Use of Social Science Data in 
Supreme Court Decisions. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Esterling, Kevin M. 2007. “Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to 
Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees.” American Political Science 
Review 101(1): 93–109. 
Evich, Helena Bottemiller. 2019. “Agriculture Department Buries Studies Showing 
Dangers of Climate Change.” POLITICO. https://politi.co/2Y7bKDR (April 25, 
2020). 
Fagan, E. J. 2018. “Marching Orders? U.S. Party Platforms and Legislative Agenda 
Setting 1948–2014.” Political Research Quarterly 71(4): 949–59. 
———. 2019. “Issue Ownership and the Priorities of Party Elites in the United States, 
2004–2016.” Party Politics: 1354068819839212. 
Fagan, E. J., Bryan D. Jones, and Christopher Wlezien. 2017. “Representative Systems 
and Policy Punctuations.” Journal of European Public Policy 24(6): 809–31. 
Fagan, E. J., Zachary A. McGee, and Herschel F. Thomas. 2019. “The Power of the 
Party: Conflict Expansion and the Agenda Diversity of Interest Groups.” Political 
Research Quarterly: 1065912919867142. 
Farrell, Justin. 2015. “Corporate Funding and Ideological Polarization about Climate 
Change.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences: 201509433. 
Fernholz, Tim. 2010. “Dems Versus the Deficit.” The American Prospect. 
https://prospect.org/api/content/586715ce-ef0e-5543-9cac-5d743597fc7d/ (March 
19, 2020). 
Feulner, Edwin. 2000. “The Heritage Foundation.” In Think Tanks and Civil Societies: 
Catalysts for Ideas and Actions, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 67–
84. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 2017. Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party Sorting, and Political 
Stalemate. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University. 
Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2011. Culture War? The Myth of 
a Polarized America. 3rd ed. Boston, MA: Longman. 
 220 
Fisher, Dana R., Joseph Waggle, and Philip Leifeld. 2013. “Where Does Political 
Polarization Come From? Locating Polarization Within the U.S. Climate Change 
Debate.” American Behavioral Scientist 57(1): 70–92. 
Friedman, Joel, and Chad Stone. 2017. Republican Tax Plans Cost More — and Add Less 
to Growth — Than Proponents Claim. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/republican-tax-plans-cost-more-and-
add-less-to-growth-than-proponents-claim (March 7, 2020). 
Friedman, Lisa. 2019. “E.P.A. to Limit Science Used to Write Public Health Rules.” The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/climate/epa-science-
trump.html (April 25, 2020). 
Froio, Caterina, Shaun Bevan, and Will Jennings. 2017. “Party Mandates and the Politics 
of Attention: Party Platforms, Public Priorities and the Policy Agenda in Britain.” 
Party Politics 23(6): 692–703. 
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012. Learning While Governing: Expertise and 
Accountability in the Executive Branch. University of Chicago Press. 
Gattuso, James. 2017. Debunking the Left’s Myths on Net Neutrality. Heritage 
Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/government-
regulation/commentary/debunking-the-lefts-myths-net-neutrality (March 11, 
2020). 
Gayner, Jeffrey. 1995. “The Contract with America: Implementing New Ideas in the 
U.S.” The Heritage Foundation. /political-process/report/the-contract-america-
implementing-new-ideas-the-us (March 19, 2019). 
Gerring, John. 2001. Party Ideologies in America, 1828 - 1996. Reprinted. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Glastris, Paul, and Haley Sweetland Edwards. 2014. “The Big Lobotomy.” Washington 
Monthly June/July/August 2014. 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaug-2014/the-big-lobotomy/ 
(March 11, 2019). 
Glazier, Rebecca A., and Amber E. Boydstun. 2012. “The President, the Press, and the 
War: A Tale of Two Framing Agendas.” Political Communication 29(4): 428–46. 
Graves, Lucia. 2012. “Controversial Billboard Prompts Internal Rifts At Heartland.” 
HuffPost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/heartland-institute-insurance-
billboard_n_1510031 (April 25, 2020). 
 221 
Green, Mark, and Michele Jolin. 2006. Change for America: A Progressive Blueprint for 
the 44th President. 1st ed. Philadelphia, PA: Basic Books. 
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Peter B. Mortensen. 2010. “Who Sets the Agenda and 
Who Responds to It in the Danish Parliament? A New Model of Issue 
Competition and Agenda-Setting.” European Journal of Political Research 49(2): 
257–81. 
Groseclose, Tim, and Jeffrey Milyo. 2005. “A Measure of Media Bias.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120(4): 1191–1237. 
Grossmann, Matt. 2014. Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American 
Policy Change since 1945. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, USA. 
Grossmann, Matt, and Casey B. K. Dominguez. 2009. “Party Coalitions and Interest 
Group Networks.” American Politics Research 37(5): 767–800. 
Grossmann, Matt, and David A. Hopkins. 2016. Asymmetric Politics: Ideological 
Republicans and Group Interest Democrats. Oxford University Press. 
Guber, Deborah Lynn. 2013. “A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the 
Politics of Global Warming.” American Behavioral Scientist 57(1): 93–115. 
Haas, Eric. 2007. “False Equivalency: Think Tank References on Education in the News 
Media.” Peabody Journal of Education 82(1): 63–102. 
Hacker, Jacob S. 2010. “The Road to Somewhere: Why Health Reform Happened: Or 
Why Political Scientists Who Write about Public Policy Shouldn’t Assume They 
Know How to Shape It.” Perspectives on Politics 8(3): 861–76. 
Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy.” 
American Political Science Review 100(1): 69–84. 
Hamilton, Lawrence C. 2011. “Education, Politics and Opinions about Climate Change 
Evidence for Interaction Effects.” Climatic Change 104(2): 231–42. 
Harrington, Scott. 2010. The Health Insurance Reform Debate | AEI. American 
Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/articles/the-health-insurance-reform-
debate/ (February 24, 2020). 
Heckman, James J. 1995. “Lessons from the Bell Curve.” Journal of Political Economy 
103(5): 1091–1120. 
 222 
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander. 2019. State Capture: How Conservative Activists, Big 
Businesses, and Wealthy Donors Reshaped the American States, and the Nation. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, and Cathie Jo Martin. 2018. “How Employers and 
Conservatives Shaped the Modern Tax State.” In Worlds of Taxation: The 
Political Economy of Taxing, Spending, and Redistribution Since 1945, Palgrave 
Studies in the History of Finance, eds. Gisela Huerlimann, W. Elliot Brownlee, 
and Eisaku Ide. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 17–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90263-0_2 (April 10, 2019). 
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, Matto Mildenberger, and Leah C. Stokes. 2019. 
“Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress.” American Political Science 
Review 113(1): 1–18. 
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, Theda Skocpol, and Daniel Lynch. 2016. “Business 
Associations, Conservative Networks, and the Ongoing Republican War Over 
Medicaid Expansion.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 41(2): 239–86. 
Hickey, Emily A., and J. Lon Carlson. 2010. “An Analysis of Trends in Restructuring of 
Electricity Markets.” The Electricity Journal 23(5): 47–56. 
Hirano, Shigeo, James Snyder, Stephen Ansolabehere, and John Mark Hansen. 2010. 
“Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress.” Quarterly 
Journal of Political Science 5(2): 169–91. 
Holcombe, Randall G. 1980. “An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model.” Economic 
Inquiry 18(2): 260–74. 
Howell, Katie. 2010. “Frustration on Senate’s Failure to Act on Energy Policy May Pave 
Way for ‘Clean Energy Standard.’” The New York Times. 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/14/14greenwire-
frustration-on-senates-failure-to-act-on-energ-90076.html?pagewanted=all 
(February 13, 2020). 
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional 
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
IMF Fiscal Monitor Update: As Downside Risks Rise, Fiscal Policy Has To Walk a 
Narrow Path, January 2012. 2012. International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Monitor. 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2016/12/31/As-Downside-Risks-
Rise-Fiscal-Policy-Has-To-Walk-a-Narrow-Path (April 21, 2020). 
 223 
Jacobson, Gary C. 2015. “It’s Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency 
Advantage in US House Elections.” The Journal of Politics 77(3): 861–73. 
Jacques, Peter J., Riley E. Dunlap, and Mark Freeman. 2008. “The Organisation of 
Denial: Conservative Think Tanks and Environmental Scepticism.” 
Environmental Politics 17(3): 349–85. 
Jennings, Will. 2009. “The Public Thermostat, Political Responsiveness and Error-
Correction: Border Control and Asylum in Britain, 1994-2007.” British Journal of 
Political Science 39(4): 847–70. 
Jochim, Ashley E., and Bryan D. Jones. 2013. “Issue Politics in a Polarized Congress.” 
Political Research Quarterly 66(2): 352–69. 
Jones, Bryan D. 2001. Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and 
Governance. University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2005. The Politics of Attention: How 
Government Prioritizes Problems. University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., Sean M. Theriault, and Michelle Whyman. 2019. The Great 
Broadening: How the Vast Expansion of the Policy-Making Agenda Transformed 
American Politics. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Jones, Bryan D., and Walter Williams. 2008. The Politics of Bad Ideas: The Great Tax 
Cut Delusion and the Decline of Good Government in America. New York: 
Pearson Longman. 
Karni, Annie. 2016. “2016 Election: Ken Salazar to Lead Hillary Clinton’s Transition 
Team.” POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/clinton-transition-
team-white-house-salazar-227044 (March 18, 2020). 
Karol, David. 2009. Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management. 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2019. Red, Green, and Blue: The Partisan Divide on Environmental Issues. 
Kevin Kosar. 2016. “Restoring Congress as the First Branch.” R Street Policy Study 50. 
https://www.rstreet.org/2016/01/28/restoring-congress-as-the-first-branch/ 
(December 6, 2018). 
Key, V.O. 1964. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th Edition. New York, NY: 
Crowell. 
 224 
Klein, Philip. 2017. “Mick Mulvaney: The Day of the CBO ‘Has Probably Come and 
Gone.’” Washington Examiner. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/mick-
mulvaney-the-day-of-the-cbo-has-probably-come-and-gone (April 25, 2020). 
Klüver, Heike, and Christine Mahoney. 2015. “Measuring Interest Group Framing 
Strategies in Public Policy Debates.” Journal of Public Policy 35(2): 223–44. 
Koger, Gregory, Seth Masket, and Hans Noel. 2009. “Partisan Webs: Information 
Exchange and Party Networks.” British Journal of Political Science 39(3): 633–
53. 
———. 2010. “Cooperative Party Factions in American Politics.” American Politics 
Research 38(1): 33–53. 
Kousser, Thad, Scott Lucas, Seth Masket, and Eric McGhee. 2015. “Kingmakers or 
Cheerleaders? Party Power and the Causal Effects of Endorsements.” Political 
Research Quarterly 68(3): 443–56. 
Krehbiel, Keith. 2006. Information and Legislative Organization. Nachdr. Ann Arbor: 
Univ. of Michigan Press. 
Kreutzer, David et al. 2010. A Renewable Electricity Standard: What It Will Really Cost 
Americans. Heritage Foundation. 
https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/renewable-electricity-standard-
what-it-will-really-cost-americans (February 11, 2020). 
Kunda, Ziva. 1990. “The Case for Motivated Reasoning.” Psychological Bulletin 108(3): 
480–98. 
LaMarche, Gara. 2014. “How the Left Is Revitalizing Itself.” 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-left-revitalizing-itself/ (March 19, 
2020). 
Lane, Lee. 2009. “What Will the Climate Bill Cost?” American Enterprise Institute - 
AEI. https://www.aei.org/economics/us-economy/what-will-the-climate-bill-cost/ 
(February 11, 2020). 
Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. “Party Polarization and ‘Conflict 
Extension’ in the American Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 
46(4): 786–802. 
Layman, Geoffrey C., Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz. 2006. 
“PARTY POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: Characteristics, Causes, 
and Consequences.” Annual Review of Political Science 9(1): 83–110. 
 225 
Lee, Frances E. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. 
Senate. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2016. Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago 
London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Levendusky, Matthew, and Neil Malhotra. 2016. “Does Media Coverage of Partisan 
Polarization Affect Political Attitudes?” Political Communication 33(2): 283–
301. 
Lewallen, Jonathan, Sean M. Theriault, and Bryan D. Jones. 2016. “Congressional 
Dysfunction: An Information Processing Perspective: Congressional Dysfunction 
and Hearings.” Regulation & Governance 10(2): 179–90. 
Lewis, Jeffrey B. et al. 2019. “Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database.” 
https://www.voteview.com (March 19, 2019). 
Limbaugh, Rush. 2013. “We’ve Been Played on Immigration.” The Rush Limbaugh 
Show. 
https://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2013/06/13/we_ve_been_played_on_immig
ration/ (February 17, 2020). 
Lindaman, Kara, and Donald P. Haider-Markel. 2002. “Issue Evolution, Political Parties, 
and the Culture Wars.” Political Research Quarterly 55(1): 91–110. 
Lovett, John, Shaun Bevan, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2015. “Popular Presidents Can 
Affect Congressional Attention, for a Little While: Presidents Can Affect 
Congressional Attention.” Policy Studies Journal 43(1): 22–43. 
Lubienski, Christopher, T. Jameson Brewer, and Priya Goel La Londe. 2016. 
“Orchestrating Policy Ideas: Philanthropies and Think Tanks in US Education 
Policy Advocacy Networks.” The Australian Educational Researcher 43(1): 55–
73. 
Lueck, Sarah et al. 2010. Health Reform Package Represents Historic Chance to Expand 
Coverage, Improve Insurance Markets, Slow Cost Growth, and Reduce Deficits. 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. https://www.cbpp.org/research/health-
reform-package-represents-historic-chance-to-expand-coverage-improve-
insurance (February 25, 2020). 
Lynch, Robert, and Patrick Oakford. 2013. The Economic Effects of Granting Legal 




Mai, Trieu et al. 2016. A Prospective Analysis of the Costs, Benefits, and Impacts of U.S. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards. National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), 
Golden, CO (United States). https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1364225 (February 5, 
2020). 
Manento, Cory. 2019. “Party Crashers: Interest Groups as a Latent Threat to Party 
Networks in Congressional Primaries.” Party Politics: 1354068819834528. 
Marmor, Theodore. 2014. “Book Review: Critical: What We Can Do About the Health-
Care Crisis.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 25(2): 481. 
Mason, Lilliana. 2018. Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. Chicago, 
Illinois ; London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Matthews, Dylan. 2013a. “Heritage Says Immigration Reform Will Cost $5.3 Trillion. 
Here’s Why That’s Wrong.” Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/05/06/heritage-says-
immigration-reform-will-cost-5-3-trillion-heres-why-thats-wrong/ (February 27, 
2020). 
———. 2013b. “Heritage Study Co-Author Opposed Letting in Immigrants with Low 
IQs.” Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/05/08/heritage-study-co-
author-opposed-letting-in-immigrants-with-low-iqs/ (February 27, 2020). 
———. 2018. “What Liberals Won in the Budget Deal, According to a Leading Liberal 
Wonk.” Vox. https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/2/8/16987128/congress-spending-deal-budget-bipartisan-robert-
greenstein-cbpp (March 19, 2020). 
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
———. 2005. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-
2002. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The 
Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
———. 2009. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?” American Journal of 
Political Science 53(3): 666–80. 
McClosky, Herbert, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O’Hara. 1960. “Issue Conflict and 
Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers1.” American Political Science 
Review 54(2): 406–27. 
 227 
McCright, Aaron M. 2016. “Anti-Reflexivity and Climate Change Skepticism in the US 
General Public.” Human Ecology Review 22(2): 77–108. 
McCright, Aaron M., and Riley E. Dunlap. 2003. “Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative 
Movement’s Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy.” Social Problems 50(3): 
348–73. 
———. 2011. “The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American 
Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010.” The Sociological Quarterly 
52(2): 155–94. 
Mccrimmon, Ryan. 2019. “Economists Flee Agriculture Dept. after Feeling Punished 
under Trump.” POLITICO. https://politi.co/2J4A6tU (April 25, 2020). 
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political 
Science 28(1): 165–79. 
McDonald, Lauren. 2014. “Think Tanks and the Media: How the Conservative 
Movement Gained Entry Into the Education Policy Arena.” Educational Policy 
28(6): 845–80. 
McGann, James. 2016. The Fifth Estate: Think Tanks, Public Policy, and Governance. 
Brookings Institution Press. 
———. 2019. 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. University of Pennsylvania: 
Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=think_tan
ks. 
McGann, James, and R. Kent Weaver, eds. 2000. Think Tanks and Civil Societies: 
Catalysts for Ideas and Action. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
McGhee, Eric et al. 2014. “A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and 
Legislator Ideology.” American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 337–51. 
Medvetz, Thomas. 2014. Think Tanks in America. Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Pr. 
Meltzer, C. C. 2011. “Summary of the Affordable Care Act.” American Journal of 
Neuroradiology 32(7): 1165–66. 
Merkley, Eric, and Dominik A. Stecula. 2018. “Party Elites or Manufactured Doubt? The 
Informational Context of Climate Change Polarization.” Science Communication 
40(2): 258–74. 
 228 
Mettler, Suzanne. 2011. The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies 
Undermine American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mills, Russell W., and Jennifer L. Selin. 2017. “Don’t Sweat the Details! Enhancing 
Congressional Committee Expertise Through the Use of Detailees.” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 42(4): 611–36. 
Mooney, Christopher Z. 1991. “Information Sources in State Legislative Decision 
Making.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 16(3): 445–55. 
Moore, Stephen. 2020. “Mass Transit Is Making Gridlock Worse.” RealClearPolitics. 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/03/03/mass_transit_is_making_gr
idlock_worse_142549.html (March 11, 2020). 
Mortensen, Peter B. 2013. “Public Sector Reform and Blame Avoidance Effects.” 
Journal of Public Policy 33(2): 229–53. 
Mortensen, Peter Bjerre et al. 2011. “Comparing Government Agendas: Executive 
Speeches in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Denmark.” Comparative 
Political Studies 44(8): 973–1000. 
Mynatt, Clifford R., Michael E. Doherty, and Ryan D. Tweney. 1977. “Confirmation 
Bias in a Simulated Research Environment: An Experimental Study of Scientific 
Inference.” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 29(1): 85–95. 
Neubauer, Robert. 2011. “Manufacturing Junk: Think Tanks, Climate Denial, and 
Neoliberal Hegemony.” Australian Journal of Communication 38(3): 65. 
Nichols, John. 2016. “The Democratic Platform Committee Now Has a Progressive 
Majority. Thanks, Bernie Sanders.” 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/sanders-picks-and-allies-could-write-a-
boldly-progressive-platform/ (March 18, 2020). 
Nickerson, Raymond S. 1998. “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises.” Review of General Psychology 2(2): 175–220. 
Noel, Hans. 2014. Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America. Cambridge 
University Press. 
O’Connor, Brendon. 2001. “The Intellectual Origins of ‘Welfare Dependency.’” 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 36(3): 221–36. 
Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. 2011. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of 
Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. 
Paperback edition. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press. 
 229 
Page, Benjamin I., Jason Seawright, and Matthew J. Lacombe. 2019. Billionaires and 
Stealth Politics. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Page, Benjamin R. et al. 2017. Macroeconomic Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. 
Tax Policy Center. 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/95491/macroeconomic_anal
ysis_of_the_tax_cuts_and_jobs_act_conference_12-20.pdf. 
Palmer, Anna, and Kenneth P. Vogel. 2013. “Heritage Does Damage Control.” 
POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/heritage-foundation-
immigration-reform-91148.html (February 19, 2020). 
Paltsev, Sergey, John M. Reilly, Henry D. Jacoby, and Jennifer F. Morris. 2009. The Cost 
of Climate Policy in the United States. MIT Joint Program on the Science and 
Policy of Global Change. Report. 
Peach, Sara. 2011. “2012 GOP Candidates Demonstrate Dramatic Political Shift on 
Climate » Yale Climate Connections.” Yale Climate Connections. 
https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2011/11/2012-gop-candidates-
demonstrate-dramatic-political-shift-on-climate/ (April 22, 2020). 
Pear, Robert. 2008. “Health Care Policy Is in Hands of an Ex-Senator.” The New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/us/politics/12daschle.html (January 
27, 2020). 
Plumer, Brad, and Coral Davenport. 2019. “Science Under Attack: How Trump Is 
Sidelining Researchers and Their Work.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/climate/trump-administration-war-on-
science.html (April 25, 2020). 
Podesta, John. 2008. Green Recovery. Center for American Progress. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2008/09/09/4929/green-
recovery/ (January 27, 2020). 
Pollin, Robert, James Heintz, and Heidi Garrett-Peltier. 2009. The Economic Benefits of 
Investing in Clean Energy. Center for American Progress. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2009/06/18/6192/the-
economic-benefits-of-investing-in-clean-energy/ (February 6, 2020). 
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. “The Polarization of American Politics.” 
The Journal of Politics 46(4): 1061–79. 
Prasad, Monica. 2018. Starving the Beast: Ronald Reagan and the Tax Cut Revolution. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 230 
RAND. 2010. Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (HR 3590). 
RAND Corporation. Policy Brief. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2010/RAND_RB95
14.pdf. 
Ricci, David M. 1993. The Transformation of American Politics: The New Washington 
and the Rise of Think Tanks. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Rich, Andrew. 2005. Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rich, Andrew, and R. Kent Weaver. 2000. “Think Tanks in the U.S. Media.” Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics 5(4): 81–103. 
Richwine, Jason, and Robert Rector. 2013. The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and 
Amnesty to the U.S. Taxpayer. The Heritage Foundation. 
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-
and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer (February 11, 2020). 
Ringe, Nils, Jennifer Nicoll Victor, and Justin H. Gross. 2013. “Keeping Your Friends 
Close and Your Enemies Closer? Information Networks in Legislative Politics.” 
British Journal of Political Science 43(3): 601–28. 
Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rose, Max, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2013. “Framing the Poor: Media Coverage and 
U.S. Poverty Policy, 1960–2008.” Policy Studies Journal 41(1): 22–53. 
Rosenfeld, Sam. 2018. The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era. 
Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press. 
Rowell, Alex, and rew Schwartz. 2017. Millions of Working- and Middle-Class 




(March 7, 2020). 
S. 744: Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernizaiton Act. 
2013. Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation. Cost 
Estimate. http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/s744.pdf. 
 231 
Santorum, Rick. 2012. “Rick Santorum Values Voter Summit Speech Transcript (Full 
Text).” Presented at the Value Voters Summit. 
https://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81256.html (March 12, 2020). 
Savage, Charlie. 2008. “John Podesta, Shepherd of a Government in Exile.” The New 
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/politics/07podesta.html 
(January 31, 2020). 
Schattschneider, E. E. 1942. Party Government. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. 
Scherer, Michael. 2008. “Inside Obama’s Idea Factory in Washington.” Time. 
http://content.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1861305,00.html. 
Schickler, Eric. 2016. Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 
1932-1965. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Schwartz, Mildred A. 1990. The Party Network: The Robust Organization of Illinois 
Republicans. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Shafran, JoBeth Surface. 2015. “Whirlpools of Information: Information Processing in 
Policy Subsystems 1995-2010.” Thesis. 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/33349 (October 23, 2017). 
Shannon, Brooke N., Zachary A. McGee, and Bryan D. Jones. 2019. “Bounded 
Rationality and Cognitive Limits in Political Decision Making.” Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics. 
https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-961 (November 15, 2019). 
Sheppard, Parker, and David Burton. 2017a. How the GOP Tax Bill Will Affect the 
Economy. Heritage Foundation. Issue Brief. 
https://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/how-the-gop-tax-bill-will-affect-the-
economy (March 7, 2020). 
———. 2017b. The Economic Impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Heritage 
Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/taxes/commentary/the-economic-impact-
the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act (March 7, 2020). 
Shepsle, Kenneth W. 1989. “The Changing Textbook Congress.” In Can the Government 
Govern, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 238–66. 
Shobe, Jarrod. 2017. “Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of 
Agencies in the Legislative Process.” George Washington Law Review 85: 451–
535. 
 232 
Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. Identity Crisis: The 2016 
Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Skibell, Arianna. 2017. “Q&A: Ex-Skeptic on the Libertarian Case for Climate Action.” 
Greenwire. https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056165 (April 25, 2020). 
Slothuus, Rune, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2010. “Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, 
and Issue Framing Effects.” The Journal of Politics 72(3): 630–45. 
Soroka, Stuart, and Christopher Wlezien. 2010. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public 
Opinion, and Policy. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2019. “Tracking the Coverage of Public Policy in Mass Media.” Policy Studies 
Journal 47(2): 471–91. 
Stahl, Jason M. 2016. Right Moves: The Conservative Think Tank in American Political 
Culture since 1945. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 
Stokes, Leah Cardamore. 2020. Short Circuiting Policy: Interest Groups and the Battle 
over Clean Energy and Climate Policy in the American States. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Stone, Chad, and Sharon Parrot. 2013. Examining the Congressional Budget Office Cost 
Estimate of the Senate Immigration Bill. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/examining-the-congressional-budget-office-cost-
estimate-of-the-senate-immigration-bill (February 11, 2020). 
Stone, Diane. 1996. Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy 
Process. London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass. 
Suskind, Ron. 2004. “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush.” The New 
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-
the-presidency-of-george-w-bush.html (March 12, 2020). 
Tesler, Michael. 2018. “Elite Domination of Public Doubts About Climate Change (Not 
Evolution).” Political Communication 35(2): 306–26. 
The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 




The Effects of Renewable or Clean Electricity Standards. 2011. Congressional Budget 
Office. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-
2012/reports/07-26-energy.pdf. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, as Reported by Conference Committee (12/15/17): Static and 
Dynamic Effects on the Budget and the Economy — Penn Wharton Budget Model. 
2017. Penn Wharton Budget Model. 
https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2017/12/18/the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-
act-reported-by-conference-committee-121517-preliminary-static-and-dynamic-
effects-on-the-budget-and-the-economy (March 7, 2020). 
Theriault, Sean M. 2003. “The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party Polarization in 
the Modern Congress.” https://msu.edu/~rohde/Theriault.pdf. 
Theriault, Sean M. 2006. “Party Polarization in the US Congress: Member Replacement 
and Member Adaptation.” Party Politics 12(4): 483–503. 
———. 2008. Party Polarization in Congress. Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2013. The Gingrich Senators. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thomsen, Danielle M. 2014. “Ideological Moderates Won’t Run: How Party Fit Matters 
for Partisan Polarization in Congress.” The Journal of Politics 76(3): 786–97. 
———. 2017. Opting out of Congress: Partisan Polarization and the Decline of 
Moderate Candidates. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 
Thunert, Martin. 2004. “Think Tanks in Germany.” In Think Tank Traditions: Policy 
Research and the Politics of Ideas, Manchester, UK: Manchester University 
Press. 
UNDP. 2003. Thinking the Unthinkable. Bratislava: United Nations Development 
Programme Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of the United 
States. 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2013. “Letter Regarding S. 744, the ‘Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013.’” 
https://www.uschamber.com/letter/letter-regarding-s-744-border-security-
economic-opportunity-and-immigration-modernization-act (February 17, 2020). 
Van De Water, Paul. 2010. Health Reform Essential for Reducing Deficit and Slowing 
Health Care Costs. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/health-reform-essential-for-reducing-deficit-and-
slowing-health-care-costs (February 25, 2020). 
 234 
Van De Water, Paul, and James R. Horney. 2010. Health Reform Will Reduce the Deficit. 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. https://www.cbpp.org/research/health-
reform-will-reduce-the-deficit (February 25, 2020). 
Victor, Jennifer Nicoll, and Nils Ringe. 2009. “The Social Utility of Informal Institutions: 
Caucuses as Networks in the 110th U.S. House of Representatives.” American 
Politics Research 37(5): 742–66. 
Voß, Jan-Peter. 2007. “Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of 
‘Emissions Trading’ as a New Policy Instrument.” Science and Public Policy 
34(5): 329–43. 
Watkins, Shanea, and Patrick Tyrrell. 2009. The Stimulus Bill: $825 Billion in Forgone 
Family Spending. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo. 
https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/the-stimulus-bill-825-
billion-forgone-family-spending (March 27, 2020). 
Weaver, R. Kent. 1986. “The Politics of Blame Avoidance*.” Journal of Public Policy 
6(4): 371–98. 
———. 1989. “The Changing World of Think Tanks.” PS: Political Science and Politics 
22(3): 563–78. 
Weidenbaum, Murray L. 2011. The Competition of Ideas: The World of the Washington 
Think Tanks. Paperback ed. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers. 
Williams, Walter. 1998. Honest Numbers and Democracy. Social Policy Analysis in the 
White House, Congress, and the Federal Agencies. Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press. 
Wilsok, V. Seymour. 1973. “The Relationship between Scientific Management and 
Personnel Policy in North American Administrative Systems.” Public 
Administration 51(2): 193–205. 
Wlezien, Christopher. 1995. “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for 
Spending.” American Journal of Political Science 39(4): 981–1000. 
Wolbrecht, Christina. 2000. The Politics of Women’s Rights: Parties, Positions, and 
Change. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2002. “Explaining Women’s Rights Realignment: Convention Delegates, 1972–
1992.” Political Behavior 24(3): 237–82. 
 235 
Wolbrecht, Christina, and Michael T. Hartney. 2014. “‘Ideas about Interests’: Explaining 
the Changing Partisan Politics of Education.” Perspectives on Politics 12(03): 
603–30. 
Wolfe, Michelle. 2012. “Putting on the Brakes or Pressing on the Gas? Media Attention 
and the Speed of Policymaking: Wolfe: Media Attention and the Speed of 
Policymaking.” Policy Studies Journal 40(1): 109–26. 
Wood, B. Dan, and Soren Jordan. 2017. Party Polarization in America: The War Over 
Two Social Contracts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781108164450 (February 25, 2019). 
Workman, Samuel. 2015. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy in the US Government. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Workman, Samuel, JoBeth Shafran, and Tracey Bark. 2017. “Problem Definition and 
Information Provision by Federal Bureaucrats.” Cognitive Systems Research 43: 
140–52. 
Ye, Jason. 2012. Summary of the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (S.2146). Center for 
Climate and Energy Solutions. https://www.c2es.org/document/summary-of-the-
clean-energy-standard-act-of-2012-s-2146/ (February 13, 2020). 
Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. 
Zelizer, Julian E. 2006. On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its 
Consequences, 1948-2000. 1st pbk. ed. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Zeller, Shawn. 2007. “Conservapedia: See Under ‘Right.’” The New York Times. 
Zycher, Benjamin. 2012. Wind and Solar Power, Part III: Chasing the Green Tail. 
American Enterprise Institute. https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/wind-
and-solar-power-part-iii-chasing-the-green-tail/ (February 11, 2020). 
 
